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Abstract
The first substantive chapter of this thesis studies the impact of a politician’s gender on 
the educational achievements of a representative sample of Indian citizens aged 13-39 
in 1999/2000. For this purpose I collected a unique and detailed dataset on politicians 
in India who contested in elections during 1967-2001 and I matched them to individuals 
by district of residence. These data allows me to identify close elections between women 
and men, which yield quasi-experimental election outcomes used to estimate the causal 
effect of a politician’s gender. I find that increasing female political representation 
by 10 percentage points increases the probability that an individual attains primary 
education in urban areas by 6 percentage points, which is 21% of the difference in 
primary education attainment between the richest and the poorest Indian states.
This framework is then applied in the second substantive chapter to analyze whether 
politicians in India favour individuals who share their same identity more than the 
rest in policy making. I do this by matching the politician’s identity to the identity 
of the beneficiaries of educational policies. I focus on the two groups that have lower 
educational achievements in India: women and the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. I 
use reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) and variation on 
female political representation in order to determine the politicians’ identity. Results 
show that caste reservations only have a positive effect on the education received by 
SC/ST individuals when the proportion of SC/ST population in the district is high. 
Female politicians increase girls’ education in urban areas. In addition when defin­
ing identity as gender and caste, results show that SC/ST female politicians increase 
women’s and SC/ST’s education while general female politicians increase women’s and 
general individuals’ education.
Given that development policies are taken by the state governments, in the third sub­
stantive chapter I use panel data from the 16 main states in India during the period
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1967-1999 to study the effects of having higher female representation in the State Leg­
islatures on public goods provided, laws enacted and expenditure. I find that both the 
politicians’ gender and caste matter for policy. Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
female legislators favour investments in primary education, and in beds in hospitals and 
dispensaries. They favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu 
Succession Act, proposed to give women the same inheritance rights as men and pro- 
poor redistributive policies such as land reforms. In contrast, general female legislators 
do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose land reforms, invest in higher 
tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In many countries in the world, women are underrepresented in all political positions. 
While the proportion of women who went to vote increased during the 1990s, women 
are still not well represented in political life. This PhD thesis analyses whether female 
representation in the State Assemblies in India matters for policy determination and, 
in consequence, development.
According to political economy models where candidates can commit to specific policies 
and only care about winning the elections, political decisions only reflect the electorate’s 
preferences (Downs 1957). In this case, female political representation should not have 
a differential impact on policy decisions as only the median voter preferences would 
matter. However, if complete policy commitment is absent the identity of the legislator 
matters for policy decisions (Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski 1996). 
These models predict that increasing a group’s political representation will increase its 
influence in policy.
The case of India constitutes a good example as the issue of female political repre­
sentation has recently gained importance there. Even if reservations for women are 
already taking place in Panchayats (local governments), in September 1996, the Indian 
Government introduced a Bill in Parliament, proposing the reservation of one third of 
the seats for women in the Lok Sabha (Central Government) and the State Assemblies. 
Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parliamentary sessions, 
without an agreement being reached. Those who are in favour of this reservation ar­
gue that increasing women’s political representation will ensure a better representation
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of their needs. Even those who oppose reservation acknowledge the fact that female 
politicians behave differently than male politicians.
In order to conduct this PhD thesis I take advantage of a very detailed dataset that 
I collected on politicians who contested seats in the 16 biggest states in India during 
1967-2001. In the first and second substantive chapters I combine this data with NSS 
survey data and census data. In the third I combine it with state level data on laws, 
public goods and expenditures.
Thorough this PhD thesis I have a common identification problem, which is to identify 
the causal effect of female politicians on outcomes. This is the case because there may be 
an omitted variable that affects both who is elected and the policy implemented. This 
omitted variable may be the electorate’s preferences. In order to solve this problem, in 
the three chapters I use a common identification strategy, which consists on using the 
fraction of seats won by a woman in a close election against a man as an instrument 
for the fraction of seats won by a woman. I define close elections as those in which 
the winner won the runner up by very few votes. The instrument is valid because the 
fact that a male or a female candidate won in a close election can be considered to be 
largely random, and therefore female candidates who won in a close election against a 
man will be elected in similar constituencies and under similar circumstances as male 
candidates who won in a close election against a woman.
The first substantive chapter studies the impact of a politician’s gender on the ed­
ucational achievements of a representative sample of Indian citizens aged 13-39 in 
1999/2000. India has very low educational attainments compared to other develop­
ing countries. Moreover, educational differences across genders, states and rural/urban 
areas are very large.
Education is mainly provided by the state governments, which can increase levels of 
education by changing the quantity and quality of education provided. Therefore, given 
that political institutions are very important for education and are formed by different 
types of politicians, it is important to understand whether some characteristics of these 
politicians determine the type of policies applied.
This chapter estimates the impact on an individual’s primary school attainment of the 
gender of the politicians who were in power in his or her district in India when he or 
she was young. The districts are a lower level of adm in istration  of the state and have
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educational offices; moreover the district is the best possible unit of analysis because it 
allows me to estimate the effect of female politicians in the smallest possible area where 
their electoral constituency is located.
I find that politicians’ gender matters for educational achievements. In particular, 
primary educational attainment is higher in urban areas when female political rep­
resentation is higher. In contrast, female representation does not have an effect on 
individuals living in rural areas. Increasing female political representation by 10 per­
centage points increases the probability that an individual attains primary education in 
urban areas by 6 percentage points, which is 21% of the difference in primary education 
attainment between the richest and the poorest Indian states. In addition, given that 
being a woman reduces the probability of attaining primary education by 6 percentage 
points, this is an important amount.
In a similar setting, the second substantive chapter analyses whether politicians in the 
state governments in India favour those citizens who belong to their groups in pol­
icymaking by studying the impact of a politician’s identity on the probability that 
individuals belonging to the politician’s identity group attain primary education. In 
particular, the chapter analyses whether having a politician of a particular group re­
duces educational inequalities between this group and the rest. It mainly focuses on 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) reservations and on female political 
representation, as women and Scheduled castes and Tribes are the groups who display 
lower educational attainments.
Results show that caste reservations had a negative effect on the education received 
by SC/ST individuals, but that this result is reversed when the proportion of SC/ST 
population in the district is high. Female politicians increase girls’ education in urban 
areas. When defining identity as gender and caste, results show that politicians target 
their own groups: SC/ST female politicians increase women’s and SC/ST’s education 
while general1 female politicians increase women’s and general individuals’ education.
Finally, and given that educational policies are taken at the state level, in the third 
substantive chapter I analyze whether state parliaments where women have higher 
representation adopt different policies than the rest, not only regarding education but 
also regarding other matters. State governments control most of the social and economic 
expenditure and have the power to implement most of the development policies in India.
1 General seats are non-reserved seats. General individuals are individuals that are not SC/ST.
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In this chapter the impact of both general and SC/ST female legislators will be identified 
separately, as they may have different policy preferences. In addition, if the cost of 
running for election is higher for women than for men, female legislators will probably 
belong to the elite. Thus, the fact that some seats are reserved for low castes allows me 
to identify separately the effect of low caste female legislators and to distinguish the 
gender effects from the class effects, as SC/ST female legislators will be poorer than 
general female legislators.
I find that both the politician’s gender and caste matter for policy. In particular, 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women legislators invest in primary education, 
by increasing the number of schools and teachers and favour “women-friendly” laws, 
such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, designed to give women the same 
inheritance rights as men. They also favour redistributive policies, such as land reforms. 
In contrast, general female legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, 
oppose land reforms, invest in higher tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.
The existing literature( e.g. Thomas (1991), Thomas and Welch (1991), Case (1998 & 
2000), Besley and Case (2000 &; 2002) and Rehavi (2003) for the US, Svaleryd (2002) for 
Sweden and Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) for India) provides evidence that male and 
female politicians choose different policies. The first substantive chapter contributes to 
this literature by providing evidence on the effect of female politicians on educational 
outcomes achieved by individuals living in the areas where those politicians where 
elected.
There is very little and conflicting evidence on whether politicians favour those who 
belong to their groups in policymaking, both for developed and developing countries. 
Besley et al (2004) and Bardhan et al (2005) have looked at the impact of caste reserva­
tions in local governments on public goods and policies received by lower caste house­
holds. Understanding the impact of the politician’s identity on who wins and who loses 
from the policies he or she implements may have important distributional implications. 
The second chapter contributes to this literature by defining the politicians’ identity 
by both gender and caste, which has not yet been done in the literature.
Finally, the third chapter contributes to literature on the legislator’s identity by identi­
fying gender and caste effects separately and finding that they both matter for policy, 
something which had not been done in the past.
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The methodology used in this PhD Thesis is closely related to the regression disconti­
nuity methodology, which has been widely used and was first introduced in the context 
of elections by Lee (2001) for incumbency advantage and Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) 
for the effect of party control on fiscal policies. Angrist and Lavy (1999) used regres­
sion discontinuity as an instrument to estimate the impact of class size on educational 
achievements. Rehavi (2003) used close elections between women and men in the US 
as an instrument to estimate the effect of female politicians at the state level on US 
policies.
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Chapter 2
Are Female Leaders Good for 
Education?
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the impact of a politician’s gender on the educational achievements 
of a representative sample of Indian citizens aged 13-39 in 1999/2000. The motivation 
behind the chapter is twofold. First, education is very important for growth in de­
veloping countries; in light of this, the Millennium Development Goals want to ensure 
universal primary education by 2015. India accounts for more than one third of the 
world’s poor and it has very low educational attainments. The adult literacy rate in 
2003 was 61%, roughly the same as that in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area which is 1.5 
times poorer. Moreover, the female literacy rate was 47%, lower than the 52% observed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Human Development Report 2005). Educational differences are 
not only large across genders, but across states and rural/urban areas.
Education is mainly provided by the government, which can increase levels of education 
by implementing appropriate policies. Therefore, given that political institutions are 
key for education and are formed by different types of politicians, it is important to 
understand whether some characteristics of these politicians determine the type of 
policies applied.
Second, it is important to study whether a politician’s gender does make a difference. 
The issue of female political representation has been increasingly important in India.
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In fact, reservation for women both in the national and the states’ governments has 
been debated since 1996, even if it has already started in local governments. According 
to citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate 1997 and Osborne and Slivinski 1996), 
the legislator’s identity matters for policy determination. The evidence from developed 
countries shows that female and male legislators make different policy decisions.1 In 
a traditional society like India’s, where gender roles are very different, these roles are 
likely to shape women’s preferences and therefore lead to different behaviour once in 
government.
To assess whether a politician’s gender matters for educational outcomes I collected a 
detailed dataset on 29686 politicians who contested seats in the 16 biggest states in 
India during 1967-2001. I combine these data with NSS survey data to estimate the 
impact on an individual’s primary school attainment of the gender of the politicians 
who were in power in his or her district in India when he or she was young. The 
district is the best unit of analysis because it allows me to estimate the effect of female 
politicians in the smallest possible area where their electoral constituency is located. 
Moreover, given that Indian districts are the lower level of administration and have 
educational offices; legislators in a particular district could also direct funds to these 
offices, having an impact not only on their constituencies but on the overall district. 
The big advantage of this dataset is that allows me to identify, not only the effect of 
female politicians, but the effect of female politicians on educational outcomes achieved 
by individuals living in the areas where they were elected.
The key challenge is to identify empirically the causal effect of female politicians on an 
individual’s education. This is difficult because omitted variables are likely to affect 
both electoral outcomes and policy. To identify the effect of female representation I 
instrument the share of constituencies in the district won by a female politician with 
the share of constituencies in the district won by a female politician in a close election 
against a male politician. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner led 
the runner-up by very few votes. The instrument is valid because the fact that a male or 
a female candidate won in a close election can be considered to be largely random, and 
therefore female candidates who won in a close election against a man will be elected 
in similar constituencies and under similar circumstances as male candidates who won 
in a close election against a woman.
1For example, see Thomas (1991), Thomas and Welch (1991), Case (1998 & 2000), Besley and Case 
(2000 & 2002) and Rehavi (2003) for the US and Svaleryd (2002) for Sweden.
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I find that the politician’s gender matters for educational achievements. In partic­
ular, primary educational attainment is higher in urban areas when female political 
representation is higher. In contrast, female representation does not have an effect on 
individuals living in rural areas. Increasing female political representation by 10 per­
centage points increases the probability that an individual attains primary education in 
urban areas by 6 percentage points, which is 21% of the difference in primary education 
attainment between the richest and the poorest Indian states.
One may expect that female legislators belonging to the party that won most of the 
seats could have more bargaining power than the rest. When dividing female legislators 
according to whether they belong to the party in power in the legislature or not I find 
that those in the party that has the majority of seats are the ones who have the strongest 
effect.
Results are consistent with the citizen candidate model, since a politician’s identity, here 
defined by gender, has an impact on policy. If female politicians care about women’s 
needs, education will be more important for women in urban areas, since the returns to 
education, proxied by the wage differentials between educated and non-educated women 
are higher there. Moreover, in urban areas it will be easier for them to find employment 
in the non-agricultural sector, where their skills are required. Men can benefit from 
education both in urban and rural areas, since wage differentials between educated 
and non-educated men are similar in rural and urban areas and they may have higher 
mobility to move to urban areas in search of non-farm employment. According to this, 
female politicians will invest more in education in urban areas, while male politicians 
will invest both in rural and urban areas. This can explain why female representation 
matters in urban but not in rural areas.
This chapter brings together two strands of the literature, the literature on the deter­
minants of education and the literature on the identity of the legislator. There is a large 
amount of literature on education. It focuses on the evaluation of policies related to 
an increase in the number of teachers and educational inputs (Banerjee et al 2004 and 
Chin 2005), or on the impact of different household, labour market, village and school 
characteristics on educational attainment (Dreze and Kingdon (2001)). Other papers 
focus on the impact of traditional institutions on education: Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2005) study how a traditional institution like caste affected schooling choices in the 
1990’s, Pandey(2005) shows how in villages in North India with a history of elite control 
teacher’s and student’s performances are lower, while caste reservation in the village
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did not seem to reverse it. This chapter complements the literature on education in 
developing countries by studying whether the gender of the politicians who decide the 
educational policies in India has an impact on educational outcomes.
The existing literature on the identity of the legislator in India focuses on the effect 
of different reservation policies and shows that the identity of the legislator matters 
for policy determination. Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) show that the reservation of 
one third of the seats for women in Panchayats (local rural self-government) of West 
Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive impact on investment in infrastructure relevant 
to women’s needs. Pande (2003) analyses how the reservation of seats for scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes in the State Assemblies increases the volume of transfers 
that these groups receive. This chapter complements this literature by studying the 
effect on educational outcomes of variation in female political representation due to 
electoral outcomes rather than reservation policies and by focusing on politicians who 
contested seats in the State Assemblies between 1967 and 2001.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the insti­
tutional context, the theoretical background and describes the data used. Section 2.3 
explains the identification strategy used. Section 2.4 shows the results obtained and 
Section 2.5 discusses the results obtained and concludes.
2.2 Background and D ata
2.2.1 P olitica l O rganization
India is a federal country, and the constitution gives the States and Union Territories 
significant control over their own government. The State Legislative Assemblies are 
directly elected bodies set up to carry out the administration of the government in the 
25 States of India. In some states there is a bicameral organization of legislatures, with 
both an upper and lower house. However, the lower house (Legislative Assembly) takes 
the final decisions.
The State Legislative Assemblies are those that mainly decide on educational policies 
and the expenditure devoted to education. They have Education Departments, which 
are administrative bureaucracies to control and implement these activities. Article 246
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of the Constitution gives the Legislature of any State powers to make laws dealing 
with educational issues. Even though education falls into the Concurrent List (matters 
shared between the central and the state governments), the state government plays the 
major role in educational policy, particularly at the primary and secondary levels.
India is a parliamentary democracy. The States and Union Territories are divided into 
single-member constituencies where candidates are elected in first-past-the-post elec­
tions. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn to make sure that there 
are, as near as practicable, the same number of inhabitants in each constituency. The 
assemblies vary in size, according to population. The districts are the administration 
unit at the lower level from the state. Each one includes between one and 37 con­
stituencies. The median district contains 9 electoral constituencies. The voting system 
in India is based on the principle of universal adult suffrage, and any Indian citizen 
who is registered as a voter and is over 25 years of age is allowed to contest elections 
for the State Assemblies.
In September 1996, the Government introduced a parliamentary bill that proposed the 
reservation of one third of the seats for women in the Central Government and the State 
Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parliamentary 
sessions, without an agreement being reached. Women in India are under-represented 
in all political positions. Between 1967 and 2001 in the 16 main states at most 14% 
of the general seats and 24% of the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in 
the State Assemblies were won by a woman in a given year and state. In Figure 2.1 
I plot the fraction of seats in each state won by women between 1967 and 2001. This 
figure shows significant differences across states on both the levels and trends of female 
representation, which provides the variation exploited in the empirical analysis.
2.2.2 T heoretical Background
In political economy models where candidates can commit to implement specific policies 
when elected and only care about winning the elections, political decisions should only 
reflect the electorate’s preferences. (Downs 1957). If this were the case, female political 
representation would not matter for policy outcomes, since equilibrium policies would 
follow the preferences of the median voter. Thus, as long as women could vote in the 
elections, their preferences would be represented by the candidate elected, irrespective 
of this candidate’s gender. Nevertheless, in the absence of complete policy commitment
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the identity of the legislator matters for policy determination. (Besley and Coate 1997 
and Osborne and Slivinski 1996) show that increasing a group’s political representation 
would increase its influence in policy.
Individual legislators are elected in single-member constituencies. They belong to dif­
ferent political parties, but represent the interest of the constituencies in which they 
were elected in the State Assembly. India has been characterized by a multiparty elec­
toral system, the party who won more seats in the legislature being the one that forms 
government, with or without other parties in the coalition.
Several models explain why legislators direct funds to his or her own constituency and 
why individual legislators may have preferences towards the type of policies applied 
in their constituencies. Alesina (1988) shows how different parties may have different 
preferences because they represent different constituencies and care about being elected 
and about the policies they will implement once elected in their constituencies. Persson 
et al (2000) compare a parliamentary regime with a presidential-congressional regime 
and show that in a parliamentary regime, if all agents are self-motivated, citizens dele­
gate their decisions to their representatives and political candidates cannot commit to 
policy platforms before the elections, there will be more redistribution and public goods 
provision towards the citizens represented by the coalition in government. In fact, they 
show that, as legislators value holding office, the threat of being voted out makes them 
perfect delegates for their constituencies. However, their power to do so will depend on 
their bargaining power in the legislature.
In a similar spirit, Grossman and Helpman (2005) show that there may be conflicts 
of interest between political parties and individual legislators. Once their party is in 
power, individual legislators will want to provide public goods to their constituents, 
independently of the promises made by their political party. The extent of this will 
depend on the degree of party discipline. According to this, both female and male 
politicians may want to direct funds to their own constituencies, independently of what 
was promised by their party. It is plausible to assume that Indian political parties 
will face costs of enforcing “party discipline”, implying that individual legislators may 
have the power to implement their policies in their constituencies, especially if they are 
part of the parties with more power in the legislature. However, if female legislators 
also have different preferences from male legislators, then the type of expenditures and 
policies they will conduct will be different.
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Thus, politicians in India will have incentives to provide public goods or expenditure 
to their constituencies. According to this, female politicians may have an impact on 
the education received in their constituency and possibly as well in the whole district. 
This is the case because, given that Indian districts usually have education offices, 
these politicians could keep in close contact with these offices and influence the way 
expenditures are made there. They could also decide to transfer more funding to one 
district, in particular if their constituency is located there.
2.2.3 D ata
The empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between the education received by 
an individual and the identity of the politicians who were in power in his or her district 
when he or she was young. In this section I will describe the data used and how I 
combined different data sources.2
2.2.3.1 Electoral Data
I use a very detailed dataset I collected on the State Legislatures in India during the 
period 1967-2001 from the reports published by the Election Commission of India. I 
collected data at the constituency level of the candidate who won, his or her gender and 
political party. I also collected data on all female candidates who contested for election, 
their political parties and the votes they obtained. For those women and men who won 
against a candidate of the other gender, I have data on who was the runner-up in each 
particular election and the votes obtained by him/her. Overall I have information on 
29686 politicians who contested on the 16 main States during the period 1967-2001.3
Each one of these candidates was elected in a single-member constituency and then 
occupied a seat in the State Legislative Assembly. Given that each district has from 1 
to 37 electoral constituencies, each district will have from 1 to 37 representatives in the 
Assembly.
3 For more detailed information on the variables used and the data sources see the Data Appendix.
3These 16 states account for more than 90 per cent of the total population in India, about 935 million 
people. They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and 
West Bengal.
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Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on the political variables used in this study. It 
includes information on the proportion of seats won by women, both in general and in 
SC/ST seats, the proportion of reserved seats and the proportion of seats won by each 
political party, as well divided by gender.4 It also gives information on the fraction 
of seats won by women belonging to the party that had the majority of seats in the 
state and those who did not. For those districts in which women were elected, I provide 
information on the proportion of constituencies in the district won by women in close 
elections against men and the proportion of constituencies that had close elections 
between women and men. Information the different parties disaggregated by gender is 
also provided.
Descriptive statistics show that female representation has been low over the time period 
under consideration: around 4% of the seats per district and electoral year. In addition, 
over this time period Congress parties are those who have held most of the seats, 
followed by Janata, Hindu and Regional Parties. Within districts in which women won 
the elections, the majority of both women and men who won were from the Congress 
party, followed by Janata, Hindu and regional parties. Thus, female politicians are not 
disproportionately representing a particular party and all parties had female candidates 
winning seats.
2.2.3.2 NSS Data
I combine this dataset with data from the 55th round of National Sample Survey (NSS). 
This is a nationally representative household survey that provides information at the 
household and the individual level. The survey was conducted in India between July 
1999 and June 2000 on a sample of randomly selected households.
I use the Employment and Unemployment schedules of the 55th round of the NSS. 
They contain information on 596688 individuals, 371188 in rural areas and 225500 in
4There are eight main party groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional, 
Independent candidates and other parties. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, 
Indian National Congress Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left parties include 
the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist. Soft Left parties include Praja 
Socialist Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. 
Hindu parties include the Bharatiya Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana 
Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali Dal and 
other state specific parties.
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urban areas.5
The NSS gives information on personal characteristics such as religion, gender and 
whether the individual belongs to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes. It also gives infor­
mation on whether the individual migrated from another area, her employment status, 
and district of residence. It also provides information on the individual’s educational 
attainment. I use this to create a variable that is equal to one if the individual obtained 
primary or a higher level of education through formal education.6
Panel A in Table 2.2 gives descriptive statistics on some characteristics of the individ­
uals in the sample used, classified by urban/rural status. There is data on the number 
of men, women, SC/ST individuals, the fraction of individuals who obtained at least 
primary education disaggregated by gender, and the fraction of Hindu and Muslim in­
dividuals. While 43.9% of women and 63.9% of men living in rural areas completed 
primary education, in urban areas they are 75.5% and 79.8% respectively. Thus educa­
tional attainment is much lower in rural areas, and gender differences are much larger 
there.
2.2.3.3 Combining Data Sources
Since the NSS data provides information on individual’s residence up to the district 
level only and politicians are elected in constituencies, to merge the two datasets I have 
aggregated the electoral data up to the district level.
This is not a trivial task. In order to know which constituencies are included in each 
district for each electoral year between 1967 and 2001,1 looked at different constituency 
delimitation orders and the publications “State Elections in India”, which lists the 
constituencies that are included in each district for each election. Once I had the list 
of constituencies in each district for each electoral year I had to take into account 
that some districts have split, have been newly created or have disappeared during 
the time period under consideration. I then used the 1991 census district definition 
and I only included those districts that did not split or disappear. As well, I did not
5The NSS uses the Indian Census definition of urban and rural areas.
6I then only consider individuals who attended formal education courses in my sample. Those who 
obtained education as adults are then considered as non-educated since they did not pass the primary 
standard examination when they were young. Nevertheless, there sure only 987 individuals in this 
category, and results do not chsuige after dropping these individuals from the sample.
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consider those districts which were newly created between 1967-2001 and those which 
include constituencies belonging to another neighbouring district at the same time.7 In 
this way, I aggregated all the data into districts. This procedure allowed me to have 
information on 276 districts, that include around 2761 electoral constituencies.8
I merge these two datasets by the district of residence and by the year in which each 
individual started primary school9. Thus, using information on the year each individual 
was bom and his or her district of birth I can know which politicians where in power 
before he or she started primary school.
Since an individual who migrated from another district after this age will not have 
benefited from the educational policies applied in the district of destination, I eliminate 
those who migrated after schooling age from another district, state or country from the 
sample. I also eliminate those who migrated from rural to urban areas or vice versa 
within the same district, since educational policies may be different in rural than in 
urban areas.10
Since primary school lasts four or five years depending on the state of residence and 
individuals usually start schooling at the age of six, I restrict the sample to those 
individuals who are older than 13 at the time of the survey, to allow for differences in 
states and for individuals having to repeat entire years and thus finishing late.
The resulting sample size is 105208 individuals. The availability of political data allows 
me to include in the sample only individuals bom after 1964. Thus, I can perform a 
cohort analysis in which individuals in each cohort will have lived in different districts 
and thus, since politicians change over district and over time, will have been exposed 
to different politicians.
To each one of the individuals in the sample I assign the politicians who were in power 
during the three years before he or she started primary education. Panel A in Table 2.3 
gives an example how the data is organized: individual 1, who lives in district A and
7Some constituencies straddle a district bound.
®There are around 463 districts in the 16 biggest states in India.
9I consider it to be 6 years of age. The NSS provides information about an individual’s age and 
the time the individual was interviewed. Since the individual could have been sampled either in 1999 
or 2000 and this sample year is given by the NSS, I take this into account when I compute the age at 
which an individual started primary school.
10Even if migration in India is generally low, migration is higher for women, especially because 
sometimes they move outside their district to get married.
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was born in 1964, should have started primary education in 1970, which means that 
the politicians in his district that could have had an effect on his or her education will 
be those in power between 1967 and 1969, before he or she started primary education. 
Thus, I take averages of the political variables between 1967 and 1969.
2.3 Identification
2.3.1 Identification Strategy
The key identification challenge is to estimate the causal effect of a politician’s identity 
on education, by separating this effect from the effect of unobservable variables that 
drive both education and female representation. To illustrate this, assume that one 
estimates the equation:
Yidt = oc + (3Fdt + £idt
Where Yidt is the educational outcome for individual i, living in district d and born in 
cohort t. Fdt is the fraction of constituencies in the district held by female politicians 
during the three years before individual i started primary education. Then, the coeffi­
cient /? would not be consistently estimated by OLS if there is an omitted variable Qdt, 
not included in the model and correlated with Fdt•
Politicians in a given district and year are elected by the population in their constituen­
cies. Thus, the fact that a woman or a man wins the election in a given seat cannot be 
considered a random event as it is determined by the electorate’s preferences. The omit­
ted variable could be electoral preferences in the district, which may be correlated both 
with female political representation and with educational attainments in the district. 
Even if district fixed effects are included in the regression, these control only for per­
manent differences across districts in female representation and the outcome variables. 
One can not rule out the fact that the omitted variable Qdt may be district-specific and 
change over time.
In order to identify the causal effect of female politicians I take advantage of the exis­
tence of close elections between a woman and a man candidate, elections in which the
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winner won the runner up by a very small number of votes11 The identification strat­
egy used in this chapter follows the same idea as the regression discontinuity approach. 
This methodology has been widely used and was first introduced in the context of elec­
tions by Lee (2001) for incumbency advantage and Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) for the 
effect of party control on fiscal policies. In the field of development economics, Miguel 
and Zaidi (2003) use regression discontinuity to test for the “Patronage” hypothesis in 
Ghana. Regression discontinuity has been used as an instrument by Angrist and Lavy 
(1999) to estimate the impact of class size on educational achievements and by Rehavi 
(2003), who used close elections between women and men in the US as an instrument 
to estimate the effect of female politicians at the state level on expenditures.
In the same spirit, to identify the causal effect of female politicians I use as an instrument 
for female representation the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in 
a close election against a man. Close elections are elections in which the vote difference 
between the winner and the runner up is very small. The reason why the instrument 
is valid is that female candidates who barely win the elections against a man do it 
in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for female politicians”. These 
constituencies will be ex ante comparable to constituencies in which male candidates 
win in a close election against a woman. If we consider that the last few votes received 
by both candidates are random, both the female and the male candidates could have 
won the elections and, thus, the fact that the female candidate won the seat instead of 
the male is random as well. In other words, constituencies in which a woman won in a 
close election against a man and constituencies in which a man won in a close election 
against a woman will be similar in all the unobservable variables, they will only differ 
in the fact that by chance either a man or a woman won the election. The fact that a 
candidate is elected in first-past-the-post elections held in single-member constituencies 
is a function of the vote difference between the winner and the runner up. This function 
has a discontinuity when the vote difference is zero; this is the case because the winner 
has to receive more votes than the runner up in order to win the election. Thus, the 
fact that the candidate is elected or not changes discontinuously as this vote difference 
is zero. In elections in which the winner and the runner up have different genders, as 
the vote difference becomes smaller and approaches the discontinuity, constituencies in 
which the vote difference is very small and a woman won will be more and more similar 
to constituencies in which the vote difference is very small and a man won. Thus, this 
discontinuity at the zero vote difference will provide a randomized treatment. Since I
11I define close elections as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes.
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consider elections in which the winner and the runner up have different genders, when 
the difference in votes is very small the winner’s gender will be randomized. I define 
close elections as elections in which the votes difference between the winner and the 
runner-up is less than 3.5% of the total votes in that particular constituency.12
Panel B in Table 2.3 shows how individuals in the sample are classified according to 
whether there were close elections between men and women in their district during the 
three years before they started primary education. There are several constituencies in 
each district, which means that an individual will be affected by a close election if there 
has been any close election in his or her district of residence. This table shows that 18% 
of individuals in the sample have been affected by close elections between a man and 
a woman, in other words, have been living in a district where close elections between 
men and women took place when they were young. If one then looks at individuals that 
have been affected by close elections: 6.7% of the whole sample have been in districts 
where more men than women won in close elections, 4.6% have been in districts where 
the same number of women and men won in close elections and 6.8% in districts where 
more women than men won in close elections. Thus, as expected, there is about the 
same number of individuals affected by men winning in close elections as by women 
winning in close elections.
The model to be estimated is:
yidt =  @d +  i>t +  0Fdt +  A TCdt +  XidtT] +  ZcttS +  £idt (2.1)
Fdt — +  V't ftFCdt +  /tTCdt +  Xdt& +  ZdtS +  udt (2.2)
In specification 2.1, Yidt takes the value of 1 if individual i belonging to cohort t, 
and born in district d has obtained at least primary education and 0 otherwise. I 
estimate the model using two stage least squares, where equation 2.1 is the second 
stage and equation 2.2 is the first stage. Since observations in the same district could 
be correlated, I compute the standard errors clustered at the district level.
13I perform the same exercise with smaller margins and results are unchanged. See the Robustness 
Checks section.
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The main variable of interest, F&, is the fraction of constituencies in the district that 
were won by a female politician during the three years before individual i started pri­
mary education. The instrument for this variable is FCdt, the fraction of constituencies 
in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man during the same time 
period. I control for TC&> the fraction of constituencies in the district in which there 
were close elections between women and men, as well during the same time period. The 
fraction of constituencies that had close elections between men and women controls for 
the fact that the existence of this type of close elections may not be a random event. 
However, the outcome of a close election is random, meaning that the winner’s gender in 
close elections between women and men is random as well. In other words, the impact 
of the existence of close elections between women and men on education is controlled 
by in specification 2.1 and partialled out of the instrument in specification 2.2.
9d are district fixed effects, which account for district-specific characteristics that do not 
change over time. ipt are the cohort fixed effects, which account for the fact that indi­
viduals born in different years may have been subject to different shocks or nationwide 
educational policies.
Xidt is a vector of individual-level control variables. I use different dummy variables for 
rural areas and Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe individuals. Since rural areas are 
likely to have lower literacy levels and educational inputs than urban areas, a dummy 
for rural areas captures this effect. Similarly, SC/ST individuals seem to be those who 
have less access to education in India. I also include dummies that indicate whether 
the individual is a woman or whether the individual is Hindu or Muslim. As before, 
gender and religion may be important determinants of an individual’s education.
Zdt are the set of district characteristics that vary over time and may have an effect on 
the dependent variable. In order to be able to disentangle the identity of the legislator 
effect from the political parties’ effect, I include as control variables the average fraction 
of seats won by the different political parties in each district the three years before the 
individual started primary education. If female politicians have a differential effect 
compared to male politicians after controlling for party composition, this will mean 
that the results will be given by gender and not party differences. These variables vary 
across districts and across time. As in Besley and Burgess (2002) I use six main party 
groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu and Regional parties. Thus, 
independent candidates and other very small parties are the reference category. I also 
include as a control variable the fraction of SC/ST reserved seats in the district, since
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this may also have an impact on the nature of political competition in each district.
I control for other variables that vary across districts and time. For example, I include 
female and male literacy rates in order to control for the fact that in districts were 
there are more literates the electorate’s preferences may be different. At the same 
time, it may as well be that in districts where literacy rates are higher parents are more 
likely to bring their children to school. I have also included the share of SC/ST, and 
urban and female population in the regression, since they may also have an impact on 
both educational and electoral outcomes. Descriptive statistics for these variables are 
shown in Panel B of Table 2.1. For these control variables, I use information on district 
characteristics three years before the individual started primary education, to account 
for the situation the legislator had in a particular district.
2.3.2 Checks on  th e  Identification Strategy
In this section I show some facts that support the validity of the identification strategy 
used. I address three issues. First of all, I provide evidence supporting the fact that 
the outcome of a close election is indeed random. In addition, districts and constituen­
cies in which female candidates won in close elections against men should be similar 
in observables to those in which male candidates won in close elections. Finally, I pro­
vide evidence that districts that had close elections between men and women are not 
systematically different than other districts in India.
2.3.2.1 Randomness of Close Election Outcomes
If there are political or demographic characteristics that predict the probability that 
women win in close elections in the district, the outcome of the close elections and, 
thus, the gender of the winners cannot be considered random. In order to estimate 
the probability that women won in close elections in a district, I have calculated the 
proportion of close elections won by women by district in each electoral year. I then 
regress this probability on the fraction of seats contested by the different party groupings 
in close elections, the proportion of urban population, the proportion of female and 
SC/ST population, male and female literacy rates, the number of times that women 
have won elections in the past in that district, a dummy equal to one if the district
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never had close elections in the past and the proportion of reserved seats. Results are 
shown in Table 2.4, and confirm that none of the coefficients turn out to be significant, 
suggesting that the outcome of a close election is indeed random.
2.3.2.2 Comparing on Observables
If the winner’s gender in a close election between a man and a woman is random, we 
expect that districts in which more women won in close elections should be very similar 
to districts in which more men won in close elections.
Table 2.5 provides information on the differences in district characteristics according 
to the number of women who won against men and number of men who won against 
women. Districts are classified in two groups, those in which more men won and those 
in which more women won. Then I compute the differences in district characteristics 
between these two groups. I do this considering the elections in which the winner has 
lead over the runner-up by margins of 3.5%, 3% and 2.5% of votes. I use information at 
the district level on the proportion of urban population, male and female literacy rates, 
the fraction of seats reserved for SC/STs, the number of educational institutions and 
hospitals weighted by the population and the proportion of seats won by female and 
male candidates in elections that are not close. The columns corresponding to margins 
of less than 3.5%, 3% and 2.5% show that districts in which more men won in close 
elections with this or a smaller margin and districts where more women won in close 
elections with this or a smaller margin are very similar in all these variables.
In summary, districts in which more women won in close elections are very similar 
to districts in which more men won in close elections. One should also observe that 
constituency and individual characteristics of women and men winning in close elections 
are the same. In the remainder of this section I analyze some of these characteristics, 
which could compromise the comparability between close elections in which men won 
and close elections in which women won.
First of all, there might be concerns that two different constituencies in which a woman 
contested in a close election against a man might not be similar if in one of them 
there were many other women candidates, apart from the winner and the runner up, 
contesting for the same seat. This would be a case in which political parties perceive 
the constituency as one in which there is “preference for female politicians” and tend
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to field female candidates there. If the number of female candidates contesting for 
the same seat as the two close candidates is significantly different for constituencies in 
which a man won in a close election against a woman and constituencies in which a 
woman won in a close election against a man, these two types of constituencies might 
have different characteristics. I have data on all the female candidates contesting in a 
particular constituency, apart from the winner and the runner up. As shown in the top 
panel of Table 2.6, the number of other female candidates contesting against women 
who won in close elections against a man is not significantly different than that for men 
who won in close elections against a woman.
It might also be that one of the candidates in a close election is in this situation because 
he or she is the incumbent for that seat in that particular constituency. This would 
make constituencies in which women and men won in close elections against a candidate 
of the other gender different in observables if men (or women) are those who tend to be 
the incumbent. Moreover, if there is incumbency advantage (or disadvantage) in these 
elections, more women (or men) would win in these type of elections and one could 
question the extent to which the outcome of a close election is random. It should also 
be taken into account that the policies applied by candidates who were the incumbent 
and won the elections again might be different than those of candidates who occupy 
the seat for the first time, since they will have more experience as legislators. In order 
to address this concern I use the fact that I have information on the candidate’s names, 
thus, I can know whether a particular candidate was already in power in the same 
constituency where he or she is contesting now during the previous electoral year. I 
then create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual was the incumbent 
for that seat. However, as it is shown in the second panel of Table 2.6, the percentage 
of winners in close elections who were the incumbent is statistically the same for female 
and male legislators who won in close elections.
Another concern that needs to be addressed is that maybe there are some constituencies 
in which there have been more close elections between men and women in the past 
than in others. If this happens more often in constituencies where women won the close 
election than in constituencies in which men won, then these two types of constituencies 
would not be comparable, since in the one where there have been more close elections 
there would probably be more “preference for female politicians”. In the third panel 
of Table 2.6 I test whether constituencies in which a man or a woman won in a close 
election are different in terms of how many times the particular constituencies have
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had close elections between men and women. However, results show that the number of 
previous close elections is the same, whether a woman or a man won. Thus, women won 
in close elections in situations in which the electoral preferences for female politicians 
are similar as situations in which men won in close elections.
Finally, if elections in which men and women won in close elections are really similar, 
they should have the same electoral turnout, otherwise, one type of constituencies 
would be more active in electoral terms than the other. And, more importantly, the 
distribution of votes between the first two candidates and the rest should be the same. 
This is the case because if in one case the total votes were distributed among many 
candidates, these could not be considered as close elections between the winner and 
the runner up. The last two panels of Table 2.6 show that women who won in close 
elections won by the same number of votes as men who won in close elections, and in 
constituencies where the total number of votes was the same. Since constituencies in 
India were designed to have the same population, this means that turnout was the same, 
and the distribution of votes between the first candidate and the rest was the same as 
well. This further corroborates that constituencies in which a man or a woman won in 
a close election are perfectly comparable and thus, the gender of the winner is, indeed, 
random. These two panels also eliminate concerns that, if in a constituency there were 
three candidates with almost the same number of votes, one could not consider the 
election between the winner and the runner up as a close election. In fact, the winners 
in close elections tend to receive around 40% or votes,
this means that the runner up will receive a minimum of 36.5% of votes. This leaves 
the other candidates with 23.5% of votes, which is a very big difference compared to 
the winner. Thus, even if there was only one other candidate in the constituency, he 
or she did not have any chance of winning the election.13
2.3.2.3 External Validity
Overall, 141 out of 297 districts never had a close election between a man and a woman, 
which is slightly less than half the districts in my sample. However, it could be argued 
that close elections between men and women take place in districts that are different, or 
more progressive, than the average district in India. Even if there is a significant amount
13As it was proven before, there are no concerns regarding the gender of these other candidates.
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of individuals affected by close elections, if districts that never had close elections 
are very different than those that did, results obtained in this chapter would not be 
representative for all of India. Table 2.7 shows that districts that have never had close 
elections and those that did are similar in observables. For districts that have never 
had close elections and districts that did, it shows descriptive statistics for population 
characteristics, the proportion of reserved seats, the total number of seats, and public 
goods like hospitals and educational institutions weighted by the population in the 
years that elections took place.
Finally, there might be concerns that the probability of contesting a close election 
between a woman and a man is different for each political party. If this were the case 
close elections would not reflect the overall situation in the parliament because only a 
few parties would be involved. Table 2.8 shows how the distribution of seats between 
the different party groupings is the same for close elections between men and women 
as for the rest. Thus, party composition seems not to be a concern, since the party 
composition in close elections reflects that of the overall parliaments in the States.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 B aseline R esults
Results for the basic econometric specification are shown in Table 2.9. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual obtained at least primary 
education and zero otherwise. The coefficient for the proportion of constituencies in 
the district held by women during the three years before an individual started primary 
education is reported. In columns 1-3 I report results for the OLS regressions, while in 
columns 4-6 I show results for the 2SLS regressions.
OLS results in columns 1-3 female representatives have a positive and significant effect 
on the probability that an individual attains primary education. When I divide the 
sample among those who live in urban and rural areas, female representatives have a 
positive and significant effect on individuals living both in urban and in rural areas, see 
columns 2 and 3. The 2SLS estimates in columns 4-6 show a very different picture, the 
female representation effect is now only significant for the urban sample and it is very 
large, see column 5. The magnitude of this coefficient implies that, by increasing female
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representation in the district by 10 percentage points, the probability that an individual 
attains primary education in an urban area increases by 6 percentage points, which 
is around 8% of the total probability that an individual obtains primary education in 
urban areas. In addition, given that being a woman reduces the probability of attaining 
primary education by 6 percentage points and being SC/ST reduces it by 18 percentage 
points, this is an important amount.14
The first stage regression for these specifications is shown in Table 2.10. Results show 
that the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election 
against a man is indeed a very good predictor of the fraction of constituencies in the 
district won by a woman. Keeping the fraction of constituencies held by men who won 
in close elections against a woman constant, increasing the fraction of constituencies 
won by women in close elections against men by one percentage point would increase 
female representation by 0.9 percentage points15.
Results show that female politicians have a positive impact on the education obtained 
by individuals living in urban areas of their own district. Since the reference category 
is male politicians, the fact that female politicians have a positive and significant effect 
means that they have a significantly larger effect on education in urban areas than 
male politicians. However, this is not the case in rural areas. The coefficient for the 
2SLS estimates in the urban sample is much larger than the one in the OLS regression 
using the same sample. This indicates that the OLS coefficients are downward biased, 
suggesting that the omitted variable is positively correlated with female representation 
and negatively correlated with education (or vice versa). For example, it may be that, 
if female politicians are known to be effective for educational improvements, in areas 
where educational levels are low they will tend to elect female politicians. Moreover, it 
may as well be that in very backward areas where educational levels are very low they 
elect female representatives because they are the family member of an important male 
politician, or they belong to the “elite” family in power. For the rural sample the OLS 
coefficient is bigger than the 2SLS one, but it is very imprecisely estimated. In addition, 
the OLS coefficients both for urban and rural areas are very similar. This implies that, 
by running the regressions with OLS one would not be able to distinguish the fact that
14These coefficients are not reported in Table 2.9, but are available from the author upon request.
16Both the instrument and the female representation variable vary at the district and cohort level, 
even if the dependent variable is at the individual level. When running the first stage regression at the 
district and year level the coefficient for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
in a close election against a man is 1.2025, with a standard error of 0.1992.
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the effect of female representation in urban and rural areas is very different. In other 
words, the omitted variable makes the OLS coefficient for the rural sample significant, 
when in reality female representation has no effect in rural areas16.
2.4.2 P lacebo Tests
In this section I perform two placebo tests using migrants and individuals who were too 
old to achieve primary education when female politicians were in power in the district. 
Policies implemented by these politicians could not have affected these individuals. If 
this were the case, results obtained could indicate that female representation is in fact 
acting as a proxy for another variable.
2.4.2.1 Placebo 1: Are Late Migrants Affected?
If an individual’s primary education attainment is really affected by the identity of the 
politicians who were in power in his or her district when he or she was young, we should 
not observe any effect on individuals who were not living there when the politicians 
were in power. In other words, individuals who migrated to the area when they were 
too old to achieve primary education can be used to perform a placebo test since they 
could not have been affected by the policies applied by the female legislators who were 
in power there when they were young. Thus, one should not observe any effect from 
female politicians on these individuals, since primary school ends when an individual 
is 11 years of age and an individual aged 14 should already be in secondary school.
In order to test for this I use data on individuals who migrated from other districts or 
who migrated within the same district between rural and urban areas17 after the age 
of 14. For each individual I use as right hand side variables the political characteristics 
and control variables of the new district of residence when the individual was aged
16When running the pooled regressions at the district and cohort level, the coefficient for the fraction 
of constituencies in the district won by a woman is 0.0475 with a standard error of 0.1611 for the whole 
sample. For the urban sample the coefficient is 0.4966, with a standard error of 0.2885. For the rural 
sample the coefficient is -0.0201, with a standard error of 0.1838. Thus, coefficients are slightly smaller, 
but as before only the coefficient for the urban sample remains significant.
17Since policies are different in urban than in rural areas, an individual who migrated from a rural 
to an urban area will not have been affected in the same way as the “urban” individuals. Thus, it is a 
valid placebo.
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3-5.18 I then run specification 2.1 on these individuals, using 2.2 as a first stage, as 
before.
Results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.11, that show results for the rural and 
urban sample, respectively. I report the coefficient for the fraction of constituencies 
in the district in which a woman won the election. Column 1 shows results for the 
urban sample. In this case the sample size is much smaller, but the effect of female 
politicians on individuals who arrived in the area when they were too old to achieve 
primary education is very small and not significant. The effect in rural areas is as 
well not significant, see column 2. Given that those who should not have been affected 
axe, indeed, not affected this corroborates the notion that results on education found 
before really come from the identity of the politicians in power in the district when the 
individuals were young.
2.4.2.2 Placebo 2: Are Older Children Affected?
If an individual’s primary education attainment is really affected by having a female 
politician in his or her district before he or she started primary education, we should not 
observe any effect of female politicians on individuals who were too old to be affected 
by their policies when they were in power. In fact, an individual’s primary education 
attainment can be determined by the policies applied by the politicians in power before 
he or she started primary education,19 but should not be determined by politicians in 
power when he or she should have finished primary education. If this were the case, 
this would indicate that results for the estimated effect of female politicians are in fact 
acting as a proxy for another variable that has a wider time-span. In other words, 
one should not observe an effect from female representatives on the education of older 
individuals.
In order to test for this I combine data on the politicians’ identity variables used in the 
previous specification with data on individuals who were aged 14 to 16 when they were 
in power.20 I then run specification 2.1 on these individuals, using 2.2 as a first stage.
Results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.11. I report coefficients for the fraction
18The NSS does not give information on which district were they coming from, I only know whether 
they were coming from another district or not.
19Or maybe even during his or her first years of primary education.
20As before, this individuals should be in secondary schooling age.
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of constituencies in the district won by women. In column 3 I restrict the sample to 
individuals living in urban areas. In this case the sample is much smaller, but female 
representatives do not have any effect on these individuals. Moreover, the coefficient is 
negative and much smaller than that obtained for younger individuals. As it is shown 
in column 4, female representatives do not have any effect on individuals living in rural 
areas.
2.4 .3  M easures o f P olitica l Influence
In line with the interpretation that female politicians affect education because they act 
on policies, In this section check whether the effect of female representation is stronger 
when they are more influential, either within the district or in the legislature.
2.4.3.1 Does Being A Member of the Majority Party Matter?
In line with existing theoretical models, a single legislator will have more power to 
implement policies or to direct funds to his or her own constituency if he or she has 
more bargaining power within the legislature. This is likely to be the case if he or she 
belongs to the party that has the majority of seats in the legislature. Thus, if the effects 
observed are due to the politician’s actions, one should observe that female legislators 
who belong to the party that won the majority in the state have a stronger effect than 
the rest. In order to test for this I have divided female politicians according to whether 
they belong to the party that had the majority of seats in the state or not. I then run 
the specification:
Yujt =  0d +  ^t +  PiFmairidt +  (32Fnomaindt + A TCdt +  Xidtrj + ZdtS +  £idt (2.3)
Where Fmaindt, the fraction of constituencies won by women of the main party is 
instrumented with the fraction of constituencies won by women of the main party in a 
close election against a man. Similarly, Fnomairidt, the fraction of constituencies won 
by women belonging to other parties is instrumented with the fraction of constituencies 
won by women belonging to other parties against men.
Results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.12, for the urban and rural samples 
respectively. I report coefficients for the fraction of constituencies won by women of
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the main party and the fraction of constituencies in the district won by women of the 
other parties. In urban areas, women of the party who got the majority of seats in the 
state are those who have an effect, while the coefficient for women belonging to other 
parties is not significant. For the rural sample none of the coefficients is significant.21
2.4.3.2 Does District Size Matter?
If the effects on education are coming from the politician’s actions, one should observe 
that the effect of female politicians is bigger in districts that contain fewer constituen­
cies. This is the case because, if legislators are more sensitive to their constituencies’ 
demands, they will be expected to have a bigger impact on people living in their con­
stituency, more than on the district as a whole. In smaller districts estimates of the 
impact of the legislator will be more accurate, and they will be a better approximation 
of the identity of the legislator’s effect on people living in his or her constituency. In 
contrast, in larger districts, the estimates of the differential effect of female legislators 
will presumably be lower, since the effect will be more diluted given that the effect 
is shared among more constituencies. Thus, the estimates obtained in the previous 
section will be a lower bound of the actual effect.
In order to test whether the effect is indeed bigger in smaller districts I have divided 
the districts according to the number of constituencies they include. In particular, I 
have computed the mean number of constituencies in all districts for the three years 
averages22 and I have created a dummy variable equal to one if an individual lives in a 
large district, i.e. if his or her district has more constituencies than the mean and zero 
otherwise. I have then created another dummy that is equal to one if the individual fives 
in a smaller district. I then interact the female representation variable these dummy 
variables. The specification tested is:
21 Female politicians who belong to other parties that did not get the majority of seats in the state 
but that are part of the coalition in power could have the same bargaining power as female politicians 
from the main party. I do not have data on the different coeditions that have had power over time 
in the different states in India Women in the party who got the majority of seats will almost surely 
be in the coalition, so they will have more power than the rest. Presumably, if I could divide female 
representatives among those who belong to the coalitions in power and those who do not, the difference 
between those coefficients would be even larger than the difference obtained in Table 2.12.
22The mean is 9.29 constituencies per district.
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Yidt — Od +  +  01 Fdt * lidt +  02Fdt * s idi +  0$lidt +  YTCdt +  XidtT) +  Zdt6 +  £idt
(2.4)
Where lidt and Sidt are the dummy variables for whether the individual lives in a large 
or a small district, respectively. I then report the coefficients for the 2SLS estimates of 
the total effect on individuals living in large districts, 0 X, and on individuals living in 
small districts, 0 2- Results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.12, for the urban 
and rural sample respectively. Column 3 shows results for the urban sample. The effect 
of female representatives in small districts is positive and significant, plus, it is larger 
than the coefficient for female representatives obtained before. In large districts the 
coefficient for female representatives is smaller. Column 4 shows results for individuals 
living in rural areas, here female representatives do not have any effect, neither in big 
nor in small districts. Since results for small districts are now slightly stronger than 
results in Table 2.9 for the urban sample, one can conclude that results obtained before 
are indeed a lower bound of the real effect.
2.4.3.3 Does Political Disruption Matter?
One should expect that the effect of female politicians will be stronger in situations in 
which politicians have had more time to implement their policies. To test for this I 
exploit the variation created by the fact that some states have been under President’s 
rule in different years and for different periods of time.
President’s rule is the term used in India to describe a situation in which a state 
government is dissolved by its governor and it is placed under direct federal rule. Article 
356 of the Indian Constitution enables President’s rule and gives the central government 
the authority to invalidate any state government if the constitutional machinery in the 
state fails.
Politicians who were in power when the state was under President’s rule should have 
had less power than the rest, since they had less time to implement their policies. In 
those cases the effect of female representation will be likely to be smaller, since female 
politicians will have been in power for less time.
I have information on how many months of each year were subject to President’s rule 
for each State. Then I compute the total number of months with President’s rule
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during the three year averages used to create the other political variables. I can then 
classify individuals in the sample according to length of the time period during which 
the legislature was under President’s rule within the three years before they started 
primary education.
I create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual has been exposed to 
more months of President’s rule than the mean23 and another dummy that is equal 
to one if the individual has been exposed to less months of President’s rule than the 
mean. I then interact these variables with the female representation variable. The 
specification to be tested will then be:
= 0d +  +  Pi Fdt * Mpridt + P2Fdt * LWidt +  P^M pr^  +  ATCdt +  XidtV +
+Zdt6 +  Eidt (2.5)
Where Mpridt is the dummy variable indicating whether the individual has been ex­
posed to more months of presidential rule and Lpridt is the dummy variable indicating 
whether the individual has been exposed to less months of presidential rule. I then 
report the coefficients for 2SLS estimates of the total effect on individuals that were 
affected by more President’s rule than the mean, /?1? and on individuals that were 
affected by less than the mean, @2-
Results are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.12, for the urban and rural sample 
respectively. Coefficients in column 5 show that, in urban areas, only in cases where 
politicians had sufficient power do female representatives have an effect. The effect on 
individuals affected by a longer period of President’s rule is smaller and not significant. 
Results for the rural sample are presented in column 6, where none of the coefficients 
is significant.
Thus, results suggest that female representatives will have an effect in cases in which 
they can exercise their power for longer, confirming the initial hypothesis that the 
effects found on education are due to their policy actions.
23For States and years in which there has been President’s rule, the mean is 7.59 months over the 
three years averages. The distribution is quite skewed to the left, with a minimum of 0.25 months in 
the three years period and a maximum of 36 months.
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2.4 .4  R obustness checks
In this section I provide some more evidence supporting the identification strategy used 
in this study and I include time trends in the regressions.
In this chapter I have defined close elections as elections in which the votes difference 
between the winner and the runner up is less than 3.5%. Here I check whether the 
results are sensitive to this choice of vote margin. In columns 1-4 of Table 2.13 I test 
whether results are the same when I define close elections as those in which the winner 
won the runner-up by smaller margins. In particular, in columns 1 and 2 I use a 3% 
margin as a cut-off point, while in columns 3 and 4 I use a 2.5% margin. I then run 
the 2SLS specifications 2.1 and 2.2 as before. Now, however, the instrument will be 
defined in a different way, since some elections that before were considered close now 
will not be. As before, I report results for both the urban and rural samples and the 
coefficient for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by women. Results in 
columns 1-4 are very similar to those obtained before. The coefficient for the effect of 
female politicians seems to increase slightly as the margin is reduced, but it is still in 
the same confidence interval as the coefficient for the 3.5% margin.
The probability that an individual attains primary education in a state or district may 
change across generations, in fact, it may increase over time. If, in addition the right 
hand side variables in the regression also trend upwards, results obtained may proxy for 
this trend. Since elections are held at the state level, different states may have different 
trends. In addition, different districts may have different trends in both educational 
attainments and the right hand variables. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.13 I control 
for the existence of state-specific trends. Results remain unchanged. In addition, in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.131 include district-specific trends in the regression. Results 
are also very similar to the ones obtained before.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Results in this chapter show that the identity of the legislator affects educational out­
comes. Female politicians have a bigger effect than male politicians on the education 
received by individuals living in urban areas but not by those living in rural areas. By 
increasing female representation in the district by 10 percentage points, the probability
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that an individual attains primary education in an urban area increases by 6 percentage 
points, which is around 8% of the total probability that an individual obtains primary 
education in urban areas. In addition, given that being a woman reduces the probabil­
ity of attaining primary education by 6 percentage points and being SC/ST reduces it 
by 18 percentage points, this is an important amount.
In line with the interpretation that female politicians affect education because they act 
on policies, I find that the effect of female representation is stronger when they axe 
more influential, either within the district or in the legislature. For example, female 
politicians belonging to the party who has the majority of seats are those who have 
the strongest effect. The effect is also stronger on individuals living in small districts, 
that contain less constituencies. This confirms that results obtained before axe in fact 
a lower bound of the actual effect. Moreover, the effect of female politicians is smaller 
when there has been political disruption, namely President’s Rule, for a longer period 
in the state. Reassuringly, two placebo tests, using migrants and individuals who were 
too old to achieve primary education when the female legislators were in power show 
that female representation did not have any effect on these individuals.
If both female and male politicians implement their own preferences when they axe in 
power,24 it is then reasonable to assume that these politicians will care about the needs 
of those who share their identity. One possible explanation for the results obtained is 
that, if female politicians caxe about empowering those who shaxe their identity, then 
they would choose to invest in education in urban areas as returns for women axe higher 
there than in rural areas and hence demand for women’s education is higher.25
I have computed the wage differentials for women older than 15 who axe working with 
and without primary education. Data for these variables is shown in Panel A of Table 
2.2. In urban axeas, the difference between the wage of an educated and an uneducated 
woman is 2.7 times the wage of an uneducated woman. In rural axeas, the wage differen­
tial due to education is 1.9 times the wage received by an uneducated woman.26 Thus,
24In fact, if there are two types of citizen-candidate, women and men, and they have different prefer­
ences, once they decide to contest for election and win they will implement their own preferences. This 
will be true if they can not commit to implement a specific policy ex ante, which is likely to be the case 
in India. If politicians are self-interested, they will try to improve their economic opportunities, which 
will coincide with the economic opportunities of their groups.
25In rural areas they may invest in different public goods (for example, access to roads or drinking 
and water facilities), which are more valuable to women there.
26Berhman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashishtha (1999) do not find labour market returns to schooling 
for women in rural areas, which is consistent with the explanation provided here.
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the difference in wages between educated and non-educated women is much larger in 
urban areas. In addition, educated women living in rural areas will have to take oppor­
tunities to work in non-farm employment in rural areas, since their mobility is reduced 
by social constraints. In urban axeas, women can take advantage of more opportunities 
to work in activities that require their education skills (see Chadha 1997). Table 2.2 
shows how in urban areas 92% of working women that have primary education work 
in the non-agricultural sector, while this is only 29% in rural areas. These facts may 
explain why education is more important for women in urban than in rural areas. In 
contrast, men can benefit from education both in rural and urban areas. In fact, in 
urban areas, the wage of an educated man is 1.94 times the wage of an uneducated man, 
while in rural areas, it is 1.71 times the wage of an educated man, so the difference 
between rural and urban areas is smaller than for women. Taking into account that 
men have higher mobility than women and can always move to work in urban areas, 
they will have more opportunities than women in rural areas, and, if they get educated 
they will be more able to take advantage of their skills.27
This chapter complements the literature on education in developing countries by study­
ing whether the gender of a politician who is in charge of implementing educational 
policies has an impact on educational outcomes. This chapter is also related to the 
existing literature on the effects of the identity of the legislator in India, and comple­
ments it by exploring the effect of an exogenous increase in female representation that 
took place without reservation, and allows me to clearly identify the effect of female 
legislators on the education received by individuals who were young in the district when 
these legislators were in power. It also complements the growing literature on the iden­
tity of the legislator in other countries by providing additional evidence that identity 
does indeed matter for policy decisions, since women and male politicians have different 
effects on education.
Finally, results obtained also provide evidence in favour of citizen-candidate models 
(Besley and Coate 1997 and Osborne and Slivinski 1996). The fact that the identity of 
the legislator has an impact on policy suggests that Downsian models could not be used 
to explain the results obtained and that indeed, candidates cannot commit in advance
27Kochar (2004) finds that urban returns to education have a positive impact on boys education 
living in rural areas. This is especially the case for landless households. In the limit, and, if there was 
perfect mobility, returns to education could be equal for men in rural and urban areas, but she shows 
how this does not seem to be the case.
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to implement specific policies once elected.
The fact that the identity of the legislator matters along gender fines may have policy 
implications. The issue of female political representation has been increasingly impor­
tant in India and there have been growing pressures for female political reservation. 
In September 1996, the Government introduced a Bill in Parliament, proposing the 
reservation of one third of the seats for women in the Central Government and the 
State Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several par­
liamentary sessions, without an agreement being reached. Those in favour argue that 
increasing female political representation will ensure a better representation of their 
needs. Even those who oppose the reservation acknowledge the fact that female politi­
cians behave differently than male politicians. This chapter corroborates these views 
with empirical evidence and may shed some fight on these issues, by looking at the ef­
fect of the politicians’ gender on education. Clearly, reservation would increase female 
representation, but it would as well change the nature of political competition, either by 
changing the set of candidates available for each seat, by altering voters’ preferences or 
by changing the candidates’ quality. Therefore, reservation may change other variables, 
but it is an increase in female representation. The fact that female representatives of 
the party that has the majority have more bargaining power to implement their policies 
should also be taken into account when considering reservation for women.
2.6 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Female Political Representation by State 1967-2001
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: District Political Dataset 
Unit of observation: district in an electoral year________
Variable (as a fraction of the total seats in the district) Obs. Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women 2546 0.0387 0.0750
Proportion of seats won by women belonging to the main party in the state 2546 0.0268 0.0643
Proportion of seats won by women belonging to others but the main party in the state 2546 0.0119 0.0409
Proportion of seats won by Congress 2546 0.4359 0.3289
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left 2546 0.0599 0.1475
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left 2546 0.0245 0.0916
Proportion of seats won by Hindu 2546 0.1336 0.2344
Proportion of seats won by Janata 2546 0.1489 0.2631
Proportion of seats won by Regional 2546 0.0800 0.2047
Proportion of seats won by Others 2546 0.0594 0.1600
Proportion of seats won by Independent 2546 0.0578 0.1114
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 2546 0.2363 0.1948
Variable ( as a fraction of the total seats in the district in districts where women were elected) Obs. Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against men 708 0.0163 0.0416
Proportion of seats who had close elections between men and women 708 0.0225 0.0488
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (main party) 708 0.0116 0.0363
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (other parties) 708 0.0058 0.0274
Proportion of seats won by Congress women 708 0.0782 0.0915
Proportion of seats won by Congress men 708 0.3575 0.2738
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left women 708 0.0088 0.0350
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left men 708 0.0674 0.1554
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left women 708 0.0014 0.0140
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left men 708 0.0184 0.0788
Proportion of seats won by Hindu women 708 0.0121 0.0434
Proportion of seats won by Hindu men 708 0.0902 0.1578
Proportion of seats won by Janata women 708 0.0123 0.0386
Proportion of seats won by Janata men 708 0.1180 0.2071
Proportion of seats won by Regional women 708 0.0113 0.0409
Proportion of seats won by Regional men 708 0.0917 0.2027
Proportion of seats won by Others women 708 0.0107 0.0400
Proportion of seats won by Others men 708 0.0685 0.1651
Proportion of seats won by Independent women 708 0.0044 0.0254
Proportion of seats won by Independent women 708 0.0490 0.0930
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Table 2.2; Descriptive statistics. NSS SSth Round and control variables.
Panel A: NSS Individual variables and labour market characteristics
Variable
RURAL 
Obs Mean Sd
URBAN 
Obs Mean Sd
Women 96545 0.4599 0.4984 45657 0.4177 0.4932
Men 96545 0.5401 0.4984 45657 0.5823 0.4932
SC/ST 96545 0.2986 0.4577 45657 0.1750 0.3800
Hindu 96545 0.8349 0.3713 45657 0.7259 0.4460
Muslim 96545 0.1001 0.3001 45657 0.1993 0.3995
Primary education or more 96545 0.5473 0.4978 45657 0.7805 0.4139
Women with primary education or more 44399 0.4392 0.4963 19072 0.7550 0.4301
Men with primary education or more 52146 0.6394 0.4802 26585 0.7988 0.4009
Women with primary education or more who work 16183 0.1641 0.3704 17532 0.0863 0.2808
Men with primary education or more who work 24642 0.6922 0.4616 18912 0.6269 0.4837
Women with primary education or more working in non-agriculture 2656 0.2854 0.4517 1513 0.9227 0.2672
Men with primary education or more working in non-agriculture 17057 0.3657 0.4816 11855 0.9371 0.2428
Women without primary education who work 23556 0.4069 0.4913 7477 0.2200 0.4143
Men without primary education or more who work 14502 0.9410 0.2357 4733 0.8927 0.3096
Women without primary education who work in non-agriculture 9584 0.1133 0.3170 1645 0.6778 0.4675
Men without primary education who in non-agriculture 13646 0.2138 0.4100 4225 0.8618 0.3452
Women without primary education: wages received 5635 125.32 106.44 1025 190.46 192.58
Men without primary education: wages received 7942 221.71 165.85 2651 346.16 261.05
Women with primary education: wages received 1255 249.18 389.31 993 702.08 809.97
Men with primary education: wages received 6792 380.07 429.18 6452 674.00 668.56
Panel B: Other variables
Variable Obs Mean Sd
Urban population in the district 7808 0.2045 0.1442
SC/ST population in the district 7808 0.2525 0.1367
Women in the district 7808 0.4819 0.0161
Male literacy rate in the district 7642 0.5272 0.1572
Female literacy rate in the district 7642 0.2782 0.1706
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 2546 0.2363 0.1948
Number of months with President's Rule in the state 560 0.8576 2.5090
Data on workers refers to their usual activity. Workers are classified as people older than 15 years o f age in the labour force not 
currently looking for employment Wages are computed from individuals older than 15 years of age who are working and are not 
self-employed.
50
Table 2J: Data Issues
PANEL A: Data organization
1 A 1964 1970 in power during 1967-1969 in district A
2 A 1965 1971 in power during 1968-1970 in district A
3 A 1987 1993 in power during 1990-1992 in district A
4 B 1964 1970 in power during 1967-1969 in district B
5 B 1965 1971 in power during 1968-1970 in district B
6 B 1987 1993 in power during 1990-1992 in district B
PANEL B: Individuals affected by close elections
Classification of individuals according to close elections between men and women in their district of residence
_____________________________________ Individuals Fraction
No close elections 178323 0.8195
Close elections    39281 0.1805
Classification of individuals according to the number of men and women winning in close elections in their district of residence
Individuals Fraction
Individual
More women won against a man 14452 0.0664
More men won against a woman 14713 0.0676
The same number of men and women won 10116 0.0465
Table 2.4: Probability that a Woman Wins in a Close Election against a Man
Dependent variable: proportion of women who won in a close election 
against a man per district and electoral year
1
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Congress -1.412
[2.607]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Regional Parties -3.332
[4.882]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Hindu -1.247
[2.706]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Janata -1.81
[2.075]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Others -0.433
[2.389]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Independent -1.546
[2.303]
Dummy=l if the district never had close elections before 0.241
[0.635]
Proportion of urban population 12.587
[12.85]
Number of times that a woman has won an election in the district in the past -0.006
[0.051]
Proportion of SC/ST population 18.497
[19.496]
Proportion of population that is female -15.535
[27.662]
Male literacy rate -1.923
[10.817]
Female literacy rate -0.494
[7.249]
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/STs -2.931
[5.313]
Observations 164
Adjusted R-squared -0.059
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level. District and year fixed effects are included in the 
regression.
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Tabic 2 i;  District Characteristics: Close Elections between Women and Men by Margin______________________________________________
3.50% 3% 2.50%
margin margin jn a rg u ^ ^
Differences in the proportion of urban population
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.00980
[0.0175]
-0.01850
[0.01840]
-0.01750
[0.0209]
Differences in male literacy rate
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.02472
[0.02484]
-0.02840
[0.02638]
-0.03980
[0.02884]
Differences in female literacy rate
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.02244
[0.02871]
-0.02496
[0.03015]
-0.04801
[0.03301]
Differences in the number of villages with educational institutions
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.10282
[0.07399]
0.02630
[0.08306]
0.02207
[0.09040]
Differences in the number of villages with hospitals
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.00023
[0.00021]
0.00009
[0.00023]
-0.00004
[0.00027]
Differences in the proportion of SC/ST reserved seats
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.00125
[0.02609]
-0.01837
[0.02792]
-0.03110
[0.02965]
Differences in the proportion of women who won in elections that are not close
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.00096
[0.00804]
-0.00338
[0.00875]
-0.00340
[0.00959]
Differences in the proportion of men who won in elections that are not close
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.01390 -0.01284 
[0.010004] [0.01087]
-0.00664
[0.01174]
Number of election-years 204 186 157
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Table 2.6
Constituency and candidate characteristics: Close Elections between Women and Men
Group
Other female candidates in the constituency
Obs Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Man won in close election 
Woman won in close election 
Difference
Winner was the incumbent
120
no
0.1083
0.2000
-0.0917
0.0370
0.0480
0.0601
0.0350
0.1049
-0.2100
0.1817
0.2951
0.0267
Man won in close election 120 0.2167 0.0378 0.1419 0.2914
Woman won in close election no 0.2182 0.0396 0.1398 0.2966
Difference -0.0015 0.0547 -0.1093 0.1062
Number of close elections in the past
Man won in close election 120 1.0750 0.0241 1.0272 1.1228
Woman won in close election 110 1.0727 0.0249 1.0234 1.1220
Difference 0.0023 0.0347 -0.0661 0.0706
Votes received by the winner
Man won in close election 120 31894.1700 1328.4220 29263.7600 34524.5800
Woman won in close election 110 33596.4500 1330.2330 30959.9800 36232.9300
Difference -1702.2880 1883.4150 -5413.4120 2008.8360
Total votes in the constituency
Man won in close election 120 80188.3300 2769.9040 74703.6500 85673.0200
Woman won in close election 110 80947.2700 2655.8640 75683.4400 86211.1100
Difference -758.9394 3851.7720 -8348.5610 6830.6820
Table 2.7________________________________________________________________
Comparison: Districts with and without Clow Elections_________________________
(District in an electoral year) Close elections No close elections
Urban population (prop) mean 0.1975 0.1961
sd 0.0035 0.0039
observations 927 1087
Male literacy rate mean 0.5250 0.5481
sd 0.0054 0.0049
observations 927 1087
Female literacy rate mean 0.2854 0.2890
sd 0.0058 0.0054
observations 927 1087
SC/ST population (prop) mean 0.2668 0.2430
sd 0.0047 0.0037
observations 945 1116
SC/ST seats proportion mean 0.2610 0.2191
sd 0.0055 0.0054
observations 1196 1315
Seats total mean 10.5895 7.9529
sd 0.1276 0.1269
observations 1196 1315
Any educational institution mean 0.5245 0.6834
sd 0.0200 0.0200
observations 294 332
Hospitals mean 24.1167 19.3573
sd 1.0326 0.7396
observations 726 808
Table 2.8
Proportion of Seats Won by Parties_________________________
Close Elections No close elections
Party Percent Percent
Congress 40.25 41.05
Hard Left 8.47 8.04
Hindu 11.44 11.58
Independents 6.78 5.8
Janata 10.17 14.26
Regional 12.29 10.17
Soft Left 3.81 2.31
Others 6.78 6.78
Total 100 100
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Table 2.9: Do Female Politicians Have an Effect on Education?
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.0969* 0.1333** 0.1105* 0.1120 0.6377** 0.0123
[0.0527] [0.0661] [0.0609] [0.1581] [0.2907] [0.1914]
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic District Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Political Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 105208 34604 70604 105208 34604 70604
R-squared 0.2541 0.1743 0.247 0.2541 0.1714 0.247
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the lOVo, • •  significant at 
the 5%, **• significant at the 1%. Columns 1-3 are OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of 
constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies 
in the district won by a woman. For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction o f  constituencies in die district that 
had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less 
than 3.3% of votes. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction o f  seats 
won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction o f urban, SC/ST and female population, male 
and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a rural 
area where applies.
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Table 2.10: First Stage Regression
Dependent variable: Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman
1
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 1.2196***
in a close election against a man [0.0278]
Fraction of constituencies in the district that had close -0.3185***
elections between women and men [0.0144]
Controls yes
F first stage 293.87
Observations 105208
R-squared 0.5087
Robust standard non clustered at the district level ate reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant a 
the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. This is the first stage regression it which the friction of constituencies in the district two by a 
woman in a dose election against a man is used to mstmnent the fraction ofconstituendes in the district won by a woman. For 
this regression I also include as a control the friction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and 
men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3-5% of votes. It includes district 
and cohort fixed effects, u  well u  the other controls described in Table 2.9.
Table 2.11: Placebo Tests
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1 2 3 4
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Urban Rural Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
(effect on individuals who migrated to the area after the age of 14)
-0.0549
[0.4851]
0.3322
[0.4783]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
(effect on individuals aged 14-16 when they were in power)
-0.0546
[0.2733]
-0.3161
[0.1941]
Controls yes yes yes yes
Observations
R-squared
12338
0.2280
7381
0.2517
22124
0.2083
37714
0.216
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, * *  significant at 
the 5%, * * *  significant at the 1%. Columns 1-4 are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction o f  constituencies in the district won 
by a woman in  a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction o f  constituencies in  the district won by a woman. 
For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction o f  constituencies in  the district that had close elections between 
women and men. C lose elections are defined as those in which the wanner won the runner up by less than 3.5% o f  votes. 
Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction o f  seats won by each political 
party grouping, the fraction o f  reserved seats, the fraction o f  urban, SC/ST and female population, male and female literacy rates 
and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a  rural area where applies.
Table 2.12: Measure* of Political Influence
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
who belongs to the party who won the majority in the state
0.6945* 0.1015
[0.3609] [0.2207]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
who does not belong to the party who won the majority in the state
0.5059 -0.2431
[0.5346] [0.2998]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
(effect on individuals living in small districts)
0.7853*
[0.4047]
-0.1019
[0.2186]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
(effect on individuals living in large districts)
0.5098
[0.3263]
0.2296
[0.2922]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman
(effect on individuals who were exposed to less months of President’s rule)
0.6877**
[0.2915]
0.0226
[0.1938]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman
(effect on individuals who were exposed to more months of President’s rule)
-0.1339
[1.3357]
0.1076
[0.4037]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations
R-squared
34604
0.1710
70604
0.2470
34604
0.1707
70604
0.2470
34604
0.1707
70604
0.2470
Table 2.13: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primaiy education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1 2 3 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Urban Rural Urban 
individuals individuals individuals
4 5 6 7 8 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
3% margin 3% margin 2.5% margin2.5% margin
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.6777*
[0.3458]
0.0075
[0.2227]
0.7036**
[0.3261]
0.0846
[0.2246]
0.7087**
[0.3420]
-0.0521
[0.1731]
0.6668**
[0.3319]
-0.1519
[0.2171]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Close elections defined with a smaller margin yes yes yes yes no no no no
State specific trends no no no no yes yes no no
District specific trends no no no no no no yes yes
Observations 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604
R-squared 0.1708 0.247 0.1704 0.247 0.1722 0.2494 0.1878 0.2547
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** 
significant at the 1%. Columns 1-8 are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election 
against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman. For these regressions I also include as a control 
the fraction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which the 
winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes unless indicated otherwise. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the 
following controls: the fraction of seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of urban, SC/ST and female 
population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a rural 
area where applies.
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Chapter 3
Gender, Caste Reservations and 
Educational Gaps.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses whether politicians in India favour those who belong to their 
groups in policymaking by studying the impact of a politician’s identity on the prob­
ability that individuals belonging to his or her group attain primary education. In 
particular, it focuses on whether having a politician of a particular group reduces edu­
cational inequalities between this group and the rest.
According to citizen-candidate models, (Besley and Coate 1997 and Osborne and Slivin- 
ski 1996), a politician’s identity may determine the type of policies enacted. In partic­
ular, if this politician belongs to a particular group, it is important to assess whether 
this group’s needs are better catered for if it is more represented in Parliament.
There is very little evidence on whether politicians favour those who belong to their 
groups in policymaking, both for developed and developing countries. Understanding 
the impact of the politician’s identity on who wins and who loses from the policies he or 
she implements may have important policy implications for poverty and development if 
the politician’s identity determines who are the beneficiaries of different development 
programmes.
India constitutes a very interesting case study, as social and economic inequalities across
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genders and castes axe very large. This chapter focuses on women and Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes (SC/ST), as they are the groups who display lower educational outcomes.1 
Even if some seats in the State and National Governments are reserved for the Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes, reservation for women in State and National Governments has been 
debated since 1996 without an agreement being reached, even if it has already taken 
place in local governments. If the politician’s identity matters, higher female and 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes political representation should improve the amount of 
public goods that these groups receive.
As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, for all groups primary education is positively corre­
lated with wages and expenditure. These figures show that individuals with primary 
education receive higher wages than those without it and, more importantly, households 
in which the household head has primary education have higher welfare, as they con­
sume more than the rest. This is true whether the household belongs to the Scheduled 
Castes or Tribes or not. Education may then be important for welfare and for reducing 
economic, social and political inequalities but, in addition, it is a convenient policy to 
study for timing issues, as only those politicians who were in power before an individual 
started primary education could have had an effect on his or her education.
In Chapter 2 I found that higher female representation increases primary education 
attainment in urban areas. In this chapter I match the politicians’ identity with the 
identity of individuals who five in the districts where they where elected. I first an­
alyze the impact of reservations for SC/STs on the probability that these individuals 
attain primary education, and on whether reservations reduced educational inequalities 
between SC/ST citizens and the rest. Then I analyze whether female representation 
increased girls’ education more than boys’ and finally I define identity as gender and 
caste and I study whether SC/ST and general female politicians increased their groups’ 
education more than the rest.
In order to conduct this study I combine a unique dataset on Indian elections with NSS 
survey data. These data allows me to identify the effect of politicians on individual 
educational outcomes, by matching the identity of the politicians and the identity of 
the beneficiaries.
The challenge is to identify empirically the causal effect of female politicians on an 
individual’s education. This is difficult because omitted variables are likely to affect
xSee Table 3.2.
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both electoral outcomes and policy. As in Chapter 2, to identify the effect of female 
representation I instrument the share of constituencies in the district won by a female 
politician with the share of constituencies in the district won by a female politician in 
a close election against a male politician.
To identify the effects of the politician’s caste, I take advantage of an institutional 
feature of the Indian democracy that reserves seats in the State Assemblies for Sched­
uled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). I can then divide female representatives 
according to whether they won the elections in reserved seats (SC/ST seats) or in 
non-reserved seats (general seats).
Results show that caste reservations had a negative effect on the education received 
by SC/ST individuals, but that this result is reversed when the proportion of SC/ST 
population in the district is high. Female politicians increase girls’ education in ur­
ban areas. In addition when defining identity as gender and caste, results show that 
politicians target their own groups: SC/ST female politicians increase women’s and 
SC/ST’s education while general female politicians increase women’s and general indi­
viduals’ education.
There is evidence that suggests that female politicians in India favour their group in 
policymaking. Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) show that reservation of one third of the 
seats for women in Panchayats of West Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive impact on 
investment in infrastructure relevant to women’s needs. There is also empirical evidence 
that suggests that a politician’s caste matters for policy decisions. In particular, this 
literature analyzes the impact of reservations for the lower castes in India, the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Pande (2003) analyses how the reservation of seats for the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the State Assemblies increases the amount of transfers 
that these groups receive. Besley et al (2004) look at the impact of reservations for 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes in village councils and find that they increase the amount 
of low-spillover public goods that lower castes receive. Bardhan et al (2005) examine 
the impact of reservations of Panchayat Pradhans on targeting to poor and SC/ST 
households. After looking at the effects of different programmes, they conclude that 
reservations have worsened targeting to SC/ST and landless households.
This chapter contributes to this literature by looking at the effects of the politician’s 
identity, defined along the lines of caste and gender, on individual educational outcomes 
of citizens of their group living in the area where the politician was elected, and by
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analyzing whether the effect on their own group is higher than on the others.
3.2 Background and D ata
3.2.1 Institu tional Background
The 1950 Indian constitution provides for political reservation for Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. According to articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution, prior to 
every national and state election, a number of jurisdictions will be reserved for these 
population groups. Both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes tend to be socially 
and economically disadvantaged, and they constitute about 25% of the total population 
in India. Scheduled Tribe (ST) seats are reserved according to the concentration of ST 
population in that particular constituency. Scheduled Caste (SC) seats are reserved 
according to two standards: the concentration of SC population and the dispersal of 
reservations in a given state.2
The Constitution Scheduled Castes Order and the Constitution Scheduled Tribes Order 
1950 provide a list of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, respectively, for each one of the 
Indian states. These lists have been modified from time to time.
Scheduled Castes and Tribes are not formally defined as such in the Constitution. 
According to Articles 341 of the Constitution, the Scheduled Castes are the castes, races 
or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes deemed by public notification 
to be Scheduled Castes by the President in relation to that State or Union territory. 
According to Article 342, the Scheduled Tribes are the tribes or tribal communities or 
part of or groups within these tribes and tribal communities which have been declared 
as such by the President through a public notification. The lists of Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes have not changed much over time.
Scheduled Tribes have primitive ways of life, live in geographical isolation, have a 
distinct culture, are reserved with respect to communicating with the rest of the com­
munity and are economically backward. Scheduled Castes can not be served by clean 
Brahmans, or by those who serve the caste Hindus. They pollute a high-caste Hindu by 
contact or proximity and an Hindu can not be served water from their hands. Scheduled
2There has almost never been a case in which a SC/ST legislator won a non-reserved seat. Thus, 
knowing whether a seat is reserved or not one can know the caste of the legislator who wins that seat.
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Castes are prevented from using public services, such as roads and schools, and will not 
be treated as equal by high caste men with the same education. In addition, they are 
depressed on account of their illiteracy and occupation and, but for that, occupation 
would be subject to no social disability3
Reservations for women in the state and national parliaments have not yet been ap­
proved. In September 1996, the Government introduced a parliamentary bill that pro­
posed the reservation of one third of the seats for women in the Central Government 
and the State Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been discussed in several par­
liamentary sessions, but an agreement has not being reached.
I match politicians who were part of the State Legislative Assemblies with individu­
als of the same identity who lived in the district that contains the constituency where 
they were elected. The State Legislative Assemblies conduct the ad m in istration  of the 
government in the 25 states of India. When elections take place, the states are divided 
into single-member constituencies where candidates are elected in first-past-the-post 
elections. The boundaries of constituencies are drawn to ensure that there is approxi­
mately the same number of inhabitants in each constituency. Different assemblies have 
different number of constituencies, according to population that lives in each state.
The districts axe the administration unit at the lower level from the state. Each one 
includes between one and 37 constituencies, with a median of 9. The State Legislative 
Assemblies are those that mainly decide on educational policies and expenditure. Ar­
ticle 246 of the Constitution gives the Legislature of any State powers to legislate on 
educational issues. Education falls into the Concurrent List (matters shared between 
the central and the state governments), but nevertheless the state government plays 
the major role in primary and secondary education.
3.2 .2  D ata
The data used in this chapter comes from two sources: the Election Commission of 
India, and the National Sample Survey. In order to analyse whether politicians benefit 
those who share their same identity I take advantage of some of the variables that I 
have already used in the previous chapter, I have however added information on SC
3Source: Source: www.indianngos.com, Pande (2003) and Jain & Ratnam (1994). This is based on 
the Census Report of 1931(1).
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and ST seats reservations and district population. I also exploit the information on the 
identity of the individuals that I match with politicians, the beneficiaries of educational 
policies. In the remainder of this section I will describe the dataset used with more 
detail.
I use data on 29686 candidates who won seats in the State Legislatures in India during 
the period 1967-2001 in the 16 largest states.4 I collected this data from reports 
published by the Election Commission of India. This data gives information on the 
name, gender and political party of the candidate, together with the constituency where 
he or she contested. In order to conduct this study I also take advantage of the fact 
that some seats in the State Assemblies were reserved for the Scheduled Castes and 
THbes. The Election Commission of India also provides information on this. Thus, for 
each politician in the dataset I know whether her or she was contesting for a Scheduled 
Caste reserved seat, for a Scheduled Tribe reserved seat or in an unreserved seat. Since 
those contesting in reserved seats must belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, this 
allows me to identify whether those contestants where Scheduled Castes or THbes. For 
female candidates I also collected data on the votes they obtained and on who were 
they contesting against. To be precise, for those women and men who won against a 
candidate of the other gender, I have data on who was the runner-up in each election 
and the vote’s difference between the two.
Each one of these candidates was elected in a single-member constituency and then 
occupied a seat in the State Legislative Assembly. Given that each district has from 1 
to 37 electoral constituencies, each district wall have from 1 to 37 representatives in the 
Assembly.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on the the political variables used in this chap­
ter. It gives information on the proportion of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, the proportion of seats won by women, both in reserved and unre­
served seats and the proportion of seats won by the different political parties.
Descriptive statistics show that an average of 15% of electoral constituencies in each 
of the sample districts are reserved for Scheduled Castes and 8% for Scheduled Tribes. 
In addition, 4.3% of SC reserved seats and 4.5% of ST reserved seats are won by
4These account for more than 90 per cent of the total population in India, about 935 million people. 
They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal.
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women. Out of the non-reserved seats, 3.73% are won by women. Thus, female political 
representation has been low for the three types of seats, but a bit lower for non-reserved 
seats.
In order to match politicians and beneficiaries of their policies, I combine this dataset 
with data from the 55th round of National Sample Survey (NSS). This is a nationally 
representative household survey that provides information at the household and the 
individual level. The survey was conducted in India between July 1999 and June 2000 
on a sample of randomly selected households. I use the Employment and Unemploy­
ment schedules of the 55th round of the NSS. They contain information on 596688 
individuals, 371188 in rural areas and 225500 in urban areas.5
The NSS gives information on a wide range of individual characteristics. As a dependent 
variable, I use primary education attainment. I use information on the educational level 
attained by each individual to create a variable that is equal to one if the individual 
obtained primary or a higher level of education through formal education.6 Since I 
define identity as gender and caste, I use a variable that gives information on each 
individual’s gender and social group. To be precise, I use a question that provides 
information on whether the individual belongs to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled 
TVibes, Other Backward Castes or none of the former. Since Other Backward Classes 
do not enjoy mandatory reservations in parliament, I will consider them as general 
individuals in this chapter. As control variables I will also use information on religion 
and urban/rural residence of the individuals.
Panel A in Table 3.2 provides evidence on the large educational differentials that still 
exist in India between castes and genders. It shows statistics on primary education at­
tainment by caste, gender and rural/urban status. Descriptive statistics show that SC 
and ST individuals receive lower levels than education than the rest, both in urban and 
in rural areas. In addition, differentials between men and women educational attain­
ments are still big, especially in rural areas and for SC/ST individuals. In particular, 
SC/ST women living in rural areas are those with lower educational attainments.
I have merged the individual data with the politician’s data by district of residence and
5The NSS uses the Indian Census definition of urban and rural areas.
6I then only consider individuals who attended formal education courses in my sample. Those who 
obtained education as adults are then considered as non-educated since they did not pass the primary 
standard examination when they were young. Nevertheless, there are only 987 individuals and results 
do not change after dropping them from the sample.
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by the year in which each individual started primary school7. Thus, using information 
on the year each individual was born and his or her district of birth I can know the 
identity of the politicians wo were in power before he or she started primary school.
The sample size used contains 105208 individuals. The availability of political data 
allows me to include in the sample only individuals born after 1964. In addition, since 
primary school lasts four or five years depending on the state and individuals usually 
start schooling at the age of six, I restrict the sample to those who are older than 13 
at the time of the survey, to allow for differences in states and for individuals finishing 
primary education at different years. I also eliminate individuals who migrated after 
schooling age from another district, state or country from the sample, as they will not 
have been benefited from the educational policies in the district of destination. I also 
eliminate those who migrated from rural to urban areas or vice versa within the same 
district, since educational policies may be different in rural than in urban areas.8
To each one of the individuals in the sample I assign the politicians who were in power 
during the three years before he or she started primary education. Thus, I take averages 
of the political variables between 1967 and 1969. Variation comes from the fact that 
different cohorts of individuals of different identities born in different districts will have 
been exposed to different politicians of different identities.
3.3 Identification
The aim of this chapter is to analyse whether politicians of a given identity target 
policies to individuals who share the same identity as themselves. I use education as a 
measure of the benefits received and I mainly focus on caste reservations and gender.
7As in Chapter 2, I consider it to be 6 years of age. The NSS provides information about an 
individual’s age and the time the individual was interviewed. Since the individual could have been 
sampled either in 1999 or 2000 and this sample year is given by the NSS, I take this into account when 
I compute the age at which an individual started primary school.
8Since migration in India is generally very low I do not take sample selection issues into account.
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3.3.1 Effect o f S C /S T  Politicians on S C /S T  Individuals’ E ducation
In order to determine the effect that Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and general 
politicians have on the education received by individuals who share their same identity, 
I take advantage of the fact that some seats in State Assemblies in India are reserved 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The idea is to match politicians with 
individuals of the same identity, to analyse whether these politicians had a larger effect 
on individuals of their same identity than on the rest.
Section 3 of Article 332 of the Indian Constitution states that the proportion of juris­
dictions reserved for SC/ST should equal, as nearly as possible, the population share 
of SC/ST in the state. This can only change when census estimates change.
The single standard for reservation of ST seats is the concentration of ST population 
in a particular constituency. ST population is usually quite concentrated, thus, those 
constituencies have a high fraction of Scheduled TVibes. These constituencies tend to 
be more isolated and much less urban than general constituencies. The majority of STs 
live in reserved constituencies. For SC seats, the Commission is instructed to apply 
two standards: the concentration of SC population and the dispersal of reservations. 
In practice, they first reserve the constituencies with a higher proportion of Scheduled 
Castes (about 20%) and then select the others by the dispersal criterion. SC population 
is quite dispersed, thus, constituencies chosen by the dispersion criterion do not have 
such a high fraction of SC people. There is a big proportion of SCs who live in general 
constituencies. SC reserved constituencies tend to be less politically developed, slightly 
less urban, with less newspaper circulation and a slightly higher percentage of agri­
cultural labourers. Objections to reservations in a particular constituency rarely bring 
about a change in the reservation status, so their location has remained relatively stable 
and has only changed due to changes in census estimates or other changes unrelated to 
the political process.9
Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Tribes is a function of their fraction in the popular 
tion according to the previous census. Following the same strategy as Pande (2003) but 
at the district level, I use this to identify the effect of a politician’s caste on individuals 
of their same group. In other words, I estimate equation 3.1:
°In 1976 reservations changed due to the Area Restiction Removal Act. Source Pande (2003) and 
Galanter (1979).
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Yidt — Od +  ^ t +  fiscstidt * PSCSTdt +  Ageriidt * PSCSTdt + uscstpopcurrdt +
+<pscstpropcen8dt + Xidtf] + ZdtS + Eidt (3.1)
In this equation PSCSTdt is the fraction of seats in the district reserved for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes during the three years before cohort t started primary 
education. I interact this variable with two dummy variables: scstidt, which is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the individual i living in district d and belonging to cohort t 
is SC/ST and zero otherwise and geriidt, which is equal to one if the individual is not 
SC/ST. In the tables I then report the difference between the two interaction terms, 
to understand whether politicians of a given group have a larger effect on individuals 
belonging to their group than on the rest. I control for scstpropcensdt, the fraction of 
SC/ST population according to the previous census, as the number of reserved seats in 
the district will be a function of this variable. In addition, I control for the current share 
of SC/ST population in the district, scstpopcurrdt, to rule out the possibility that the 
coefficient of the reserved seats variable simply proxies for higher SC/ST population.
Od are district fixed effects, which account for district-specific characteristics that do not 
change over time. ipt are the cohort fixed effects, which account for the fact that indi­
viduals born in different years may have been subject to different shocks or nationwide 
educational policies.
Xidt is a vector of individual-level control variables. I use different dummy variables 
for rural areas and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe individuals. I also include a 
dummy that indicates whether the individual is a woman.
Zdt are the set of other district characteristics that vary over time and may have an effect 
on the dependent variable. In order to be able to disentangle the identity of the legislator 
effect from the political parties’ effect, I include as control variables the average fraction 
of seats won by the different political parties in each district the three years before the 
individual started primary education. These variables vary across districts and across 
time. As in Besley and Burgess (2002) I use six main party groups: Congress, Hard 
Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu and Regional parties. Thus, independent candidates 
and other very small parties are the reference category. I also include literacy rates in 
order to control for the fact that in districts with more SC/ST population literacy will 
tend to be lower from the start. At the same time, it may as well be that in districts
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where literacy rates are higher parents are more likely to bring their children to school. 
I have also included the share of urban population in the regression, since there is a 
big proportion of SC/ST population living in rural areas but parents may be more 
likely to educate their children in urban areas. As in Pande (2003), I include a dummy 
for individuals who started primary education in an electoral year, to ensure that the 
reservation variable does not act as a proxy for the electoral year. Descriptive statistics 
for these variables are shown in Panel B of Table 3.2. For the literacy rates and urban 
population variables, I use information on district and state characteristics when the 
legislators included in these three years were elected, or, if there were elections in the 
middle of these three years, characteristics when the first set of legislators were elected, 
to account for the situation the legislator found in a particular district when he or she 
was elected. Since observations in the same district could be correlated, I compute the 
robust standard errors clustered at the district level.
3.3 .2  Effect o f  Fem ale Politicians on W om en's E ducation
The goal in this subsection will be to estimate whether the effect of female politicians 
on the education received by girls is larger than their effect on the education received 
by boys, by matching female politicians with women and men who were living in the 
districts where these politicians were elected when they were young.
If an equation such as 3.2 is estimated:
Yidt =  0d + il)t + (3womenidt * Fdt +  ^menidt * Fdt +  X idtr) +  Zdt6 +  £idt (3.2)
Where Fdt , is the fraction of constituencies in the district that were won by a female 
politician during the three years before individual i started primary education. I inter­
act this variable with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is a woman: 
womeriidt and another variable that is equal to one if the individual is a man meriidt,to 
estimate the differential effect of female politicians on girls and boys. However, there 
may be an omitted variable that affects both who is the politician elected and the 
education achievements of the beneficiaries of educational policies. This omitted vari­
able will be problematic if it also affects women and men differently. The identification 
strategy used in this chapter is very similar to the one used in the previous chapter,
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with the difference that now the interaction terms are used to calculate the differential 
effects on different types of beneficiaries.
I take advantage of the existence of close elections between a woman and a man can­
didate, elections in which the winner won the runner up by a very small number of 
votes.10 The identification strategy used in this chapter follows the same idea as the 
regression discontinuity approach. This methodology has been widely used and was 
first introduced in the context of elections by Lee (2001) for incumbency advantage 
and Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) for the effect of party control on fiscal policies. In the 
field of development economics, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) use regression discontinuity to 
test for the “Patronage” hypothesis in Ghana. Angrist and Lavy (1999) used regres­
sion discontinuity as an instrument to estimate the impact of class size on educational 
achievements. Rehavi (2003) used close elections between women and men in the US 
as an instrument to estimate the effect of female politicians at the state level on US 
policies.
In the same spirit, to identify the causal effect of female politicians I use as an instrument 
for female representation the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
in a close election against a man.
The first stage regression would then be:
Fdt — @d + rft KFCdt +  pTCdt + Xdt<j + ZdtS + Udt (3*3)
Fdt > is the fraction of constituencies in the district that were won by a female politician 
during the three years before individual i started primary education. The instrument 
for this variable is FCdt, the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
in a close election against a man during the same time period. I control for TCdt, the 
fraction of constituencies in the district in which there were close elections between 
women and men, as well during the same time period.
The instrument satisfies the exclusion restrictions because female candidates who barely 
win the elections against a man must do so in constituencies where it is not clear that
10As in Chapter 2 I define close elections as those in which the winner won the runner up by less 
than 3.5% of votes.
72
the electorate has a strong preference for female politicians. These constituencies will be 
ex ante comparable to constituencies in which male candidates win in a close election 
against a woman. Thus, constituencies in which a woman won in a close election 
against a man and constituencies in which a man won in a close election against a 
woman will be similar in all the unobservable variables, they will only differ in the fact 
that by chance either a man or a woman won the election. The fact that a candidate is 
elected in first-past-the-post elections held in single-member constituencies is a function 
of the vote difference between the winner and the runner up. This function has a 
discontinuity when the vote difference is zero; this is the case because the winner has 
to receive more votes than the runner up in order to win the election. The fact that 
the candidate is elected or not changes discontinuously as this vote difference is zero. 
In elections in which the winner and the runner up have different genders, as the vote 
difference becomes smaller and approaches the discontinuity, constituencies in which 
the vote difference is very small and a woman won will be more and more similar to 
constituencies in which the vote difference is very small and a man won. Thus, this 
discontinuity at the zero vote difference will provide a randomized treatment. Since I 
consider elections in which the winner and the runner up have different genders, when 
the difference in votes is very small the winner’s gender will be randomized. I define 
close elections as elections in which the votes difference between the winner and the 
runner-up is less than 3.5% of the total votes in that particular constituency.
The second stage regression is specification 3.4 , Y , takes the value of 1 if individual 
i belonging to cohort £, and born in district d has obtained at least primary education 
and 0 otherwise. Since observations in the same district could be correlated, I compute 
the robust standard errors clustered at the district level.
Yidt =  0d +  ip t  +  fiwomeriidt * Fat + 7meriidt * Fdt +  ATCdt + X ^r} +  Zdt6 + £idt
(3.4)
In this equation I also control for TCdt, the fraction of constituencies in the district 
in which there were close elections between women and men, as well during the same 
time period. The fraction of constituencies that had close elections between men and 
women controls for the fact that the existence of this type of close elections may not 
be a random event. However, the outcome of a close election is random, meaning that 
the winner’s gender in close elections between women and men is random as well. In 
other words, the impact of the existence of close elections between women and men on 
education is controlled by in specification 3.4 and partialled out of the instrument in
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specification 3.3.
I interact Fat with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is a woman: 
womeriidt and another variable that is equal to one if the individual is a man meriidt- 
I can then estimate the effects of female politicians on the education received by girls 
and boys. 11
Controls differ from those included in the previous section, as I include female and male 
literacy rates, to control for initial gender differences in education. I also control for the 
fraction of reserved seats, SC/ST and female population, to control for the electorate 
composition and reservation policies. Finally, I also include individual dummies indi­
cating whether the individual is Hindu or Muslim, as this may have big implications 
for girl’s education..
3.3 .3  Effects o f  th e  G ender and C aste o f  th e  P oliticians on  th e  Edu­
cation  R eceived by Individuals o f  th e  sam e Identity
This subsection aims to determine whether politicians tend to favour those who share 
their same identity, as defined by gender and caste, in policymaking. India provides the 
unique opportunity to analyse both the gender and the caste effect of politicians, which 
has not been previously analyzed in the literature. I take advantage of the fact that 
some seats in the State Assemblies axe reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes. Since some constituencies in each district will be reserved for this population 
group. I can compare female politicians who contested for SC/ST reserved seats to 
female politicians who contested for unreserved (or general) seats.
I instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman with the 
fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election against a 
man. I do this both for women who won in reserved seats (SC/ST) and for women who 
won in non-reserved seats (general seats). The specification that is going to be tested 
will then be:
11 In the first stage I also interact the instrument with the dummy variables.
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Yidt =  ed +  i>t +  J2 0 i j ( idenii t t  * F scstdt) +  ^2j(idenFidt * F 9endt) +
3 3
+\TC dt + XidtTj + ZdtS + Eidt (3*5)
Where Fscstdt, the fraction of constituencies in the district won by SC/ST women 
is instrumented with the fraction of constituencies won by SC/ST women in a close 
election against a SC/ST man. Similarly, Fgeridt, the fraction of constituencies in the 
district won by general women is instrumented with the fraction of constituencies won 
by general women against general men.
In order to estimate the effect of both SC/ST and general female politicians on individ­
uals of different identities, I interact the female representation variables with dummy 
variables that will be equal to one if the individual belongs to a particular identity 
group. Thus, ident3^being equal to one indicates that individual i, born in district d 
and in cohort t has identity j. I will use as identity variable dummies for gender, caste 
or gender and caste of the individuals, which are mutually exclusive. In this specifi­
cation the controls used are the same as those in the previous subsection, and include 
identic. In order to estimate the model, the representation variables are interacted in 
the second and the first stages with the identity dummies.
3.3 .4  V alidity o f  th e  Identification Strategy
In this subsection I perform some checks to confirm that the close elections identification 
strategy can be applied once dividing the female representation variable according to 
whether they were contesting for a SC/ST reserved seat or not. In Chapter 2 I showed 
that this was the case for close elections between women and men, but this may not 
be the case once taking caste reservations into account. To identify the effect of both 
general and SC/ST female politicians on the education received by individuals of their 
own identities I take advantage of SC/ST reservations and the fact that some of these 
female politicians won in close elections against men politicians.
In Chapter 2 1 show that the proportion of constituencies in the district won by a female 
politician against a man is a good instrument for the proportion of constituencies in 
the district won by a female politician. This is the case because the outcome of a close
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election between a woman and a man can not be predicted with any variable, districts 
where more female politicians won in close elections axe very sim ilar to those in which 
more men won in close elections, candidates and constituency characteristics are as 
well very similar and districts that never had close elections are very similar to those 
who had. However, it remains to be shown that the outcome of a close election in 
general and SC/ST seats is random and that districts and constituencies where general 
(SC/ST) female politicians won in close elections against men are very similar to those 
in which general (SC/ST) male politicians won in close elections against women.
First, the outcome of a close election between a female and a male politician should be 
truly random, in other words, should not depend on district characteristics. One way to 
test for this is to try to predict it with district level variables. Results in Table 3.3 show 
that the fraction of close elections between general women and men won by women and 
the fraction of close elections between SC/ST women and men won by women can not 
be explained by the proportion of close-elections seats contested by the different parties, 
by whether the district had close elections in the past, by the number of times that 
women had won elections in the past in the district, district population characteristics 
and the fraction of reserved seats. Regressions in Table 3.3 include district and year 
fixed effects, and are run in the sample of districts where there was at least a close 
election between a woman and a man.
Second, districts where more SC/ST (general) female politicians won in close elections 
should be similar in observables to districts where more SC/ST (general) male politi­
cians won in close elections. Table 3.4 provides information on the differences in district 
characteristics, according to whether more general (and SC/ST) women or more gen­
eral (and SC/ST) men won in close elections against a candidate of the same caste and 
the other gender. I use information at the district level on the proportion of urban and 
SC/ST population, male and female literacy rates, the fraction of seats reserved for 
SC/STs, the number of educational institutions and hospitals weighted by the popula­
tion and the proportion of seats won by female and male candidates in elections that 
were not close. Results show that districts in which more general (SC/ST) men won in 
close elections and districts where more general (SC/ST) women won in close elections 
are very similar in all these variables.
One should also observe that constituency and individual characteristics of women and 
men winning in close elections are the same. In the remainder of this section I analyze 
some of these characteristics both for general and for SC/ST reserved constituencies,
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that could compromise the comparability between close elections in which men won 
and close elections in which women won in both types of seats.
First of all, there might be concerns that two different constituencies in which a woman 
contested in a close election against a man might not be similar if in one of them 
there were many other women candidates, apart from the winner and the r u n n e r  up, 
contesting for the same seat. This would be a case in which political parties perceive 
the constituency as one in which there is “preference for female politicians” and tend to 
field female candidates there. I use information on all the female candidates contesting 
in a particular constituency, apart from the winner and the runner up, both for general 
and for SC/ST constituencies. As shown in the top panel of Table 3.5 , the number of 
other female candidates contesting against women who won in close elections against a 
man is not significantly different than that for men who won in close elections against 
a woman, for both reserved and unreserved constituencies.
It might also be that one of the candidates in a close election is in this situation because 
he or she is the incumbent for that seat in that particular constituency. This would 
make constituencies in which women and men won in close elections against a candidate 
of the other gender different in observables if men (or women) axe those who tend to 
be the incumbent, as they will have more experience as legislators and may implement 
different policies. In order to address this concern I use the fact that I have information 
on the candidate’s names, thus, I can know whether a particular candidate was already 
in power in the same constituency where he or she is contesting now during the previous 
electoral year. I then create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual was 
the incumbent for that seat. However, as it is shown in the second panel of Table 3.5, 
the percentage of winners in close elections who were the incumbent is statistically the 
same for female and male legislators who won in close elections, both for general and 
for SC/ST constituencies.
Another concern that needs to be addressed is that there may be some constituencies in 
which there have been more close elections between men and women in the past than in 
others. If this happens more often in constituencies where women won the close election 
than in constituencies in which men won, then these two types of constituencies would 
not be comparable, since the one where there have been more close elections would 
probably be more “women friendly”. In the third panel of Table 3.5 I test whether 
constituencies in which a man or a woman won in a close election are different in terms 
of how many times the particular constituencies have had close elections between men
77
and women. Results show that they are the same for both types of constituencies.
Finally, if elections in which men and women won in close elections axe really similar, 
they should have the same electoral turnout and the same distribution of votes between 
the first two candidates and the others. The last two panels of Table 3.5 show that 
those general (SC/ST) women who won in close elections won by the same number of 
votes as general (SC/ST) men who won in close elections and in constituencies where 
the total number of votes was the same. Since constituencies in India were designed to 
have the same population, this means that turnout was the same and the distribution 
of votes between the first candidate and the rest was the same as well. This further 
corroborates that constituencies in which a man or a woman won in a close election are 
perfectly comparable and thus, the gender of the winner is, indeed, random. These two 
panels also show that in both types of constituencies the first two candidates receive a 
minimum of 76.5% of votes in their constituencies, which means that other candidates 
only receive 23.5% of votes. Thus, even if there was only one other candidate in the 
constituency, he or she did not have any chance of winning the election.
3.4 Baseline Results:
3.4.1 Effect o f  S C /S T  Politicians on  th e  E ducation  R eceived  by S C /S T
Individuals
In this subsection I will analyze whether SC/ST politicians did favour SC/ST individ­
uals who were living in the district where the constituency where they were elected 
is located. Results are reported in Table 3.6. I report the coefficient for the fraction 
of seats in the district reserved for SC/ST interacted with a d um m y variable equal to 
one if the individual affected is SC/ST and interacted with another dummy that is 
equal to one if the individual is general. I also report the p-value of difference between 
these two coefficients, that indicates whether SC/ST favour more those who belong to 
their group than the rest or not. In column 1 I report results for the whole sample; 
results show that SC/ST politicians had a negative impact on the education received by 
SC/ST individuals. Even if their effect on general individuals is very close to zero and 
not significant, the difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant. 
Given that the reference category is politicians in general seats, this indicates that 
general politicians have a larger effect on SC/STs education than SC/ST politicians.
78
Since a considerable amount of SC/ST individuals live in rural areas, I split the sample, 
according to whether the individuals affected live in an urban or a rural area. Results 
are reported in columns 2 and 3. Coefficients in these two columns are very similar to 
those obtained before, indicating that there are no sizeable differences between urban 
and rural areas.
These results are striking, however, SC/ST politicians are contesting for seats in which 
only SC/ST politicians can contest and are as well elected by the general individu­
als living in their electoral constituencies. Thus, in order to get re-elected they will 
have more incentives to target SC/ST individuals living in their constituencies when 
designing electoral policies the larger the proportion of SC/ST individuals living in the 
constituencies. Data on each electoral constituency in India does not exist, so I have 
computed the fraction of the population of each district that is SC/ST. I then inter­
act this variable (in differences from the mean)12 with the proportion of reserved seats 
interacted with the identity dummies.13
Results are shown in column 4. Results for the fraction of reserved seats interacted with 
the identity dummies are essentially the same as before, and the gap between SC/ST 
and general individuals has the same size but it is not statistically significant. These 
coefficients indicate the effect of reservations on both types of individuals when the 
proportion of the population that is SC/ST is at the mean. Results for the interactions 
with the SC/ST population variable in deviations from the mean are different. The 
larger the fraction of SC/ST population in the district, the larger the effect that SC/ST 
reservations have on the education received by SC/ST individuals. In addition the 
coefficient for SC/ST individuals is now larger than the one for general individuals, 
even if the difference is not statistically significant. If the SC/ST district population 
in deviations from the mean is higher than 0.29, the effect of SC/ST reservations on 
SC/ST individuals will be positive, this means that the SC/ST population in the district 
has to be higher than 53%. This SC/ST district population variable proxies for SC/ST 
population in the constituency, thus SC/ST politicians will favour SC/ST individuals 
if they constitute a large group.
Finally, in column 5 I consider reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
separately, as they are different groups and may have different preferences. Results show
12The mean of this variable is then 0.002872 , with standard deviation of 0.1274371.
13A11 terms in the triple interactions are included in the regression, even if coefficients are not reported 
in the table.
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that SC reservations have a negative impact on SC’s education, while ST reservations 
do not have an effect on any of the groups. The reference category is general seats. 
Thus, the negative coefficient for the effect of SC politicians on SC individuals may be 
explained by the fact that general politicians do indeed do something for education, 
especially for the SCs, who are assumed to have more political power than the rest. 14
3.4.2 Effect o f  Fem ale Politicians on G irls’ and B oys’ E ducation
In this subsection I analyse whether female politicians have a bigger effect on girls’ than 
on boys’ education. If female politicians promote policies that favour women’s needs, 
they should increase girl’s education. However, there may be spillovers and then boy’s 
education will increase as well.
Results for the OLS regressions axe reported in columns 1-3 of Table 3.8. In column 
1 I show results for the whole sample of individuals. I report the coefficients for the 
fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman interacted with two dummy 
variables: one that is equal to one if the individual affected is a woman and another 
one that is equal to one if the individual affected is a man. I also report the computed 
difference between these two coefficients. Results show that female politicians increase 
the probability that a girl attains primary education, while this is not the case for boys. 
However, the difference between the two coefficients is not significant. In column 2 I 
only include in the sample those individuals who live in urban areas. Here results are 
the same but the effect of female politicians on girl’s education is larger and statistically 
different than the effect of female politicians on boy’s education. In column 3 I report 
results for individuals living in rural areas, here neither girls nor boys are affected by 
female politicians. These results could be affected by omitted variable bias, so I will use 
as an instrument for female representation the fraction of constituencies in the district 
won by a woman in a close election against a man.
Results for the first stage regressions are shown in Table 3.7. In column 1 1 report results 
for the first stage, when the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
in a close election against a man is used the instrument the fraction of constituencies 
in the district won by a woman. In columns 4-6 of Table 3.8 I report results for the 
second stage. Coefficients for the effect of female representation on women and on
14See Banerjee & Somanathan (2006).
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men, together with the difference between the two are shown. In column 4 I report 
results for the whole sample, while in columns 5 and 6 I restrict the sample to urban 
and rural areas, respectively. Female representation does not have a significant effect, 
neither on women nor on men in the overall sample. In contrast, female representation 
has a positive and significant effect in urban areas, both for women and for men; see 
column 5. The coefficient for the effect on women is 50% larger in magnitude than 
the one for the effect on men, although the difference between these two coefficients is 
not statistically significant. The difference in magnitudes may be due to the fact that 
women have lower primary education attainments than men to start with, or may be 
due to the fact that female politicians promote educational policies that increase girls’ 
education but that also have spillover effects on boys. Column 6 shows that in rural 
areas, female representation does not have an effect, neither on girls nor on boys.
The fact that the 2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS ones both for the effect on 
girls and boys for the overall sample and the urban sample may indicate that female 
politicians are elected where both girls’ and boys’ educational levels are lower. The fact 
that this is not the case for the coefficients in rural areas means that the bias would 
reduce the urban-rural difference observed.15
3.4 .3  Effects o f th e  P olitic ian ’s G ender and C aste on Individuals w ho  
Share their Identity.
In this subsection I take advantage of the fact that in India, some seats are reserved 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST). By looking separately at SC/ST 
and general female legislators I can then disentangle gender from caste effects and I can 
analyze whether SC/ST and general female legislators favour individuals belonging to 
their groups more than the rest in policymaking.16
I first analyse whether both general and SC/ST and general female politicians favour 
women more than men, by increasing the probability that a girl attains primary edu­
15Both the instrument and the female representation variable vary at the district and cohort level, 
even if the dependent variable is at the individual level. When running the first stage regression at 
the district and year level without individual variables the coefficient for the fraction of constituencies 
in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man is 1.2025, with a standard error or 
0.1992. Results for the second stage regression are as well very similar.
16I do not consider SC and ST female politicians separately due to the lack of data points to construct 
the instrument.
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cation more than the probability that a boy attains primary education. SC/ST women 
are part of a socially and economically disadvantaged group, with different needs than 
general women. SC/ST politicians may have different preferences and may behave dif­
ferently from general legislators due to their lower social and economic position (see 
Pande 2003), so it is interesting to see whether, once controlling for caste, gender also 
matters.
In addition, if the cost of running for elections is higher for female than for male 
candidates, female legislators will tend to belong to richer economic backgrounds. If 
this is the case, the female representation variable may then proxy for class rather than 
gender preferences. It is then convenient to divide the female representation variable 
according to the representatives’ caste, in order to disentangle gender from class effects.
The first stage regressions for this specification are reported in columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 3.7. Results show that the fraction of constituencies in the district won in a 
close election by a SC/ST female politician against a SC/ST male politician is a very 
good predictor of the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST female 
politician. The analogous is true for general female politicians. The cross-coefficients 
are also significant, but smaller.
Results in Table 3.9 show the coefficients of the effect of SC/ST and general female 
politicians on girls and boys. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS regressions, while 3 and 4 
show 2SLS regressions. The computed difference among the coefficients on girls and 
boys are also reported, both for SC/ST and for general female legislators. In column 
1 I report results for the urban sample, while in column 2 I report results for the rural 
sample. Given that results obtained before show that female politicians favour urban 
areas as opposed to rural areas, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, women may benefit 
more from education in urban areas, I will now report results for the urban and rural 
samples separately. Results in column 1 shows how SC/ST female politicians do not 
affect neither girls’ nor boys’ primary education attainment in urban areas, as compared 
to male politicians. In contrast, general female politicians have a larger effect on girls’ 
education than on boys’ education. In rural areas, see column 2, neither general nor 
SC/ST female politicians have any impact on girls’ and boys’ education, or on the 
difference between the two.
As discussed before, OLS results may be contaminated by omitted variable bias. In 
columns 3 and 4 I show 2SLS results in which the fraction of constituencies in the
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district won by a SC/ST (general) female politician is instrumented by the fraction 
of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST (general) female politician in a close 
election against a SC/ST (general) man.
Column 3 shows how both SC/ST and general female politicians have a positive effect 
on the probability that girls attain primary education in urban areas, while the effect 
on boys is not significant. However, the effect of SC/ST female politicians is almost 
three times as big as the effect of general female politicians. The coefficients on the 
effect on girls and boys are not significantly different, neither for general nor for SC/ST 
female politicians. In rural areas, the effect is not significant, neither for girls nor 
for boys. By increasing SC/ST female representation by 10 percentage points, the 
probability that a girl living in an urban area attains primary education increases by 
15 percentage points, while by increasing general female representation by 10 percentage 
points, the probability that a girl attains primary education in an urban area increases 
by 5 percentage points.
So fax results show that SC/ST female politicians increase girls’ education in urban 
areas. Even if the educational gender gap is not reduced, their effect on boys’ is not 
significant. Given that the reference category are male politicians, results indicate that 
both general and SC/ST female politicians increase women’s education more than male 
politicians.
SC/ST individuals attain primary education with lower probability than general indi­
viduals; it is also interesting to see whether female politicians increase education for 
individuals of their own caste group. Results for the 2SLS regressions are shown in Table 
3.10. I report coefficients of the effect that both SC/ST and general female politicians 
have on SC/ST and general individuals, together with the computed difference between 
the two.
Column 1 shows results for the whole sample. Results show that neither SC/ST nor 
general female politicians have had an impact on the probability that SC/ST and 
general individuals attained primary education. In addition, SC/ST female politicians 
seem to have a larger effect on general individuals than on SC/ST individuals. SC/ST 
female politicians are contesting in seats that are already reserved for SC/ST, but are 
competing against SC/ST male politicians to win the seat, this means that, in order 
to get re-elected, they may be more likely to favour policies targeted to women than 
policies targeted to SC/ST individuals. It will then be interesting to see whether the
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effects axe the same on individuals living in urban and rural areas, as women benefit 
more from education in urban areas than in rural areas.
In urban areas, SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on SC/ST individuals, 
while general female politicians have a positive effect on general individuals; see col­
umn 2. In fact, by increasing SC/ST female representation by 10 percentage points, the 
probability that a SC/ST individual attains primary education increases by 28 percent­
age points, which is 43% of the probability that a SC/ST individual attains primary 
education in an urban area. In addition, this coefficient is significantly different than 
the effect on general individuals. By increasing general female representation by 10 
percentage points, the probability that a general individual attains primary education 
increases by 5.6 percentage points, 7% of the probability that a general individual at­
tains primary education in an urban area. This coefficient is not significantly different 
than the one on SC/ST individuals, even if the latter is much smaller. This is the case 
because the latter is not precisely estimated.
In rural areas, see column 3, SC/ST female politicians have a negative effect on the 
probability that SC/ST individuals attain primary education. Since the reference group 
is men, this may mean that male politicians increase SC/ST education in rural areas, 
even after controlling for the fraction of seats in the districts that are reserved for 
SC/STs. In contrast, SC/ST female politicians do not affect general individuals. Col­
umn 3 also shows that general female politicians do not have an effect on individuals 
living in rural areas, irrespective of their caste.
In summary, female politicians seem to induce educational policies that favour indi­
viduals of their own gender and caste in urban areas. The fact that female politicians 
benefit individuals of their same caste in urban areas but not in rural areas may in­
dicate that they target individuals of their same gender and caste, as women benefit 
more from education in urban than in rural areas.
In order to confirm this later statement, in Table 3.11 I show results in which I inter­
act the female representation variables with four different dummy variables: for SC/ST 
women, SC/ST men, general women and general men. This allows me to identify the 
effect of SC/ST and general female politicians on the different groups. In column 1 
I report results for the urban sample, while in column 2 I report results for the rural 
sample. In urban areas SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on the proba­
bility that both SC/ST women and men achieve primary education. Moreover, they
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also affect positively the probability that general women achieve primary education. 
The coefficients for SC/ST women and men are not significantly different, but they are 
both different than the coefficients for general women and men. These results indicate 
that SC/ST female politicians target educational policies to individuals of their own 
group: women and the SC/STs. In fact, by increasing the proportion of seats won by 
SC/ST female politicians by 10 percentage points, this increases the probability that 
SC/ST women achieve primary education by 30 percentage points, which is a very large 
amount compared to the average probability.
General female politicians also target their own group in policymaking. General female 
politicians have a positive effect on the probability that general women achieve primary 
education. However, this coefficient is not significantly different than the coefficient for 
SC/ST women and men and general men, as these are not precisely estimated.17
3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section I perform some robustness checks in order to confirm the validity of the 
main results obtained. Results are shown in Table 3.12.
In this chapter I have defined close elections as elections in which the votes difference 
between the winner and the runner up is less than 3.5%. Here I check whether the 
results are sensitive to this choice of vote margin. In columns 1-4 of Table 3.12 I test 
whether results are the same when I define close elections as those in which the winner 
won the runner-up by smaller margins. In particular, in columns 1 and 2, I use a 3% 
margin as a cut-off point, while in columns 3 and 4 I use a 2.5% margin. I then run the 
2SLS specifications in which I analyse whether SC/ST and general female politicians 
have an effect on the education received by individuals of their own gender and caste. 
Now, however, the instrument will be defined in a different way, since some elections 
that before were considered close now will not be. I report results for the urban sample
17Since variation both in the instruments and the endogenous variables is at the district and year level, 
even if I use NSS weights in the individual regressions I should check whether results remain running 
the regressions at the district and year level, without controlling for individual characteristics. The first 
stage results are as well very similar. In the regression for SC/ST female politicians, the coefficient for 
SC/ST female politicians who won in close elections is 1.0285, with a standard error of 0.05361. In the 
regression for general female politicians, the coefficient for general female politicians who won in close 
elections is 1.1020, with a standard error of 0.1881. Moreover, coefficients for the second stage are as 
well very similar, whether I run the regression at the district level or at the individual level.
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and the coefficient for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by SC/ST and 
general women interacted with the identity dummy variables. Columns 1 and 3 show 
that, when reducing the margin, the coefficient of the effect of SC/ST female politicians 
on women remains significant and it is very similar than the one found with the 3.5% 
margin. In contrast, the coefficient for general female politicians is not significant. This 
may be due to the fact that the coefficient for general female politicians had a lower 
significance level in the original regressions and it is both the standard error and the 
coefficients that increase. Columns 2 and 4 show that, when reducing the margin, the 
coefficient of the effect of both general and SC/ST female politicians on individuals of 
their own caste group remains significant and it is very similar than the one found with 
the 3.5% margin.
Finally, similar to Pande (2003) and since SC/ST reservation is a nonlinear function 
of SC/ST population, I include as controls the square and the cube of the fraction 
of the population that was SC/ST according to the previous census. Results for the 
specifications in which politician’s identity is defined as gender and caste are shown in 
columns 5 and 6, while results for the specification in which identity is defined as caste 
is reported in column 7. Results for these three specifications are mainly unchanged 
when adding these controls, even if the coefficient for general female politicians is not 
significant. As before, this may be due to the fact that the coefficient for general female 
politicians had a lower significance level in the original regressions and it is both the 
standard error and the coefficient that increase.
3.6 Conclusions
By matching politicians’ with beneficiaries’ identity, this chapter provides evidence 
that politicians benefit those who share their same identity. The analysis focuses on 
caste reservations and on variations on female political representation and analyses 
their effects on the probability that individuals who share their same identity attain 
primary education. It finds that female politicians tend to increase girls’ education 
in urban areas; in fact SC/ST female politicians favour girls and the SC/STs, while 
general female politicians favour girls and general individuals. In contrast, it finds that 
reservation for SC/STs has a negative impact on the education received by SC/ST 
individuals.
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However, this result is reversed when there are a large number of SC/ST individuals 
living in the district. A possible explanation for this is that, given that SC/ST re­
served seats can only be contested by SC/ST candidates, the only competition that 
these candidates face comes from other SC/ST candidates belonging to different po­
litical parties. Citizen-candidate models would predict that SC/ST politicians choose 
different policies than the rest, and would choose these policies according to their own 
preferences as SC/STs. However, if they want to be re-elected, they will try to favour 
their constituents. Given that there are both general and SC/ST inhabitants in reserved 
constituencies, they will be more likely to target policies to SC/ST individuals if they 
constitute a large fraction of the population. In other words, irrespective of whether 
they promote SC/ST targeted policies at the state level, in their own constituencies 
they will try to win votes from the maximum number of citizens.
Even if this is the case for SC/ST politicians, the situation for SC/ST female politicians 
is different, as, even if they do not compete on the SC/ST issue, they compete on the 
gender issue. This means that they will try to favour women in policy making, which 
is what results in this chapter suggest. SC/ST female politicians also favour SC/ST 
individuals; this can be explained by the fact that they face higher political competition 
that drives them to target both women and the SC/STs, or because educational policies 
had spillover effects to SC/ST men. Given that their effect is restricted to urban areas 
and women benefit more from education in urban areas, the second explanation seems 
more plausible.
There is very little evidence on how politicians choose beneficiaries for their policies 
and on whether the politician’s identity has an impact on who the beneficiaries are. 
If the politician’s identity determines who the beneficiaries of the policies he or she 
implements are, increasing some groups’ political representation may reduce inequality 
between these groups and the rest of the population. This is especially important 
if those groups are relatively disadvantaged with respect to the society as a whole. 
Results obtained in this chapter give an insight on how political institutions function 
and show that political representation is crucial for the education received by individuals 
belonging to the politician’s identity group.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: District Politicians
Unit of observation: district in an electoral year_____
Variable ( total seats in the district) Obs. Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women 2546 0.0387 0.0750
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 2546 0.2363 0.1948
Proportion of seats reserved for SC 2546 0.1535 0.1098
Proportion of seats reserved for ST 2546 0.0829 0.2022
Proportion of seats won by SC/ST women 2546 0.0103 0.0404
Proportion of seats won by SC women 2546 0.0066 0.0302
Proportion of seats won by ST women 2546 0.0037 0.0275
Proportion of seats won by general women 2546 0.0285 0.0632
Proportion of seats won by Congress 2546 0.4359 0.3289
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left 2546 0.0599 0.1475
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left 2546 0.0245 0.0916
Proportion of seats won by Hindu 2546 0.1336 0.2344
Proportion of seats won by Janata 2546 0.1489 0.2631
Proportion of seats won by Regional 2546 0.0800 0.2047
Proportion of seats won by Others 2546 0.0594 0.1600
Proportion of seats won by Independent 2546 0.0578 0.1114
Variable ( total seats in the district in districts where women were elected) Obs. Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against men 
Proportion of seats who had close elections between men and women 
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (SC/ST) 
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (general)
708
708
708
708
0.0163
0.0225
0.0032
0.0130
0.0416
0.0488
0.0207
0.0372
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Survey and Control Variables.
Panel A: NSS individual variables
Variable Obs
RURAL
Mean Sd Obs
URBAN
Mean Sd
Women 70604 0.4560 0.4981 34604 0.4081 0.4915
Men 70604 0.5440 0.4981 34604 0.5919 0.4915
SC/ST 70604 0.3008 0.4586 34604 0.1777 0.3823
SC 70604 0.1913 0.3934 34604 0.1425 0.3495
ST 70604 0.1095 0.3123 34604 0.0353 0.1844
Hindu 70604 0.8363 0.3700 34604 0.7162 0.4509
Muslim 70604 0.0932 0.2907 34604 0.2039 0.4029
Primary education or more 70604 0.5528 0.4972 34604 0.7942 0.4043
Women with primary education or more 32198 0.4311 0.4952 14121 0.7684 0.4219
Men with primary education or more 38406 0.6548 0.4754 20483 0.8120 0.3907
SC/ST with primary education or more 21241 0.3981 0.4895 6150 0.6623 0.4730
SC with primary education or more 13509 0.4476 0.4973 4930 0.6694 0.4705
ST with primary education or more 7732 0.3117 0.4632 1220 0.6336 0.4820
General with primary education or more 49363 0.6194 0.4856 28454 0.8227 0.3819
SC/ST women with primary education or more 9754 0.2637 0.4407 2360 0.6233 0.4847
General women with primary education or more 22444 0.5039 0.5000 11761 0.7975 0.4019
SC/ST men with primary education or more 11487 0.5123 0.4999 3790 0.6865 0.4640
General men with primary education or more 26919 0.7156 0.4511 16693 0.8405 0.3661
Panel B: Other control variables
Variable Obs Mean Sd
Urban population in the district 8500 0.208964 0.14433
SC/ST population in the district 8500 0.254323 0.135941
SC population in the district 8500 0.162426 0.072429
ST population in the district 8500 0.092282 0.147672
Women in the district 8500 0.481989 0.015899
Male literacy rate in the district 8320 0.551711 0.164656
Female literacy rate in the district 8320 0.304319 0.182224
Literacy rate in the district 8500 0.366515 0.146597
91
Table 3 3  : SC/ST and General Seats:Probability that a Woman Wins In a Close Election
against a Man________________________________________________________________
Dependent variable: proportion of women who won in a close election 
against a man per district
General SC/ST
1 2
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Congress -1.59 0.201
(2.14) (0.923)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Regional Parties -3.235 0.026
(5.297) (1.427)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Independents -1.636 0.227
(1.908) (1.026)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Hindu -0.914 -0.212
(2.37) (1.403)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Janata -1.833 0.082
(1.585) (0.973)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Others -0.593 0.203
(2.372) (1.13)
Dummy=l if the district never had close elections before 0.439 -0.175
(0.619) (0.268)
Proportion of urban population 9.872 0.905
(12.87) (4.877)
Proportion of population that is female -0.018 0.019
(0.051) (0.032)
Male literacy rate 14.479 1.748
(20.603) (6.104)
Female literacy rate -16.185 -0.87
(27.874) (8.031)
Number of times that a woman has won an election in the district in the past -5.524 2.915
(11.364) (4.376)
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/STs 2.343 -2.358
(8.239) (3.87)
Proportion of SC/ST population -1.849 -0.766
(5.769) (1.741)
Observations 164 164
Adjusted R-squared -0.1474 0.5242
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level. District and year fixed effects are included in the 
regression.
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Table 3.4: District Characteristics: Men Contesting against Women and Women Contesting against Men by Caste
General
Seats
SC/ST
Seats
Differences in the proportion of urban population
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.0019
[0.0201]
-0.0372
[-0.0371]
Differences in male literacy rate
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.0409
[0.0292]
-0.0374
[0.0474]
Differences in female literacy rate
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.0415
[0.0345]
-0.0249
[0.0521]
Differences in the number of villages with educational institutions
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.0584
[0.0748]
0.1974
[0.1757]
Differences in the number of villages with hospitals
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
0.0008
[0.0023]
0.0010
[0.0051]
Differences in the proportion of SC/ST reserved seats
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.0111
[0.0203]
0.0467
[0.0857]
Differences in the proportion of women who won in elections that are not close
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.0044
[0.0091]
0.0005
[0.0184]
Differences in the proportion of men who won in elections that are not close
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won)
-0.0090
[0.0112]
-0.0331
[0.0238]
Number of election-years 157 47
93
Table 3.5
SC/ST and General Seats: Constituency and Candidate Characteristics in Close Elections
General SC/ST
Group Obs 
Other female candidates in the constituency
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Obs Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Man won in close election 91 0.1209 0.0464 0.0286 0.2132 29 0.0690 0.0479 -0.0291 0.1671
Woman won in close election 92 0.1957 0.0541 0.0882 0.3031 18 0.2222 0.1008 0.0095 0.4350
Difference -0.0748 0.0713 -0.2155 0.0660 -0.1533 0.0998 -0.3542 0.0477
Winner was the incumbent
Man won in close election 91 0.1868 0.0411 0.1052 0.2684 29 0.3103 0.0874 0.4708 0.4894
Woman won in close election 92 0.2065 0.0424 0.1222 0.2908 18 0.2778 0.1086 0.0486 0.5070
Difference -0.0197 0.0591 -0.1363 0.0969 0.0326 0.1402 -0.2497 0.3149
Number of close elections in the past
Man won in close election 91 1.0769 0.0281 1.0211 1.1327 29 1.0690 0.0479 0.9709 1.1671
Woman won in close election 92 1.0870 0.0295 1.0283 1.1456 18 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Difference -0.0100 0.0408 -0.0905 0.0704 0.0690 0.0610 -0.0540 0.1919
Votes received by the winner
Man won in close election 91 32270.3300 1546.5520 29197.8300 35342.8300 29 30713.7900 2616.1900 25354.7700 36072.8200
Woman won in close election 92 34100.9800 1467.4050 31186.1600 37015.8000 18 31017.7800 3155.1360 24361.0200 37674.5300
Difference -1830.6490 2131.3730 -6036.1830 2374.8860 -303.9847 4149.1090 -8660.7180 8052.7490
Total votes in the constituency
Man won in close election 91 81835.1600 3064.8000 75746.4000 87923.9300 29 75020.6900 6239.4270 62239.8000 87801.5800
Woman won in close election 92 82061.9600 2878.3610 76344.4500 87779.4700 18 75250.0000 6886.6940 60720.3500 89779.6500
Difference -226.7917 4203.1950 -8520.3550 8066.7720 -229.3103 9606.6320 -19578.0600 19119.4400
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Table 3.6: Effect of SC/ST politicians on SC/ST individuals
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5
OLS
All
individuals
OLS OLS OLS 
Urban Rural All 
individuals individuals individuals
OLS
All
individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST)
-0.2088**
[0.0821]
-0.2152*
[0.1130]
-0.1909*
[0.0958]
-0.1918*
[0.1116]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is not SC/ST)
0.0116
[0.0802]
-0.0345
[0.0868]
0.0173
[0.0927]
-0.0577
[0.0992]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC)
-0.3292**
[0.1351]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is ST)
0.0935
[0.1647]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is general)
-0.1139
[0.1031]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC)
0.1652
[0.1132]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is ST)
-0.0191
[0.1068]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is general)
0.1486
[0.0975]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST *SC/ST pop 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST)
0.6535*
[0.3913]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST* SC/ST pop 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is not SC/ST)
0.3602
[0.4105]
SC/ST pop 0.5003**
[0.2147]
Controls yes 
P value of difference between effect on SC/ST and non-SC/ST 0.0000 
P value of difference between interaction terms
Observations 105208 
R-squared 0.2452
yes
0.0490
34604
0.1473
yes
0.0000
70604
0.2412
yes
0.283
0.271
105208
0.2455
yes
105208
0.2476
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, *• significant at 
the 5%, significant at the 1%. All interaction terms are included in the regressions. Regressions include district and cohort 
fixed effects, as well as other controls like the fraction of seats won by each political party grouping, SC/ST census and current 
population, urban population, literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, started primary 
education in an electoral year or lives in a rural area where applies.
Table 3.7: First Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman
1 2 3
All seats General seats SC/ST seats
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
in a close election against a man
1.2196***
[0.0278]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
in a close election against a man
0.1935***
[0.0149]
0.8250***
[0.0536]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
in a close election against a man
1.1698***
[0.0168]
0.1410***
[0.0126]
Controls yes yes yes
Observations 105208 105208 105208
First stage F-statistic 293.87 337.03 70.95
Joint Significance of Instruments 57.31 13.25
R-squared 0.5087 0.512 0.4785
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** 
significant at die 1%. For SC/ST and general female representation the variable is defined as the proportion of constituencies in the district won by 
a SC/ST or a general woman, respectively. All controls included in the second stage regressions are included here.
Table 3.8; Effect of Female Politicians on Girls and Boys
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1
OLS
All
individuals
2
OLS
Urban
individuals
3
OLS
Rural
individuals
4
2SLS
All
individuals
5
2SLS
Urban
individuals
6
2SLS
Rural
individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a woman
0.1574**
[0.0756]
0.2769***
[0.0716]
0.1092
[0.0848]
0.1704
[0.2053]
0.7826***
[0.3086]
0.0435
[0.2332]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a man
0.0458
[0.0617]
0.0288
[0.0856]
0.1116
[0.0711]
0.0617
[0.2237]
0.5140*
[0.3089]
-0.0149
[0.2642]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Computed difference between the effect on women and men 0.1115
[0.0876]
0.2481***
[0.0917]
-0.0024
[0.0971]
0.1087
[0.2927]
0.2685
[0.2231]
0.0584
[0.3220]
Observations
R-squared
105208
0.2541
34604
0.1746
70604
0.247
105208
0.2541
34604
0.1719
70604
0.247
R o b u s t s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  c lu s te re d  a t th e  d is tr ic t  lev e l a re  re p o rte d  b e tw ee n  p a ren th eses . * S ig n ific a n t a t th e  10% , • *  s ig n ific a n t at 
th e  5 % , s ig n if ic a n t a t  th e  1% . C o lu m n s 1-3 are  O L S  reg re ss io n s . C o lu m n s 4-6 a re  2 S L S  re g re ss io n s  in  'w hich th e  frac tio n  of
c o n s titu e n c ie s  in  th e  d is tr ic t w o n  b y  a  w o m a n  in  a  c lo se  e le c tio n  a g a in s t a  m an  is  u se d  to  in s tru m e n t th e  f ra c tio n  o f  co n stitu e n c ie s  
in  th e  d is tr ic t -won b y  a  w o m an . F o r  th e se  re g re ss io n s  I a lso  in c lu d e  a s  a  c o n tro l th e  frac tio n  o f  c o n s titu e n c ie s  in  th e  d is tr ic t th at 
h a d  c lo se  e le c tio n s  b e tw ee n  w o m e n  a n d  m en . C lo se  e lec tio n s  a re  d e fin e d  a s  th o se  in  w h ic h  th e  w in n e r  w o n  th e  ru n n e r  u p  b y  less 
th a n  3 .5 %  o f  v o tes . . R e g re ss io n s  in c lu d e  d is tr ic t an d  c o h o rt fix ed  effec ts , as w e ll a s  o th e r  c o n tro ls  lik e  th e  frac tio n  o f  sea ts  w on  
b y  e a c h  p o litic a l p a r ty  g ro u p in g , th e  f rac tio n  o f  re se rv e d  sea ts , th e  frac tio n  o f  u rb a n , S C /S T  a n d  fe m a le  p o p u la tio n , m a le  and  
fe m a le  lite rac y  ra te s  a n d  d u m m y  v a ria b le s  fo r  w h e th e r th e  in d iv id u a l is  a  w o m an , h fu s lim , H in d u , S C /S T  o r  liv e s  in  a  ru ra l a rea  
w h e re  ap p lie s .
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Table 3.9 : Effect of SC/ST and General Female Politicians on Girls and Boys
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1
OLS
Urban
individuals
2
OLS
Rural
individuals
3
2SLS
Urban
individuals
4
2SLS
Rural
individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a woman
0.2034
[0.1927]
0.3450
[0.2384]
1.4971***
[0.6605]
0.0862
[0.3868]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a man
-0.0041
[0.1897]
0.1539
[0.1790]
1.0746
[0.7747]
-0.3474
[0.9558]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a woman
0.2998***
[0.0872]
0.0297
[0.0792]
0.5349*
[0.3220]
-0.0075
[0.2499]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a man
0.0389
[0.1113]
0.0964
[0.0790]
0.3392
[0.3151]
0.1207
[0.2300]
Controls yes yes yes yes
Computed difference between the effect on the different groups 
o f SC/STfemale politicians
0.2075
[0.1899]
0.1910
[0.2506]
0.4225
[0.2638]
0.4335
[0.9785]
Computed difference between the effect on the different groups 
o f generalfemale politicians
0.2608**
[0.1058]
-0.0667
[0.1048]
0.1957
[0.3090]
-0.1282
[0.2314]
Observations
R-squared
34604
0.1747
70604
0.2471
34604
0.1702
70604
0.2468
R o b u s t  s ta n d a rd  e r ro rs  c lu s te r e d  a t  th e  d is tr ic t  le v e l a re  re p o r te d  b e tw e e n  p a re n th e s e s .  * S ig n i f ic a n t a t  th e  1 0 % , **  s ig n if ic a n t  a t 
th e  5 % , * * *  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  th e  1% . C o lu m n s  1-2  a re  O L S  re g re s s io n s .  C o lu m n s  3 -4  a re  2 S L S  re g re s s io n s  in  w h ic h  th e  f r a c tio n  o f  
c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  th e  d is tr ic t  w o n  b y  a  w o m a n  in  a  c lo se  e le c tio n  a g a in s t  a  m a n  is  u s e d  to  in s tru m e n t th e  f ra c tio n  o f  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  
in  th e  d is tr ic t  w o n  b y  a  w o m a n , b o th  fo r  g e n e ra l  a n d  S C /S T  fe m a le  p o li t ic ia n s .  F o r  th e s e  r e g re s s io n s  I  a ls o  in c lu d e  a s  a  c o n tro l  
th e  f ra c tio n  o f  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  th e  d is tr ic t  th a t  h a d  c lo se  e le c tio n s  b e tw e e n  w o m e n  a n d  m e n . C lo se  e le c tio n s  a re  d e f in e d  a s  th o s e  
in  w h ic h  th e  w in n e r  w o n  th e  ru n n e r  u p  b y  le ss  th a n  3 .3 %  o f  v o te s . . R e g re s s io n s  in c lu d e  d is tr ic t  a n d  c o h o r t  f ix e d  e f fe c ts ,  a s  w e ll  
a s  o th e r  c o n tro ls  l ik e  th e  f ra c tio n  o f  s e a ts  w o n  b y  e a c h  p o li t ic a l  p a r ty  g ro u p in g , th e  f r a c tio n  o f  re s e rv e d  s e a ts ,  th e  f r a c tio n  o f  
u rb a n , S C /S T  a n d  fe m a le  p o p u la tio n , m a le  a n d  fe m a le  l i te ra c y  ra te s  a n d  d u m m y  v a r ia b le s  fo r  w h e th e r  th e  in d iv id u a l is  a  w o m a n , 
M u s lim , H in d u , S C /S T  o r  liv e s  in  a  ru ra l  a re a  w h e re  ap p lie s .
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Table 3.10 : Effect of SC/ST and General Female Politicians on SC/ST and General Individuals
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1
2SLS
All
individuals
2
2SLS
Urban
individuals
3
2SLS
Rural
individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST
-0.2617
[0.3768]
2.8388***
[0.6526]
-0.6228*
[0.3723]
Fraction of constituencies in die district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general
0.4214
[0.4560]
0.9281
[0.6307]
0.4294
[0.4986]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST
0.0671
[0.2832]
0.0039
[0.6085]
0.0165
[0.3338]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general
0.1062
[0.1844]
0.5645*
[0.2948]
0.0492
[0.2028]
Controls yes yes yes
Computed difference between the effect on the different groups 
o f SC/STfemale politicians
-0.6832* 
[0.3902]
1.9107***
[0.2134]
-1.0521***
[0.3612]
Computed difference between the effect on the different groups 
ofgeneral female politicians
-0.0390
[0.3081]
-0.5606
[0.6308]
-0.0326
[0.3349]
Observations
R-squared
105208
0.2536
34604
0.1662
70604
0.2462
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant a t the 10%, ** significant at 
the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. All columns are 2SLS regressions in which die fraction o f  constituencies in the district won 
by a  woman in a  close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction o f  constituencies in  die district won by a  woman, 
both for general and SC/ST female politicians. For these regressions I also include as a  control the fraction o f  constituencies in 
the district that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the 
runner up by less than 3.5%  o f  votes. . Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as other controls like the 
fraction o f  seats won by  each political party grouping, the fraction o f  reserved seats, the fraction o f  urban, SC/ST and female 
population, m ale and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a  woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST 
or lives in a  rural area where applies.
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Table 3.11: Effect of SC/ST and General Female Politicians on Different Groups
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primaiy education or higher, O=otherwise)
1
2SLS
Urban
individuals
2
2SLS
Rural
individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST woman
3.0915***
[0.9093]
-0.2361
[0.3122]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST man
2.5989***
[0.4637]
-1.6939
[1.2435]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general woman
1.1880**
[0.5147]
0.0181
[0.6121]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general man
0.6116
[0.6661]
0.6223
[0.6779]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST woman
-0.2682
[0.7813]
-0.2865
[0.3976]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST man
0.1722
[0.6757]
0.3738
[0.4047]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general woman
0.7052*
[0.3599]
0.1828
[0.3218]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general man
0.46327
[0.3277]
-0.0034
[0.2177]
Controls yes yes
Observations
R-squared
34604
0.1669
70604
0.2448
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at 
the 5%, significant at the 1%. All columns are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won 
by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman, 
both for general and SC/ST female politicians. For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in 
the district that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which die winner won the 
runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. . Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as other controls like die 
fraction of seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of urban, SC/ST and female 
population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST 
or lives in a rural area where applies.
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (l=primary education or higher, O=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Urban Urban Urban Urban Urban Urban All
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
3% margin 3% margin 2.5% margin 2.5% margin SC/ST pop SC/ST pop SC/ST pop
close elections close elections close elections close elections sq/cube sq/cube sq/cube
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a woman
1.6819*
[0.8905]
1.6845*
[0.8980]
1.5499**
[0.7079]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a man
1.2535
[1.0534]
1.2717
[1.0544]
1.1199
[0.8202]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a woman
0.5725
[0.3828]
0.5492
[0.3677]
0.5264
[0.3268]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is a man
0.4831
[0.3528]
0.5332
[0.3318]
0.3297
[0.3178]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST
3.033***
[0.8359]
3.1013***
[0.8314]
2.9359***
[0.7131]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general
1.1135
[0.8522]
1.1374
[0.8614]
0.9823
[0.6863]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST
0.0103
[0.6618]
0.1836
[0.7299]
-0.0134
[0.6163]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general female politician 
interacted with dummy=l if individual is general
0.7018**
[0.3471]
0.6951**
[0.3315]
0.5569*
[0.2979]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is SC/ST)
-0.2058**
[0.0820]
Fraction of constituencies in the district reserved for SC/ST 
(interacted with dummy=l if individual is not SC/ST)
0.0140
[0.0799]
Observations
R-squared
34604
0.1681
34604
0.1632
34604
0.1677
34604
0.1635
34604
0.1700
34604
0.1657
105208
0.2453
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Chapter 4
Women in Politics in the Indian 
States.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses how female political representation influences expenditure, public 
goods and policy decisions using panel data from the 16 main states in India during 
the period 1967-1999.
In Chapter 2 I have shown how female politicians increase education in the districts 
where they were elected, while in Chapter 3 I have shown that whether the female 
politician is Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe also makes a difference, as they tar­
get individuals who share their identity in policy making. These politicians are state 
legislators, and educational policies are taken at the state level. Therefore, it is inter­
esting to see whether state parliaments where women have higher representation adopt 
different policies than the rest, not only regarding education but also regarding other 
matters. State governments control most of the social and economic expenditure and 
have the power to implement most of the development policies in India. Importantly, 
the different Indian states use the same budgetary classification, and have similar in­
stitutional and electoral settings. Thus, using panel data from these states not only 
offers the advantage of data comparability, it also solves the unobserved heterogeneity 
problems present in cross-country studies.1
1These 16 states account for more than 95 per cent of the total population in India, about 804 million
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In political economy models where candidates can commit to specific policies and only 
care about winning, political decisions only reflect the electorate’s preferences (Downs 
1957). In this sense, female political representation should not have a differential impact 
on policy decisions as the median voter equilibrium prevails. In fact, as long as women 
vote, their preferences would be represented by the candidate elected, irrespective of 
this candidate’s gender. However, if complete policy commitment is absent the identity 
of the legislator matters for policy decisions (Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and 
Slivinski 1996). In particular, increasing a group’s political representation will increase 
its influence in policy.
The issue of female political representation has been increasingly important in India. 
Reservation for women in Panchayats is already in place, but not in State and National 
governments. In September 1996, the Indian Government introduced a Bill in Parlia­
ment, proposing the reservation of one third of the seats for women in the Lok Sabha 
(Central Government) and the State Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been 
widely discussed in several parliamentary sessions, without an agreement being reached. 
Those who are in favour of this reservation argue that increasing female political rep­
resentation will ensure a better representation of their needs. Even those who oppose 
the reservation bill acknowledge the fact that female politicians behave differently than 
male politicians. Clearly, reservation would change the nature of political competition, 
by changing the set of candidates available for each seat, by altering voters’ preferences 
or by changing the candidates’ quality. This chapter explores the effect of an exogenous 
increase in female representation that took place without any institutional change, and 
allows me to clearly identify the effect of female legislators on the variables of interest.
In the state and national parliaments some seats can only be contested by Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled TVibe candidates. These two population groups constitute the 
most disadvantaged sector of the Indian society, both socially and economically. Since 
in Chapter 3 I have shown that Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (henceforth, 
SC/ST) female legislators have a positive effect on the education received by SC/ST 
individuals and than female legislators who won the elections for general seats have 
a positive effect on the education received by general individuals, the impact of both 
general and SC/ST female legislators will be identified separately, as they may have
people. They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu &c Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and 
West Bengal.
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different policy preferences2. Moreover, if the cost of running for election is higher for 
women than for men, female legislators will probably belong to the elite. Thus, the fact 
that some seats are reserved for low castes allows me to identify separately the effect of 
low caste female legislators and to distinguish the gender effects from the class effects.
The identification strategy used in this chapter takes advantage of the detailed data I 
have collected on female candidates in India from 1967 until 2001. It is based on the 
fact that female candidates who won in a close election against a man will be elected 
in similar constituencies than male candidates who won in a close election against a 
woman. The fact that a male or a female candidate wins in a close election can be 
considered to a high extent random, and thus, the gender of the legislator effect can be 
correctly identified by comparing “treated” constituencies where a woman was elected 
to its “counterfactuals”, where a man was elected. I then use as an instrument for the 
fraction of seats in the state won by a female politician the fraction of seats in the state 
won by a female politician in a close election against a man.
In order to have a complete picture of the effect of female legislators, I use data on 
different types of public goods and two types of laws, one that is targeted towards the 
poor and another one which is targeted towards women. I have also collected detailed 
data on state budgets, to identify the expenditure priorities of these legislators.
I find that female legislators have a differential impact on public goods, policy and ex­
penditure decisions if we compare them to their male counterparts. Moreover, whether 
these female legislators belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe reserved seat 
also has an impact. In particular, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe female legis­
lators invest in primary education, by increasing the number of schools and teachers 
and favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 
designed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. They also favour redis­
tributive policies, such as land reforms. In contrast, general female legislators do not 
have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose land reforms, invest in higher tiers 
of education and reduce social expenditure.
This chapter contributes to a larger literature that analyses similar issues using US 
data. Thomas (1991) shows how states with higher female representation in parliament
2Empirical evidence shows that almost no women SC/ST contested for a general seat and won the 
election, thus, I can safely say that all female legislators contesting the elections for a general seat 
belong to higher castes than female legislators contesting the election for a SC/ST seat.
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introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children and fam­
ilies than their male counterparts or women in states with lower female representation. 
Thomas and Welch (1991) find that women in state houses in 12 states in the US place 
more priority than men on legislation concerning women, family issues and children. 
Case (1998), finds how the state’s child support enforcement policies tightened as the 
number of women legislators in the state grew. Besley and Case (2000) show that the 
fraction of women in state upper and lower houses are highly significant predictors of 
state workers compensation policy. Besley and Case (2002) find that women in the 
legislature apply pressure to increase family assistance, and to strengthen child sup­
port laws. Rehavi (2003) finds that an increase in female representation during the 
1990’s leads to an increase in Public Welfare Expenditure. Svaleryd (2002) finds that a 
larger share of women in the majority in Swedish municipalities increases expenditure 
on childcare, relative to elderly care. This chapter contributes to this literature by 
identifying separately the gender and the class of the legislators and finding that both 
matter for policy decisions, which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been done in 
the past.
The existing literature on India focuses on the effect of different reservation policies. 
Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) show that the reservation of one third of the seats for 
women in Panchayats (local rural self-government) of West Bengal and Rajasthan has 
a positive impact on investment in infrastructures relevant to women’s needs. Pande 
(2003), analyses how the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
in the State Assemblies increases the volume of transfers that these groups receive. 
This chapter studies the different effects of variation in both scheduled caste/tribe and 
general female representation due to electoral outcomes rather than reservation policies.
4.2 Institutional background
India is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. The lower house is called Lok Sabha, 
and has 545 members. The upper house is called Rajya Sabha, and has 250 members. 
India is a federal country, and the Constitution gives the states and union territories 
significant control over their own government.
The Vidhan Sabhas (Legislative Assemblies) are directly elected bodies that carry out 
the administration of the government in the 25 states of India. In some states there is
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a bicameral organization of legislatures, with both an Upper and Lower House. How­
ever, it is the Lower House (Legislative Assembly) the one that takes the final budget 
decisions. The Vidhan Sabhas, or State Legislative Assemblies, have the freedom to 
decide the budget they will allocate to development policies.
In the event of elections, the states and union territories are divided into single-member 
constituencies. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn to make sure that 
there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each constituency. The 
Assemblies vary in size, according to population.
Electors can cast one vote each for a candidate, the winner being the candidate who 
gets the highest number of votes.
The democratic system in India is based on the principle of universal adult suffrage, 
and any Indian citizen who is registered as a voter and is over 25 years of age is allowed 
to contest elections to the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assemblies. Candidates for 
the Vidhan Sabha should be a resident of the same state as the constituency from which 
they wish to contest.
The 1950 Indian Constitution provides for political reservation for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. According to articles 330 and 332 of the constitution, before every 
national and state election, a number of jurisdictions will be reserved for these groups. 
Both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes tend to be socially and economically 
disadvantaged, and they constitute about 25% of the total population in India. There 
are two criteria for the reservation of jurisdictions: the population concentration of 
SC/ST groups in that constituency and the dispersion of reserved jurisdictions within 
a particular state.
Women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are those who suffer 
a major degree of discrimination in India. Being a particularly disadvantaged group 
within the Indian social structure, they will have different preferences than the other 
legislators in the State Assemblies. Due to these reason, and due to the fact that many 
general women candidates may belong to the elite, I estimate separately the effects of 
these legislators on the different expenditure, public goods and policy measures under 
study.
In each one of the states, the budget is approved by the legislature after the enactment 
of the Appropriation Act, which gives authority to the government to withdraw money
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from the Consolidated Fund.3 Usually a budget speech is given to the legislature by 
the Finance Minister of each state, two days after there is a general discussion in the 
legislature about the budget proposal presented. This discussion lasts 6 days. After 
that, and during a maximum period of 18 days, individual demands made by the 
individual legislators are voted in the Legislative Assembly. Then, the introduction, 
consideration and passing of the Appropriation Bill in the Legislative Assembly with 
the Governor’s consent lasts for about two days. In total, the budget discussion takes 
a maximum of 26 days.
4.3 D ata Description
4.3 .1  E lectoral D ata
I use data on the sixteen main states in India during the period 1967-1999. My aim is 
to test the effects of having higher female representation in the State Legislatures on 
expenditure, public goods and different laws passed by the states. I also test whether 
female legislators in Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe seats (SC/ST) have a different 
impact than those in general seats.
The electoral data has been collected from the different reports on the State Elections 
published by the Election Commission of India.
The data on individual candidates for the state elections in India from 1967-2001 al­
lows me to calculate how many candidates were involved in a close election4 against a 
candidate of the opposite sex for each state and year and for both SC/ST and general 
seats. I also use information on the fraction of seats won by each political party.
Figure 4.1 shows the variation across election years and states of both SC/ST and 
general female representation. SC/ST and general female representation has been low 
in all states during the time period under consideration. In fact, between 1967 and 
2001 at most 11% of seats have been won by a general woman and 5% of the seats
3Defined by the Constitution as “all revenues received by Government, all loans raised by Govern­
ment by issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all money received by Government 
in repayment of loans”.
4A close election is defined as one in which the winner won the runner up by a very small margin. 
As in the previous chapters, I define close elections as those in which the margin was less than 3.5%.
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have been won by a SC/ST woman. Moreover, different states follow different trends 
in what regards both general and SC/ST female political representation.
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statististics on the electoral variables used in this study. 
During this time period, 3.5% of seats have been won by women, 2.7% in general seats 
and 0.7% in SC/ST reserved seats. Despite the fact that female political representation 
is very low for all states in India, both general and SC/ST female representatives axe 
shown to have an effect on policy decisions. Due to the way decisions are taken in the 
State Legislatures in India, even if female legislators do not constitute a “critical mass” 
in any voting procedure, they can still convince other legislators during or before the 
discussions, and they can also introduce proposals that are then voted by the legisla­
ture. Mishra, R.C. (2000), presents evidence from the debates in the Orissa Legislative 
Assembly showing that female legislators introduce proposals in the legislature, partic­
ipate in the debates and try to convince their male counterparts of their ideas. This is 
true for both general and SC/ST female legislators.
4.3 .2  D ependent Variables
As policy variables I use some educational inputs and public goods measures. Descrip­
tive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 4.2.
As educational inputs I use the number of teachers per 1000 individuals in primary, 
middle and secondary institutions, both in aggregate and divided by gender. In addition 
I use information on the number of secondary, middle, and primary schools per every 
thousand individuals. This will give an approximate idea of the supply of education.
I also use data on other public goods measures, such the number of hospitals, dispen­
saries and beds in hospitals and dispensaries per every 1000 individuals. This will give 
information on health provision. Data on kilometres of surfaced state roads per km2 is 
used as a measure of infrastructure.
To obtain evidence on whether female politicians favour women and the poor in pol­
icymaking, I use two measures of laws enacted: one serving the interests of the poor 
and the other serving women’s interests. For the first one I use the cumulative num­
ber of land reforms designed to tackle poverty enacted by the different states in India 
during 1967-1999. The types of land reforms used are Tenancy Reforms, Abolition
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of Intermediaries reforms and Land Ceiling legislation.5 The “women-friendly” policy 
variable I use is a dummy variable which equals one the year a given state has made an 
amendment to the Hindu Succession law. These amendments are designed to ensure 
that both women and men have the same inheritance rights.
Finally, I analyse the impact of female legislators on different components of the state 
budget. For this I have collected data on actual Revenue and Capital expenditure for 
each state and year. All the states in India use the same budgetary classification.
Revenue expenditure is defined as expenditure on current consumption of goods and 
services of the departments of Government, expenditure on Legislature, State Admin­
istration, tax collection, debt servicing, interest payments and grants-in-aid to various 
institutions. Capital expenditure is defined as expenditure devoted to acquiring or 
creating assets of a material and permanent character or to reduce recurrent liabilities.
Revenue expenditure in each one of the state’s budgets is divided among two main 
categories: Development expenditure and Non-Development expenditure. Development 
expenditure is money allocated to the maintenance of capital assets, both economic and 
social. Non-Development expenditure is directed towards current and consumption 
expenditures of the government.
Total Capital Disbursements are divided into two main categories: Total Capital Outlay 
and Discharge of Internal Debt. Total Capital Outlay is mainly composed of Devel­
opment expenditure, which includes both Social and Economic Services. Discharge of 
Internal Debt includes different types of loans. Figure 4.2 shows graphically how all 
the different expenditure categories are organized in both the capital and the revenue 
budgets in all the Indian states.
I use the 15 larger expenditure categories in both the capital and revenue budgets, and 
I aggregate capital and revenue expenditure for each one. I then use the share of Total 
Expenditure devoted to each type of expenditure as an expenditure measure. This 
measure can be used to understand whether female politicians have an effect on the 
overall budget allocation. Summary statistics for these expenditure variables appear in 
Table 4.2.
5I use the land reform measure created by Besley and Burgess (2000). Details on this variable can 
be found there.
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4.3 .3  C ontrol variables
I analyse the effects of having higher female representation in both general and SC/ST 
seats in the State Assemblies on different policy variables. Aside from any causality 
considerations, which I will make clear in the next section, I should include as controls 
in the regressions variables that vary across states and across time and that may have 
an independent effect on the policy variables.
I include the proportion of seats won by each one of the parties in each election, in 
order to distinguish the effect of gender from the effect of party ideology6.
Other control variables include the real net state domestic product per capita, total 
grants received by the central government in real per capita terms, the share of rural 
population over total population and a dummy for the year before the elections took 
place.
All these variables could affect the dependent variable in different ways: the higher the 
amount of grants received by the state, the higher will be their expenditure capacity, 
and this can affect their expenditure decisions. On the other hand, the rural population 
variable and the real net state domestic product per capita could also give an idea of 
the economic backwardness of the state, which can also influence the policy decisions 
adopted.
The dummy variable for the year before the elections takes into account that legislators 
might adopt different policies just before elections, in order to increase their probabil­
ity of being re-elected. I also include state-specific time trends in the regressions, as 
dependent variables may have different trends in different states and the representation 
variable may proxy for these trends.
Since in 1985 there was a budgetary reclassification, I also include a dummy variable for 
the years before 1985 in the expenditure regressions. This will be especially relevant
6There are eight main party groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional, 
Independent candidates and other parties. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, 
Indian National Congress Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left parties include 
the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist. Soft Left parties include Praja 
Socialist Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. 
Hindu parties include the Bharatiya Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana 
Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali Dal and 
other state specific parties.
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for Economic expenditure, since this was the expenditure category in the Revenue 
Account which changed the most after the reclassification took place. Another budget 
reclassification took place in 1972, however, budget data for the period 1967-1972 can 
not be safely compared for all the expenditure categories to budget data from later 
periods. For this reason I focus on the time period 1972-1999 for the expenditure 
variables.
The nominal variables are deflated using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural 
Labourers (CPIAL) and the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW). 
The reference period used is October 1973-March 1974.
4.4 Identification
4.4 .1  Identification question
To analyse the effects of having higher female representation in both SC/ST and general 
seats in the State Assemblies in India on government expenditure, public goods and laws 
enacted, I use panel data for the 16 main states in India during the period 1967-1999. 
The main difficulty is to assess the causal effect of female representation on outcomes.
To illustrate this, assume that he first empirical specification to be tested is:
Yit — + Pt + 7 Fit + Xi t6 +  Uit (4-1)
Where Yu is the measure of expenditure, public goods or policy for state i in year t. a, 
and Pt axe state and year fixed effects, Fa is the fraction of seats occupied by women 
in the state assemblies as elected in the previous elections, and Xu stands for other 
control variables included in the regression which vary across state and over time and 
can also have an effect on the dependent variables of interest.
For the election years I use female representation as it was in the previous elections, 
under the assumption that newly elected legislators might not have much power during
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the first year.7 Moreover, this controls for the fact that some of the elections are held 
at the end of the year, when decisions have already taken place.
The year fixed effects control for nationwide shocks or policies that were implemented 
in all states at the same time. The state fixed effects control for state specific charac­
teristics that do not vary over time.
Even though the state fixed effects control for permanent differences across states in 
female representation and the outcome variables, I can not rule out the existence of 
an omitted variable that varies across states and over time and affects both female 
representation and the outcome variables. Thus, there might be some endogeneity 
concerns. In this case, the OLS estimates reported in this econometric specification 
would be biased and specification 4.1 would not allow me to correctly identify the effect 
of having higher female representation on the dependent variables of interest.
In the next subsection I will explain how do I solve the causality problem. The iden­
tification challenge faced when dividing female politicians according to whether they 
contested for a SC/ST reserved seat or not is similar. The reason behind dividing fe­
male representatives is that female legislators who won the election for a general seat 
might have different policy preferences than female legislators who won the election for 
a SC/ST seat. India provides the opportunity of exploiting mandated political reser­
vation for SC/STs to divide the female representation variable according to the type of 
seat for which they contested. The comparison of SC/ST and general female legislators 
provides evidence on whether the identity of the legislator is defined by both gender 
and caste. I then include both general and SC/ST female representation variables in 
the regression. In addition, this allows me to provide evidence on the difference be­
tween the gender and class effects. In other words, if the cost of running for election is 
higher for women than for men politicians, female legislators will be of comparatively 
higher classes than men legislators. Thus, the female representation variable may only 
indicate class, not gender. This will not be the case for SC/ST female legislators, as 
they come from the poorest section of the society.
The equation I am then testing is:
7Results are robust to including the contemporaneous women representation variable in the election 
years. Results are available from the author.
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Yit =  <*» +  Pt + <pFgeriit + OFscstu + Xn6 + (4.2)
Where a* and (3t are the state and year fixed effects and Xu are other controls. Fgenu 
is the fraction of seats won by general women as elected in the previous elections and 
Fscsta if the fraction of seats won by SC/ST women as elected in the previous elections.
As before, the omitted variable could affect the dependent variable and be correlated 
with the fraction of seats in the state won by general and SC/ST female politicians. 
To be clear, if women are elected in constituencies where there is a “preference for 
female politicians”, this variable might also affect how many general and SC/ST female 
legislators are elected, thus, biasing the results obtained.
As reported in Table 4.3, however, states where female representation is above the 
median and states where female representation is below the median do not differ on 
variables that might be correlated with “preference for women politicians”. States above 
and below the median are very similar in both male and female literacy rates, infant 
mortality rates, income inequality, newspaper circulation per capita, the percentage of 
voters who are women and voter turnout.
4.4 .2  Identification Strategy
To identify the causal effect of female legislators on the variables of interest I use a 
parallel strategy to those used in Chapters 2 and 3. The difference is that now variables 
are defined at the state level, so I exploit variation across states and across time. In 
order to identify the causal effect of female politicians I take advantage of the existence 
of close elections between a woman and a man candidate, elections in which the winner 
won the runner up by a very small number of votes.8 The identification strategy 
used in this chapter follows the same idea as the regression discontinuity approach. 
This methodology has been widely used and was first introduced in the context of 
elections by Lee (2001) for incumbency advantage and Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) for 
the effect of party control on fiscal policies. Regression discontinuity has been used 
as an instrument by Angrist and Lavy (1999) to estimate the impact of class size 
on educational achievements and by Rehavi (2003), who used close elections between
8I define close elections as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes.
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women and men in the US as an instrument to estimate the effect of female politicians 
at the state level on expenditures.
In the same spirit, to identify the causal effect of female politicians I use as an instrument 
for female representation the fraction of seats in the state won by a woman in a close 
election against a man.9
In order to construct the instrument I use data on the votes’ shaxe received by each 
one of the female candidates in state elections in India during then period 1967-2001, 
together with the margins of votes obtained against the winner or, in the case they won 
the elections, data on the runner-ups and the margin of votes obtained against them.
I can then use the information on women candidates who barely won the elections 
against a man. This should happen in constituencies where there is no clear “prefer­
ence for women” politicians. If we consider that the last few votes received by both 
candidates are random, both the women and the men candidates could have won the 
elections and, thus, the fact that the woman candidate won the seat instead of the man 
is random as well.
The fact that there have been close elections between a woman and a man candidate 
generates “near-experimental” causal estimates of the effect that women political rep­
resentation has on the policy variables.
The first stage regression would then be:
Fa = ai + Pt + ftFCit + fiTCn +  Xn6 + £it (4-3)
Fit, is the fraction of seats in the state that were won by a female politician as elected 
in the previous elections. The instrument for this variable is FCu, the fraction of seats 
in the state won by a woman in a close election against a man.
The second stage regression is specification 4.4 , lit is the policy outcome variable for 
state i at time t. Since observations in the same state and electoral cycle could be
9This identification strategy is based on the regression discontinuity design, although it is not directly 
used in this study.For this I should be able to relate each particular legislator to an expenditure 
measure number. Since in India, State Assemblies are composed by many legislators who choose a 
single expenditure measure each year, I used close elections as an instrument.
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correlated, I compute the robust standard errors clustered at the state and electoral 
cycle.10
Yit = oti + flt + 'yF'n + XTCu ■+■ Xu6 + uit (4*4)
I control for TCu, the fraction of seats in the state in which there were close elections 
between women and men. in both stages. The fraction of seats that had close elections 
between men and women controls for the fact that the existence of this type of close 
elections may not be a random event. However, the outcome of a close election is 
random, meaning that the winner’s gender in close elections between women and men 
is random as well. To be clear, the impact of the existence of close elections between 
women and men on the policy variables should be controlled by in specification 4.4 and 
partialled out of the instrument in specification 4.3.
To identify the effects of female politicians who contested for SC/ST seats separately 
than the effect of female politicians who contested for general seats I use a similar 
strategy, but I now take advantage of the fact that some seats in the State Assemblies 
are reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. I then divide the female representation 
variable according to whether female politicians were contesting in a SC/ST reserved 
seat or not.
I instrument the fraction of seats won by SC/ST female politicians by the fraction of 
seats won by SC/ST women in a close election against a man, defining close elections in 
the same way as before. Similarly, I instrument the fraction of seats won by a general 
woman by the fraction of seats won by a general woman in a close election against a 
general man. I then estimate a first stage regression similar to 4.3 separately for SC/ST 
and general female politicians and a second stage regression of the form:
Yu =  +  /?t +  (pFgeriit + 6Fscstit + XTCu +  X itS +  uu (4.5)
4.4.3 V alidity of th e  Identification  S tra tegy
To identify the effect of female politicians, both in aggregate and for general and SC/ST 
seats I take advantage of the fact that some of these female politicians won in close
10I can not cluster at the state level as I only have included 16 states in the sample.
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elections against men.
For this to be a valid identification strategy, one should show that the fraction of close 
elections won by women in a given state and year can not be predicted by any other 
state characteristic. This is done in Table 4.4. I have tried to predict the fraction of 
close elections between women and men won by women in a given state and election 
year. This is done for all seats, and then separately for SC/ST reserved seats and for 
unreserved seats. I have regressed these variables against different state characteris­
tics, controlling for state and year fixed effects. Reassuringly, variables like electoral 
turnout, the proportion of seats in close elections contested by the different parties, 
the proportion of reserved seats, political competition11, the proportion of seats that 
had close elections in the past, the proportion of seats won by women in the past and 
literacy rates do not have any effect on the fraction of close elections between women 
and men won by women.
In addition, if the outcome of a close elections is random, it should be observed that 
states and electoral years in which more men than women won in close elections have 
similar characteristics as compared to states and electoral years in which more women 
than men won. In other words, both types of states and years should only differ in the 
fraction of close elections won by female politicians. In Table 4.5 I compare different 
characteristics for both types of states and years for three cases, those in which more 
men won, those in which more SC/ST men won and those in which more general men 
won. I report the difference between the mean of each variable for both groups, together 
with the corresponding standard error. I use information on the proportion of seats 
won by female politicians in elections that were not close, the number of female candi­
dates per seat, male and female turnout, the proportion of reserved seats, newspaper 
circulation per capita and real net state domestic product. None of the differences is 
significant.
Candidate and constituency characteristics should as well be very similar, whether 
female or male candidates won the election. Results reported in Chapters 2 and 3 show 
that this is the case, both in aggregate and for SC/ST and general seats.
Identification comes from variation across states and years in the proportion of seats
11 Political competition is defined as minus the absolute value of the absolute difference in the share 
of seats occupied by the dominant political party and its main competitor. See Besley and Burgess 
(2002).
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won by women in a close election against a man, once controlling for the fraction of seats 
that had close elections between women and men. In order to derive policy implications 
from the results obtained, I should check that states and electoral years that had more 
close elections between women and men do not have different characteristics than the 
rest. In Table 4.6 I compare different characteristics, for states and years that had more 
and less close elections than the median. I use information on the fraction of urban 
population, male and female literacy rates, the fraction of seats that are reserved for 
SC/STs, male and female turnout, newspaper circulation per capita and the proportion 
of seats won by the different political parties. Given that both types of states and 
electoral years are very similar in those characteristics, I can argue in favour of the 
external validity of the results obtained.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Educational inputs
The first set of variables that I am going to use to identify whether male and female 
legislators have different policy preferences are education variables. In this section I 
look at the effect of women representatives on some educational inputs measures, in 
order to analyse their impact on the supply of education. In Chapter 2 I found that 
female politicians increase primary education in urban areas in the districts where the 
constituency where they were elected was located. Educational policies are taken at the 
state level, so it is interesting to analyze whether having higher female representation 
at the state increase the amount of educational inputs provided.
I first use the number of primary, middle and secondary schools per thousand individ­
uals. Panel A in Table 4.7 provides results for the OLS regressions. In columns 1-3 I 
show the coefficient for the fraction of seats in the state won by female politicians. In 
colum ns 4r6 I show coefficients for both SC/ST and general female legislators. These 
results could be contaminated by endogeneity bias, but they show that female repre­
sentatives affect negatively the number of secondary schools per thousand individuals. 
While SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on secondary schools, general 
female politicians have a positive effect on middle schools. Panel B provides results 
for the corresponding 2SLS regressions. Results are quite different, and the difference 
between the 2SLS and the OLS coefficients is positive in all cases, which could indicate
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that female politicians are elected where more education is needed, or where there are 
less educational inputs.12 Columns 1-3 show that female political representation has 
a positive effect on the number of secondary schools per thousand individuals. When 
dividing the female representation variable according to whether the female politicians 
contested for a SC/ST seat or not, SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect 
on primary schools, while general female politicians increase middle and secondary 
schools. By increasing SC/ST female representation by 1 percentage point, the number 
of schools per 1000 individuals increases by 0.029 units, which is 4% of the average. By 
increasing general female representation by 1 percentage point, the number of middle 
and secondary schools increase by 0.003 and 0.0013 units per 1000 individuals, which 
is 1.5% and 1.4% of the average respectively. Given that SC/STs, especially SC/ST 
women, have less access to education, they will invest in lower tiers of education, as they 
may not benefit from middle or secondary education. In contrast, general women have 
more access to higher tiers of education, and thus they invest in middle and secondary 
schools once in politics.
As another educational input, I use the number of teachers per 1000 individuals in 
each type of schools. Results are shown in Table 4.8. Panel A shows OLS regressions, 
while Panel B shows results for the 2SLS regressions. In columns 1-3 I report results 
for the female representation variable, while in columns 4-6 I report results for general 
and SC/ST female politicians separately. OLS regressions show that female politicians, 
and specifically general female politicians, increase the number of teachers per thou­
sand individuals in middle and secondary schools. In contrast, results for the 2SLS 
regressions show that female politicians only have an effect on the number of teach­
ers per thousand individuals in primary schools; see columns 1-3. In addition, when 
dividing the female representation variable according to whether they were contesting 
for general or SC/ST reserved seats, SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect 
on teachers in primary schools, while general female politicians increase the number 
of teachers in middle and secondary schools. Results for teachers are consistent with 
those obtained for schools and confirm that low caste female legislators will favour lower 
tiers of education, while general female legislators will favour higher tiers of education. 
By increasing SC/ST female representation by one percentage point, the number of 
teachers in primary schools per thousand individuals increases by 0.41, which is 21% of 
the average. By increasing general female representation by one percentage point, the 
number of teachers per thousand individuals increases by 0.028 in middle schools and
12This is consistent with results obtained in Chapter 2 and 3.
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0.025 in secondary schools, which accounts for 2.1% and 1.6% of the mean, respectively.
Finally, I analyse the impact of female politicians on the number of both female and 
male teachers per thousand individuals in primary, middle and secondary schools. There 
is some evidence that female teachers may encourage girls to go to school, thus, it is 
interesting to understand whether female politicians have had any impact on the num­
ber of female teachers per each type of schools. Results are provided in Table 4.9. OLS 
results in this table are not reported for brevity. In columns 1-6, I show coefficients 
for the fraction of seats in the state won by female politicians, while in columns 7-12 
I show results for both the fraction of seats won by SC/ST female politicians and the 
fraction of seats won by general female politicians. Female politicians only have an 
effect on primary education by increasing the amount of female teachers, see column 2, 
but not the amount of male teachers. Once dividing the female representation variable 
according to whether they contested for a SC/ST reserved seat or not, general female 
politicians favour both male and female teachers in middle and secondary education, 
see columns 9-12. In contrast, SC/ST female politicians increase both male and female 
teachers in primary schools, but the difference between the two is larger, by increasing 
SC/ST female representation by one percentage point, the number of female teachers 
per 1000 individuals increases in 0.33, while the number of male teachers per 1000 indi­
viduals increases by 0.077. This accounts for 77% and 6.5% of the average, indicating 
that SC/ST female politicians are keen on increasing the number of female teachers in 
primary education.
4.5 .2  Public goods
Results obtained so far show that the identity of the legislator is indeed defined by 
gender and caste, as general and SC/ST female politicians choose different policies. 
Moreover, results suggest that they choose policies that may benefit their groups more. 
However, it is also interesting to see whether female politicians also favour investment 
in other public goods, like those related to health and transportation. For this, I use 
information on the number of hospitals, dispensaries and beds in hospitals and dispen­
saries per thousand individuals to grasp an idea of their effect on health provision. In 
addition, I use information on the kilometres of surfaced roads per kilometre squared. 
Results are shown in Table 4.10. Columns 1-4 show results for the fraction of seats 
in the state won by female politicians, while columns 5-8 divide female politicians ac­
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cording to whether they contested for a SC/ST seat or not. Female politicians do not 
have any differential effect as compared to men on roads, hospitals and dispensaries, in 
contrast, by increasing female representation by one percentage point, the number of 
beds in hospitals and dispensaries increases by 0.052, which is 7% of the average. When 
dividing the female representation variable in columns 5-8, neither SC/ST nor general 
female politicians have a differential effect than men on roads, hospitals and dispen­
saries, however, SC/ST female politicians are those who increase the number of beds 
in hospitals and dispensaries. In particular, by increasing SC/ST female representation 
by one percentage point, the number of beds in hospitals and dispensaries increase by 
0.11 beds per thousand individuals.
Results suggest that female politicians, and specifically SC/ST female politicians in­
crease health provision. Even if they do not have an effect on hospitals or dispensaries, 
beds in hospitals and dispensaries may be a better measure of the health-related public 
goods provided, as with the other measures one does not take the size of the hospitals 
and dispensaries into account. In fact, more beds in hospitals and dispensaries may 
mean more efficient health provision.
4.5 .3  Laws
In this section I explore the effects of having higher female representation in the State 
Assemblies in India in two types of policies, one which is directly targeted to women 
and another one which targets the poor.
The different states in India have had the power to amend different national laws and to 
implement different types of land reforms during the time period under consideration.
The Hindu Succession Act (1956) deals with intestate succession among Hindus13. It 
includes the concept of the Mitakshara Joint Family, under which on birth, the son 
acquires a right and interest in the family property. According to this, a son, grandson 
and great grandson constitute a class of coparcenaries, based on birth in the family. Un­
der this system, joint family property devolves by survivorship within the coparcenary, 
but no female is a member of the coparcenary.
During the time period under consideration, five states in India have recognized that a
13Hindus constitute approximately 80% of the population in India. However, this law applies to 
anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.
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daughter needs to be treated equally and become a coparcener in her own right in the 
same way as the son.
The state of Kerala in 1975 abolished the right to claim any interest in any property 
belonging to an ancestor during his or her lifetime. They abolished the Joint Hindu 
Family system, solving the gender differentials in inheritance rights14.
The other four states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Kar­
nataka instead amended the Hindu Succession law by removing the gender discrimina­
tion in the Mitakshara Coparcenary system.15
I create a variable which is equal to one if the state has passed one of these amendments 
in that particular year or in the past and zero otherwise.
Land reforms can be considered redistributive policies, aimed at improving the poor’s 
access to land in developing countries. Besley and Burgess (2000) classify land reform 
acts into four main categories according to the purpose they were designed for. The first 
category is called Tenancy Reform, which regulates tenancy contracts and attempts to 
transfer ownership to tenants. The second category of land reforms consists on attempts 
to abolish intermediaries. Intermediaries worked under feudal lords and collected rents 
for the British. They were known for extracting large rents from the tenants. The third 
category of land reforms implements ceilings on land holdings. The fourth category of 
land reforms was designed to allow consolidation of disparate land-holdings.
In this study I use a cumulative measure of the first three types of land reforms, the 
ones primarily designed to tackle poverty. The variable used is equal to the sum of the 
cumulative number of land reform acts in each category passed in the state.
Results for these policies are reported in Table 4.11. In columns 1 and 2 I report 
results for the 2SLS regressions in which I analyze the effect on these laws of having 
more female politicians in the state. In columns 3 and 4 I report results for the 2SLS
14The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975.
15The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act 1986.
The Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1989.
The Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act 1994.
The Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act 1994.
The Hindu Succession Act was further amended in 2005 to give women equal inheritance rights as 
men. However, 2005 is not included in the time period studied here.
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regressions in which I analyze the effect of having more SC/ST female politicians and 
more general female politicians in the state on both types of laws enacted.
While female politicians do not have a significant effect on any of the two types of laws, 
once SC/ST and general women legislators are considered separately in the regressions, 
general female legislators have a negative and significant effect on land reforms while 
SC/ST have a positive and significant effect; see columns 1 and 3. This is consistent 
with the fact that general women legislators may be part of the elite and will then 
oppose these reforms. Given that SC/STs are poorer, results obtained for land reforms 
clearly reflect the caste effect.
Results for the Hindu Succession Law are reported in columns 2 and 4 of this table. In 
this case women representatives do not have any impact on these amendments when 
considered in aggregate. In contrast, results in column 4 show that only SC/ST women 
legislators have a positive and significant effect on this variable. The fact that no effect 
is found for general female legislators might be due to their class position. In fact, 
elite women will be less likely to favour women-friendly policies and class and gender 
effects may go in opposite directions. Low caste women, since reservations are already 
made for SC/ST people, will be more likely to perceive themselves as representatives 
for women as well as representatives for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
4.5 .4  E xpenditure
Results show that female politicians have an impact on investment in public goods and 
laws approved in India. Moreover, whether they contested for a SC/ST reserved seat 
or not also has an impact. In this section I analyse the impact of female representation 
on the composition of total expenditure in the state budgets in India.
In Table 4.12 I show results for the main expenditure classifications. In columns 1-6 I 
show results for the female representation variable, while in columns 7-12 I show the 
results obtained when dividing the female representation variable according to caste. 
In column 1 I provide results for the logarithm of total expenditure per capita; in this 
case the coefficient for the proportion of seats in the state won by female politicians 
is very close to zero and not significant. This indicates that female politicians did not 
increase the size of the government. In column 2 I show results for the fraction of
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total expenditure devoted to capital investments; as before, the coefficient obtained 
is not significant. This means that female politicians do not have an effect on how 
expenditure is divided among the revenue and capital budgets. It is now interesting to 
analyze whether they affected the actual composition of expenditure.
Both capital and revenue expenditure can be divided among two broad categories: De­
velopment expenditure and Non-Development expenditure. Results for these categories 
axe shown in columns 3 and 4. Female politicians have a positive effect on development 
expenditure, but the effect on non-development expenditure is not significant. By in­
creasing female representation by one percentage point, the fraction of total expenditure 
devoted to development expenditure increases as well by one percentage point.
Development expenditure can be further divided among Economic and Social expen­
diture. I show results for these two categories in columns 5 and 6. Female political 
representation does not have any effect, neither on Social, nor in Economic expenditure.
Columns 7-12 show results for the same variables. The difference is that I then report 
coefficients for the fraction of seats in the state won by SC/ST female politicians and 
general female politicians. Neither SC/ST nor general female politicians have an effect 
on the log of per capita total expenditure or the fraction of total expenditure spent 
on capital expenditures. SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on Develop­
ment expenditure, but not in Non-Development expenditure; see columns 9 and 10. By 
increasing SC/ST female representation by one percentage point, Development expen­
diture increases by two percentage points. In contrast, general female politicians do 
not have any impact on these two expenditures categories.
Results in columns 11 and 12 show that SC/ST female politicians do not have an effect 
on Social and Economic expenditure. However, general female politicians decrease 
Social expenditure while increasing Economic expenditure. A one percentage point 
increase in general female representation decreases Social expenditure by 0.6 percentage 
points and increases Economic expenditure by one percentage point. Given that general 
female politicians may belong to higher classes, they will be less inclined to spend in 
social issues, and more on economic issues.
It is then as well interesting to understand whether female representation has had 
an impact on smaller expenditure categories within Social and Economic expenditure. 
Results axe reported in Table 4.13. In Panel A I report results for the fraction of seats
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in the state won by a female politician. In Panel B the female representation variable 
is divided according to whether the female politicians contested for a SC/ST reserved 
seat or not. I report results for seven categories within Social expenditure: Education, 
Health, Family Welfare, Water Supply and Sanitation, Housing, SC/ST Welfare and 
Social Security. I also report results for 4 categories within economic expenditure. 
These are agriculture, industry and minerals and general economic services. Results 
in Panel A show that female politicians only have an effect on one of the categories: 
Housing expenditure, which they reduce. Results in Panel B show that SC/ST female 
politicians only have an effect in one expenditure category: Social Security and Welfare, 
which they reduce. This is surprising, since part of this expenditure are transfers to 
women and children. General female politicians only have an effect on the fraction of 
total expenditure devoted to Housing, which they as well reduce.
Even if female politicians have an effect on schools and beds in hospitals, they do 
not have much of an impact on the allocation of budget expenditures, and they do 
not seem to have an effect on the fraction of total expenditure devoted to Health and 
Education. This may be the case because these expenditure categories are too broad, 
and include many different categories. Surprisingly, they do not have an effect on the 
fraction of total expenditure spent on SC/ST welfare. Pande (2003) found that SC 
politicians did not increase SC welfare expenditure, while ST politicians increased ST 
welfare expenditure. The fact that SC/ST female politicians do not have an impact on 
this expenditure may be due to the aggregation. In addition, SC/ST female politicians 
may reduce Social Security and Welfare expenditure because lower castes do not benefit 
much from it.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that female legislators have different effects on expenditure, public 
goods and policy decisions than their male counterparts. Moreover, whether these 
female legislators belong to scheduled castes/tribes or won the elections for general 
seats also matters for policy determination.
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe female legislators favour investments on primary 
education, and beds in hospitals and dispensaries. They favour development expendi­
ture, “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, pro­
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posed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. They also favour pro-poor 
redistributive policies such as land reforms. In contrast, general female legislators do 
not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistributive policies such as 
land reforms, invest in higher tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.
In order to interpret these results, one must take into consideration the class of these 
legislators, as well as gender. Given the difficulties faced by women trying to enter 
political life, female legislators may tend to belong to higher social classes than male 
legislators. This will specially be the case for general female legislators, are Schedule 
Caste/Tribe female legislators will have lower economic backgrounds. Moreover, some 
of these women decided to work in politics because of their family background. If general 
female legislators belong to a comparatively higher class than general male legislators, 
maybe results for these legislators are such that they capture more the “class” than 
the gender effect. However, this will not be the case for SC/ST female legislators, for 
whom the gender effect can indeed be captured by results in this chapter.
SC/ST female legislators increase expenditure in Development, favour land reforms 
and women-friendly laws. These results seem to indicate that SC/ST female legislators 
identify themselves with women, especially the poor and disadvantaged ones when tak­
ing their decisions. Moreover, low caste female legislators invest in primary education. 
Given the historical difficulties that low caste women have had to access education, 
they will be more likely to benefit from this type of education than from middle and 
secondary education.
However, unlike results for SC/ST female legislators, results for general female legisla­
tors are somewhat different than findings for the United States, where women politicians 
seem to care about social and especially family issues 16. By taking into account that 
general women legislators belong to the elite, i.e., they have higher income and bet­
ter jobs than the average in the state and sometimes belong to a family of politicians 
(Mishra, R.C. (2000)), these results seem to be explained by the class of these legis­
lators. Moreover, the fact that general female legislators favour investment in middle 
and secondary education is consistent with this hypothesis, since only relatively rich 
women will be likely to attend middle and secondary education.
In summary, even though reservation may have other effects on policy which are out
16To the best of my knowledge, no paper in the US literature takes into account the socio-economic 
position of women legislators.
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of the scope of this chapter, one of them would be to increase female political rep­
resentation. However, one has to keep in mind that not only an increase in female 
representation is important. Since both SC/ST and general women legislators have dif­
ferent effects on the policies adopted, the social and economic position of these female 
legislators also needs to be taken into account. Results in this chapter are consistent 
with those obtained in Chapter 3, as female politicians seem to favour those who share 
their gender and social position in policy making.
This chapter shows how male and female legislators take different policy decisions, and 
that the class of these legislators is important too. Results further suggest that increas­
ing the proportion of SC/ST seats won by female legislators would have important 
implications for the provision of primary education, for women and for the poor.
4.7 Figures and Tables
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: State Political Dataset
Unit o f observation: state in an electoral year___________
Variable (as a fraction of the total seats in the state) Obs. Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women 119 0.035062 0.024188
Proportion of seats won by SC/ST women 119 0.007808 0.008476
Proportion of seats won by general women 119 0.027254 0.02043
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 119 0.21584 0.078618
Proportion of seats won by women in close elections against men 119 0.003778 0.005557
Proportion of seats won by SC/ST women in close elections against SC/ST men 119 0.00056 0.001734
Proportion of seats won by general women in close elections against general men 119 0.003219 0.005151
Proportion of seats that had close elections between women and men 119 0.007942 0.009568
Proportion of seats won by Congress 119 0.423986 0.253889
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left 119 0.087628 0.153685
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left 119 0.016469 0.043067
Proportion of seats won by Hindu 119 0.074948 0.131507
Proportion of seats won by Janata 119 0.149068 0.217928
Proportion of seats won by Regional 119 0.137668 0.231642
Proportion of seats won by Others 119 0.043589 0.071794
Proportion of seats won by Independent 119 0.066644 0.049699
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables and Socio-Economic Characteristics
Unit of observation: state and year______________________________________________
Variable (Educational inputs and expenditure) Obs. Mean Sd
Teachers in primary education per 1000 individuals 320 1.9644 0.7093
Teachers in middle education per 1000 individuals 320 1.3684 0.7543
Teachers in secondary education per 1000 individuals 320 1.5132 0.7055
Male teachers in primary education per 1000 individuals 320 1.4218 0.5998
Female teachers in primary education per 1000 individuals 320 0.5433 0.4083
Male teachers in middle education per 1000 individuals 320 0.9383 0.4661
Female teachers in middle education per 1000 individuals 320 0.4305 0.3590
Male teachers in secondary education per 1000 individuals 320 1.0603 0.3692
Female teachers in secondary education per 1000 individuals 320 0.4533 0.4018
Primary schools per 1000 individuals 480 0.747 0.3133
Middle schools per 1000 individuals 480 0.195 0.1132
Secondary schools per 1000 individuals 416 0.0903 0.0329
Variable (Other Public Goods) Obs. Mean Sd
Km of surfaced roads per km2 252 0.2729 0.2606
Number of beds in hospitals and dispensaries per 1000 individuals 263 0.7746 0.4345
Number of dispensaries per 1000 individuals 251 0.0295 0.0284
Number of hospitals per 1000 individuals 323 0.0116 0.0133
Variable (Laws) Obs. Mean Sd
Land reforms 416 3.2115 2.6295
Hindu succession law 560 0.1286 0.3350
Variable (Expenditure-defined as a fraction of total expenditure) Obs. Mean Sd
Total expenditure in the state per capita 448 13.444 13.9238
Share of total expenditure devoted to capital investment 448 0.2503 0.0819
Development expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 446 0.6092 0.0645
Non-Development expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 442 0.2423 0.0765
Social expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 444 0.3069 0.0490
Economic expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 444 0.2987 0.0734
Education expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 447 0.1597 0.0352
Health expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 448 0.059 0.0200
Family Welfare expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 329 0.0082 0.0033
Water Supply and Sanitation expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 210 0.0266 0.0158
Housing expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 427 0.0059 0.0039
Welfare of SC/STs expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 250 0.0188 0.0151
Social Security and Welfare expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 336 0.0213 0.0152
Agriculture expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 424 0.0836 0.0452
Industry and Minerals expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 421 0.0173 0.0098
Transport and Communications expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 168 0.0534 0.0298
General Economic Services expenditure (both revenue and capital as a fraction of total expenditure) 425 0.0158 0.0175
Variable (Other controls) Obs. Mean Sd
Real net state domestic product per capita 522 0.1234 0.0518
Fraction of the population that is rural 560 0.7698 0.0804
Grants received from the central government per capita (in real terms) 536 0.4269 0.6949
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Table 4.3 Differences in State Characteristics according to Female Political Representation
Female Representation Above Median
Variable Obs Mean [95% Conf.Interv] Obs Mean [95% Conf.Interv]
F. Literacy rate 220 26.57 24.58 28.56 166 26.01 23.76 28.27
M. Literacy rate 220 55.35 53.54 57.16 166 54.53 52.68 56.38
Infant mortality rate 97 93.81 87.57 100.06 115 94.02 88.33 99.71
Gini 241 29.44 28.91 29.96 189 29.55 29.04 30.05
Newspaper circ. Pc 264 0.06 0.05 0.07 232 0.06 0.05 0.07
women as % voters 224 0.58 0.56 0.59 228 0.58 0.56 0.6
turnout 279 0.63 0.62 0.64 281 0.63 0.61 0.64
Female Representation Below Median
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Table 4.4 : Probability of Women Winning In Close Elections against Men
Dependent variable: proportion of women who won in a close election against a man per state
All general SC/ST
1 2 3
Turnout 0.0258 0.1078 -0.0602
[0.0375] [0.0912] [0.2203]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Congress -0.0769 0.9668 -2.1759
[0.5479] [1.3294] [3.2103]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Hard Left 0.2743 3.4327 -2.1599
[1.4046] [3.4082] [8.2300]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Soft Left 0.5939 -3.0082 2.1278
[1.6335] [3.9637] [9.5714]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Hindu -0.1605 -0.2920 0.7617
[0.1516] [0.3678] [0.8882]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Regional -0.0568 0.0143 -0.1724
[0.1938] [0.4702] [1.1355]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Janata -0.0037 0.0377 0.2259
[0.1450] [0.3519] [0.8499]
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Others -0.4862 -1.1208 1.5350
[0.4809] [1.1668] [2.8176]
Porportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 35.1162 120.4467 -118.0462
[34.7117] [84.2278] [203.3920]
Political competition in the state -0.4242 -1.4727 1.1823
[0.9766] [2.3697] [5.7223]
Proportion of seats that had close elections in the past 8.4983 16.7611 -41.3098
[11.2641] [27.3324] [66.0017]
Proportion of seats won by women in the past -1.0359 3.4677 -17.9777
[4.7389] [11.4989] [27.7673]
Literacy rate -0.0784 -0.1298 -0.0538
[0.1084] [0.2629] [0.6349]
Observations 41 41 41
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7255 -0.1887 -4.4577
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Table 4.5 : State Characteristics: Men Contesting against Women and Women Contesting against Men in Close Elections
All
Seats
SC/ST
Seats
General
Seats
Difference in the proportion of seats won by women in elections that were not close -0.0036 0.0345 -0.0051
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0047] [0.0184] [0.0034]
Difference in the number of female candidates per seat -0.0457 -0.03418 -0.07148
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0413] [0.0521] [0.0443]
Difference in male turnout 0.1015 -0.00403 -0.13997
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.1136] [0.0255] [0.1268]
Difference in female turnout 0.0619 -0.00448 -0.15113
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0994] [0.0375] [0.1101]
Difference in the proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST -0.0122 0.0010 -0.0167
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0160] [0.0240] [0.0171]
Difference in newspaper circulation per capita -0.00314 -0.00372 -0.01287
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0115] [0.0096] [0.0128]
Difference in real net state domestic product per capita -0.0025 -0.00283 -0.00481
(States in which more men than women won in close elections compared to States in which more women than men won) [0.0122] [0.0179] [0.0134]
Number of state-elections 90 39 81
Table 4.6 : State Characteristics:States who Had more and less Close Elections 
between women and men
(Difference between states with more and less close elections than the median)
Urban population
Male literacy rate
Female literacy rate
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST
Female turnout
Male turnout
Newspaper circulation per capita 
Proportion of seats won by Congress 
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left 
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left 
Proportion of seats won Regional 
Proportion of seats won Hindu 
Proportion of seats won Janata 
Number of state-elections
All
Seats
0.0044
[0.0141]
1.4583
[2.6901]
-0.69783
[3.1047]
-0.0060
[0.0136]
0.0520
[0.0716]
0.0786
[0.0809]
-0.0094
[0.0088]
0.0657
[0.0435]
0.0095
[0.0261]
0.0008
[0.0070]
-0.0182
[0.0401]
-0.01799
[0.0243]
0.0031
[0.0362]
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Table 4.7 : Schools
Dependent variable: number of schools per 1000 individuals
PANEL A: OLS
1
OLS
primary
schools
2
OLS
middle
schools
3
OLS
secondary
schools
4
OLS
primary
schools
5
OLS
middle
schools
6
OLS
secondary
schools
Fraction of seats won by a woman 
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman
0.1645
[0.1548]
-0.1286
[0.1002]
-0.2023**
[0.0981]
0.5693
[0.4766]
0.1123
[0.1543]
0.1849**
[0.0771]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman 
Controls yes yes yes
0.1122
[0.1571]
yes
0.1472**
[0.0739]
yes
0.0346
[0.0319]
yes
Observations
R-squared
464
0.99
464
0.99
400
0.98
464
0.99
464
0.99
400
0.98
PANEL B: 2SLS
Dependent variable: number of schools per 1000 individuals
1
2SLS
primary
schools
2
2SLS
middle
schools
3
2SLS
secondary
schools
4
2SLS
primary
schools
5
2SLS
middle
schools
6
2SLS
secondary
schools
Fraction of seats won by a woman 0.3188
[0.6138]
0.1358
[0.1586]
0.1902*
[0.1052]
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 2.9174*
[1.5603]
0.1902
[0.3626]
0.4146
[0.2666]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman 0.2756
[0.4127]
0.3076**
[0.1338]
0.1292*
[0.0697]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations
R-squared
464
0.99
464
0.99
400
0.98
464
0.99
464
0.99
400
0.98
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and electoral year are reported between parentheses. •  Significant at the 10%, *• 
significant at the 5%, • • •  significant at the 1%. Panel A shows OLS regressions. Panel B shows 2SLS regressions in which the 
fraction o f  seats in the state won by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction o f  seats in the 
state won by  a  woman, both in aggregate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I also include as 
a control the fraction o f  seats in the state that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those 
in which the w inner won the runner up by less than 3.5% o f votes. . Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as 
other controls like the fraction o f  seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction o f  reserved seats, the fraction o f  rural 
population, grants received from the central government, real per capita net state domestic product, a  dummy for the year before 
the elections took place and state specific tim e trends.
135
Table 4.8 : Teachers
Dependent variable: number of teachers per 1000 individuals
PANEL A: OLS
1
OLS
primary
2
OLS
middle
3
OLS
secondary
4
OLS
primary
5
OLS
middle
6
OLS
secondary
Fraction of seats won by a woman 
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman
0.1980
[0.9414]
1.2165**
[0.5339]
2.0107***
[0.5471]
4.2659
[4.0484]
-1.1230
[1.4628]
1.4826
[1.6394]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman 
Controls yes yes yes
-0.3571
[1.1532]
yes
1.5357**
[0.6100]
yes
2.0827***
[0.5791]
yes
Observations
R-squared
304
0.83
304
0.99
304
0.98
304
0.83
304
0.99
304
0.98
PANEL B: 2SLS
Dependent variable: number of teachers per 1000 individuals
1
2SLS
primary
2
2SLS
middle
3
2SLS
secondary
4
2SLS
primary
5
2SLS
middle
6
2SLS
secondary
Fraction of seats won by a woman 9.0287**
[4.4384]
0.4582
[1.068]
1.8799
[1.5573]
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 41.4268*
[21.4501]
-4.6086
[3.5008]
6.1604
[5.3886]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman -3.3546
[3.9788]
2.7857***
[0.8222]
2.4712**
[0.9994]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations
R-squared
304
0.8
304
0.99
304
0.98
304
0.78
304
0.98
304
0.98
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and electoral year are reported between parentheses. *  Significant at the 10%, • •  
significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Panel A  shows OLS regressions. Panel B shows 2SLS regressions in which the 
fraction o f  seats in the state won by  a woman in a close election against a m an is used to instrument the fraction o f  seats in the 
state won by  a  woman, both in aggregate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I also include as 
a  control the fraction o f  seats in the state that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those 
in which the winner w on the runner up by less than 3.5%  o f  votes. . Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as 
other controls like the fraction o f  seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction o f  reserved seats, the fraction o f  rural 
population, grants received from the central government, real per capita net state domestic product, a dummy for the year before 
the elections took place and state specific time trends.
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Table 4.9 : Male and Female Teachers
Dependent variable: number of teachers per 1000 individuals
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
primary primary middle middle secondary secondary primary primary middle middle secondary secondary
male female male female male female male female male female male female
teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers teachers
Fraction of seats won by a woman 2.9372 6.0476** 0.0475 0.3881 1.3399 0.5294
[1.9795] [3.028] [0.7219] [0.5087] [1.0966] [0.6965]
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 7.7777* 33.1645* -4.0883 -0.7473 4.446 1.5319
[4.3408] [19.0408] [2.607] [1.6647] [3.8131] [1.8698]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman -1.2762 -1.9804 1.6648*** 1.1686** 1.3265* 1.1946***
[1.3333] [3.4635] [0.5480] [0.4586] [0.6829] [0.4323]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
R-squared 0.94 0.57 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.57 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
Robust standucl errors clustered at the state and electoral year are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 1 * • * '  
significant at the S%, significant at the 1 All columns are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of~ seats in the * taste -wen
by as woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction o f seats in the state -wen fey m woman, both in 
aggregate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I  also include m m  a control the fraction o f seats 
in the a teste that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the 
runner up fey leas than 3 o f votes. . Regressions include as tastes and year fixed effects, me well as other controls like the fraction
o f  seats won fey each political party grouping* the fraction o f reserved seats, the fraction o f rural population, grants received from 
the contrail government, real per capita net a teste domestic product, a duntmy fox* the year* before the elections to ole place and state 
specific time trends.
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Table 4.10 : Other Public Goods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
surfaced beds in hospitals dispensaries surfaced beds in hospitals dispensaries
roads hospitals and per 1000 per 1000 roads hospitals and per 1000 per 1000
km dispensaries ind ind km dispensaries ind ind
Fraction of seats won by a woman 0.4414 5.2748** -0.0093 0.3019
[0.8054] [2.2032] [0.0491] [0.2073]
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 1.2166 11.0469** 0.0308 0.9488
[1.3254] [4.7363] [0.1118] [0.7944]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman -0.4959 1.9709 -0.0435 0.0994
[1.2355] [1.5827] [0.0585] [0.1782]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 240 263 322 251 240 263 322 251
R-squared 0.99 0.94 0.9 0.87 0.99 0.95 0.9 0.87
Robust standard ei 101 u  clustered at the state and electoral year are reported between parentheses. m Significant at the 10%, 
significant at the 5%, significant at the 1%. All column* are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of seats in the state won
by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of* seats in the state -won by a woman, both in 
a88tegate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction of* seats 
in the state that had close elections between -women and men. Close elections are defined as those in 'which the -winner -won the 
runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. . Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as other controls lilce the fVaction 
of* seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of* reserved seats, the fraction of* rural population, grants received from 
the central government, real per capita net state domestic product, a dummy for the year before the elections took place and state 
specific time trends.
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Table 4.11: Laws
Dependent variables: Land Reforms and Hindu Succession Law
1 2  3 4
Land reform Hindu success. Land reform Hindu success. 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Fraction of seats won by a woman 0.2714 4.1493
[5.7694] [2.5551]
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 25.0290** 17.0208*
[12.5278] [9.1027]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman -6.0599* -0.9635
[3.2303] [1.6065]
Controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 400 505 400 505
R-squared 0.98 0.79 0.97 0.74
Robust standard errors clustered at die state and electoral year are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** 
significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. All columns are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction o f seats in the state won 
by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction o f seats in the state won by a woman, both in 
aggregate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction o f seats 
in the state that had close elections between women and men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the 
numer up by less than 3.5% of votes.. Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as other controls like the flection 
of seats won by each political party grouping, the flection o f reserved seats, the fraction of rural population, grants received from 
the central government, real per capita net state domestic product, a dummy for the year before the elections took place and state 
specific time trends.
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Table 4.12 : Expenditure Measures: Broad Classification
Dependent variable: expenditure category as a fraction of total expenditure
1
2SLS
Total
expenditure
(logpc)
2
2SLS 
Share of 
Capital 
expenditure
3 4 
2SLS 2SLS
Share o f Share of 
Dev Non-Dev 
expenditure expenditure
5
2SLS
Share of 
Social 
expenditure
6 7 
2SLS 2SLS
Share of Total 
Economic expenditure 
expenditure (log pc)
8
2SLS 
Share of 
Capital 
expenditure
9
2SLS
Share of 
Dev 
expenditure
10
2SLS
Share of 
Non-Dev 
expenditure
11
2SLS
Share of 
Social 
expenditure
12
2SLS
Share of 
Economic 
expenditure
Fraction of seats 
Fraction of seats
won by a woman -0.0121 
[0.0332]
won by a SC/ST woman
-0.1800
[0.5762]
1.0054*
[0.5813]
0.6455
[0.4768]
0.2584
[0.3877]
0.7373
[0.5322]
0.0111
[0.0785]
-0.4902
[0.8302]
2.3740*
[1.3585]
1.6479
[1.0526]
0.3796
[0.6803]
1.8693
[1.6415]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman 0.0188
[0.0359]
0.4956
[0.6121]
0.2001
[0.5451]
0.2299
[0.3824]
-0.5913**
[0.2969]
1.0058***
[0.3786]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations
R-squared
410
0.96
410
0.82
408
0.67
404
0.79
406
0.73
406
0.77
410
0.96
410
0.80
408
0.65
404
0.80
406
0.73
406
0.74
Robust standard errors clustered at the state and electoral year ere reported between parentheses. m Significant at the 10%, 
significant at the 5%, significant at the 1 .All columns are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of seats in the state won
by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of seats in the state 'won by a woman, both in 
aggregate and for SC/ST and general politicians separately. For these regressions I also include as a control the fraction of seats 
in the state that had close elections between 'women and men. dose  elections are defined as those in which the winner won the 
runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. . Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as other controls lilce the fraction 
of seats -won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of rural population, grants received from 
the central government, real per capita net state domestic product, a dummy for the year before the elections took place and state 
specific time trends.
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Table 4.13 : Expenditure Measures; Detailed Classification
PANEL A: FEMALE REPRESENTATION
Dependent variable: expenditure category as a fraction of total expenditure
1
2SLS
Education
2
2SLS
Health
3 4 
2SLS 2SLS 
Family welf. Water sup.
5
2SLS
Housing
6 7 8 9 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
SC/ST welf Soc. secur. Agriculture Ind. miner.
10
2SLS
Transport
11
2SLS
Gen..ec.serv.
Fraction of seats won by a woman 0.2342
[0.1989]
0.0244
[0.1429]
0.0821
[0.0697]
-0.0982
[0.1083]
-0.1130*
[0.0652]
-0.0434
[0.2135]
-0.1559
[0.1412]
-0.3358
[0.6312]
0.118
[0.0830]
-0.0565
[0.4160]
0.0622
[0.2282]
Observations
R-squared
410
0.84
410
0.83
291
0.64
181
0.84
389
0.49
214
0.91
302
0.69
387
0.65
385
0.74
168
0.9
387
0.47
PANEL B: SC/ST AND GENERAL FEMALE REPRESENTATION
Dependent variable: expenditure category as a fraction of total expenditure
1
2SLS
Education
2
2SLS
Health
3 4 
2SLS 2SLS 
Family welf Water sup.
5
2SLS
Housing
6 7 
2SLS 2SLS 
SC/ST welf Soc. secur.
8
2SLS
Agriculture
9
2SLS 
Ind. miner.
10
2SLS
Transport
11
2SLS
Gen..ec.serv.
Fraction of seats won by a SC/ST woman 0.0609
[0.3057]
0.0252
[0.2138]
0.0357
[0.0935]
0.1381
[0.2135]
-0.0651
[0.095]
-0.2444
[0.2966]
-0.5840**
[0.2916]
0.5215
[0.6965]
0.203
[0.1543]
-0.1418
[3.6049]
0.7654
[0.5057]
Fraction of seats won by a general woman -0.1056
[0.1509]
-0.0918
[0.1295]
0.0272
[0.0286]
-0.2041
[0.1664]
-0.0545**
[0.0268]
0.1222
[0.1356]
-0.08
[0.1777]
0.3203
[0.3892]
0.0809
[0.0625]
0.2367
[1.3491]
-0.1235
[0.1631]
Observations 410 410 291 181 389 214 302 387 385 168 387
R-squared____________________________________0.86 0.83 0.72 0.82 0.61 0.91 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.9 0.43
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Results obtained in this PhD thesis show that the legislator’s identity matters for policy, 
and that politicians tend to favour individuals who share their same identity in policy 
making.
Results in the first substantive chapter of this PhD thesis show that the identity of 
the legislator affects educational outcomes. Female politicians have a larger effect than 
male politicians on the education received by individuals living in urban areas, while 
this is not the case for those living in rural areas. By increasing female representation in 
the district by 10 percentage points, the probability that an individual attains primary 
education in an urban area increases by 6 percentage points, which accounts for 8% 
of the total probability that an individual obtains primary education in urban areas. 
A possible explanation for these results is that if both female and male politicians 
implement their own preferences when they are in power, it is then reasonable to assume 
that these politicians will care about the needs of those who share their identity. Thus, 
if female politicians care about empowering those who share their identity, then they 
would choose to invest in education in urban areas as returns for women are higher 
there than in rural areas and hence demand for women’s education is higher.
Results in the second substantive chapter show that politicians favour those who share 
their identity in policymaking. The analysis focuses on reservations for Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes and on female political representation and analyses their effects on 
the probability that individuals who share the same identity as the politicians attain 
primary education. This chapter finds that female politicians tend to increase girls’
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education in urban areas. SC/ST female politicians favour girls and the SC/ST individ­
uals, while general female politicians favour girls and general individuals. In contrast, 
it finds that reservation for SC/STs has a negative impact on the education received 
by SC/ST citizens. However, this result is reversed when there are a large number of 
SC/ST individuals living in the district. A possible explanation for this is that SC/ST 
politicians will favour more their own group if they are a significant proportion of the 
electorate, as their seats are reserved and they do not compete on caste issues against 
other candidates.
Results thus indicate that the identity of the legislator has an effect both on educational 
outcomes and on who receives education in the districts where these legislators were 
elected, however educational policies are decided at the state level. The third substan­
tive chapter shows how politicians’gender and caste had an impact on state policies. 
Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe female legislators favour investments on primary 
education, and beds in hospitals and dispensaries. They favour “women-friendly” laws, 
such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, proposed to give women the same 
inheritance rights as men. They also favour pro-poor redistributive policies such as land 
reforms. In contrast, general female legislators oppose redistributive policies such as 
land reforms, do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, invest in high tiers of 
education and reduce social expenditure. In summary, results in this chapter also show 
that SC/ST and general female legislators tend to favour their groups when deciding 
which policies to implement.
Results in this PhD thesis show that female political representation in India has had 
an effect on policies chosen and on the education received by citizens who lived in 
the districts where they were elected. It also shows how both the gender and caste 
of the politicians matter for policy determination. The fink between the politicians’ 
identity and development may have important policy implications. This is especially 
the case regarding the women reservation bill debate, as results in this thesis show that 
both gender and caste of the legislators matter for policy determination and for who is 
affected by those policies.
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Data Appendix
Electoral data:
Collected from different volumes of the Statistical Reports on the General Elections to 
the Legislative Assemblies. The election commission of India publishes one report for 
every election in each state. There is data at the constituency level for the 16 main 
states in India for elections held during 1967-2001.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by women: defined as the total number of seats 
in which a woman won the election in the district divided by the total number of seats 
in the district. Then three years averages for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by women: defined as the total number of seats 
in which a woman won the election in the state divided by the total number of seats in 
the state. This variable is lagged one period.
-Proportion of seats reserved for SC /ST in the district: defined as the total number 
of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the district divided by the total 
number of seats in the district. Then three years averages for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats reserved for SC /ST in the state: defined as the total number of 
seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the state divided by the total number 
of seats. This variable is lagged one period.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by SC/ST and general female politicians: defined 
as the total number of seats won by Scheduled Castes and Tribe female politicians 
divided by the total number of seats in the district or the total number of seats won 
by general female politicians divided by the total number of seats in the district. Then
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three years averages are taken.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by SC/ST and general female politicians: defined 
as the total number of seats won by Scheduled Castes and Tribe female politicians 
divided by the total number of seats in the state or the total number of seats won 
by general female politicians divided by the total number of seats in the state. This 
variable is lagged one period.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by women in a close election against a man: 
defined as the number of women in the district who won by less than 3.5% of votes 
against a man over the total number of seats in the district. Then three years averages 
for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by women in a close election against a man: 
defined as the number of women in the state who won by less than 3.5% of votes 
against a man over the total number of seats in the state. This variable is then lagged 
one period.
-Proportion of seats in the district in which a man and a woman contested in a close 
election: defined as the number of men and women in the district who won by less than 
3.5% of votes against a candidate of the other gender over the total number of seats in 
the district. Then three years averages for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats in the state in which a man and a woman contested in a close 
election: defined as the number of men and women in the state who won by less than 
3.5% of votes against a candidate of the other gender over the total number of seats in 
the state. This variable is then lagged one period.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by SC /ST women in a close election against a 
SC /ST man: defined as the number of SC/ST women in the district who won by less 
than 3.5% of votes against a SC/ST man over the total number of seats in the district. 
Then three years averages for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by SC/ST women in a close election against a 
SC /ST man: defined as the number of SC/ST women in the state who won by less 
than 3.5% of votes against a SC/ST man over the total number of seats in the state. 
This variable is then lagged one period.
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-Proportion of seats in the district won by general women in a close election against a 
general man: defined as the number of general women in the district who won by less 
than 3.5% of votes against a general man over the total number of seats in the district. 
Then three years averages for each district are computed.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by general women in a close election against a 
general man: defined as the number of general women in the state who won by less 
than 3.5% of votes against a general man over the total number of seats in the state. 
This variable is then lagged one period.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by each political party: number of seats won 
by the political party divided by total seats in the district. Then three years averages 
for each district are computed. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, 
Indian National Congress Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left 
parties include the Communist Party of India and Communist. Party of India Marxist. 
Soft Left parties include Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties 
include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. Hindu parties include the Bharatiya 
Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana Parishad, Jammu 
&; Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali Dal and 
other state specific parties.
-Proportion of seats in the state won by each political party: number of seats won 
by the political party divided by total seats in the state. Then three years averages 
for each district are computed. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, 
Indian National Congress Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left 
parties include the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist. 
Soft Left parties include Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties 
include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. Hindu parties include the Bharatiya 
Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana Parishad, Jammu 
& Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali Dal and 
other state specific parties.
NSS Data:
55th Round of the National Sample Survey Organization Data. Household Schedule 
10: Employment and Unemployment. The survey was conducted in India between July 
1999 and June 2000. I use the questions asked to individual members of each household.
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-Primary education attainment: There is a question that classifies individuals according 
to whether they are illiterate, literate through attending non-formal education courses 
or adult education centers, literate through the Total Literacy Campaign or other pro­
grammes, literate below primary education, individuals who achieved primary educa­
tion and individuals who achieved middle, secondary, higher secondary or graduate 
education. I then create a variable that is equal to one if the individual obtained 
primary or a higher level of education
-Gender: Question about gender. I create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
individual is a woman.
- Caste: Question about the individual’s social group. Dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the respondent belongs to Scheduled Castes or Tribes.
-Religion: Question about the individual’s religion. Dummy variables that are equal to 
one if the respondent is Muslim or Hindu, respectively.
-Migration: Question about the last usual residence. There are various possibilities: 
same district (urban/rural), same state but another district (rural/urban), another 
state (urban/rural) and another country. There is another question about the period 
in years since the individual left the last usual residence.
-Workers: Individuals older than 15 who are employed according to ’’Usual Activity 
Status” defined by the NSS. I create a variable that is equal to one if the individual 
falls in this category and zero otherwise.
-Non-agricultural workers: Classified according to NIC code of the ’’Usual Activity 
Status”. Workers (as before) who did not work in the primary sector. I create a 
dummy equal to one if the individual works in the secondary or tertiary sectors and 
zero if the individual works in the primary sector.
- Wages: Wages received for the work done during the reference week as reported by 
the respondent. Includes wages in kind and in cash.
Demographics:
Data from 1961-1991 were obtained from the Indian district database created by Van- 
neman and Barnes. Data from the Indian Census 2001 comes from the webpage “Ed­
ucation For All in India”.
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-Data on male and female literacy rates: literate males (and females) older than 5 over 
total population of males (and females) older than 5 in the district.
-Data on SC /ST population: number of SC/ST individuals over the total population 
in the district.
-Data on female population: number of women over total population in the district.
-Data on urban population: number of individuals living in urban areas over total 
population in the district.
-Data on rural population in the state: obtained from the Indian Census.
-Data on total population in the state: obtained from the Indian Census.
President’s rule:
Collected from Arora (1990), Kumar Sethy (2003) and web pages of the State Gov­
ernments in India. Data on the number of months with President’s rule per State and 
year.
Educational variables:
From the publication “Education in India”. I am grateful to Tim Besley and Robin 
Burgess for sharing their data with me.
-Data on schools:: defined as the number of primary, middle and secondary schools in 
the state divided by the total population in 000.
-Data on teachers: defined as the number of male and female primary, middle and 
secondary school teachers in the state divided by the total population in 000.
Other public goods:
Obtained from the Tim Besley and Robin Burgess database, I thank them for letting 
me use their data.
-Roads: Variable defined as the kilometers of surfaced road in the state divided by the 
area of the state. Data on roads can be found in various issues of the Reserve Bank of 
India Report on Currency and Finance.
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-Hospitals: Variable defined as the total number of hospitals in the state divided by 
the total population in 000.
-Beds in hospitals and dispensaries: Variable defined as the total number of beds in 
hospitals and dispensaries in the state divided by the total population in 000.
--Dispensaries:Variable defined as the total number of dispensaries in the state divided 
by the total population in 000.
Expenditure:
Collected from different monthly bulletins of the Reserve Bank of India. Some of 
the Revenue Expenditure data was updated from the Tim Besley and Robin Burgess 
database.
-Data on Total expenditure: refers to Total Revenue Expenditure plus Total Capital 
Disbursements for every state and year.
-Data on each one of the expenditure categories: refers to the total amount spent in the 
Capital budget plus the total amount spent in the Revenue budget on that particular 
category, divided by Total Expenditure.
Public finance:
Obtained from the Tim Besley and Robin Burgess database.
-Data on Real Per Capita Net State Domestic Product: Net State Domestic Product 
deflated with the deflator described below and divided by the total population in the 
state.
-Data on Real Grants Received from the Government per Capita: Grants received by 
the state from the central government deflated with the deflator described below and 
divided by total population in the state.
-Deflator: Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) and the Con­
sumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW). The reference period used is Octo­
ber 1973-March 1974
Laws
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-Land reforms: Obtained from the Tim Besley and Robin Burgess database. For more 
details refer to: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp
-Hindu Succession Law: Obtained from: The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) 
Act, 1975, The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act 1986,The Hindu 
Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1989, The Hindu Succession (Maharashtra 
Amendment) Act 1994, The Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act 1994. This 
variable is equal to one if there has been a “pro-women” amendment in the state and 
zero otherwise.
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Appendix
In India there is a uniform structure of school education, although within the States 
and Union Territories there are differences in the number of years constituting primary, 
middle and secondary education.
The primary stage consists of classes I-V, in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh 
and West Bengal.1 On the other hand, it consists of classes I-IV in Assam, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra.
The middle stage consists of classes VI-VIII in Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
Classes V-VII in Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra. And classes 
VI-VII in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.
The secondary stage consists of classes IX-X in Bihar, Haryana, Jammu &; Kashmir, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
And classes VIII-X in Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh and Orissa.
The minimum age for admission in the first class of the primary stage is 5 or 6 years 
of age, depending on the State or Union Territory. The majority of States and Union 
Territories have established free education, however, in some States education is not 
free for classes IX and above.2
1 Among others. Only the 16 main states in India are considered in this study.
2The highest annual fee is Rs. 360 in Meghalaya, when the lowest is Rs. 48 in Assam. Mean annual 
household income lies arund Rs. 34551.
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